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THE FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

by

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THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

W. R. Graham

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the various steps in the formation of the League of Arab States. This paper does not go beyond the formation of the League.

The actual steps in the formation of the League began with the consultations in Egypt, initiated by al-Nahhās Pasha, in which he invited the representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen to individual consultations, for the purpose of seeking their opinions in regard to forming an Arab union. The minutes of these consultations are incorporated into this thesis in their entirety.

The next step on the road to the formation of the League was the calling of a Preparatory Committee, which met in Alexandria from 25 September to 7 October 1944, and culminated with the issuance of the Protocol of Alexandria. A summary of the minutes of these meetings is included in this thesis also.

The final steps are a series of conferences, the purpose of which was to execute the Protocol of Alexandria and actually form a League. The conferences were: the Political Branch Committee, which met from 14 February to 3 March 1945; the Preparatory Committee, which met on 17 and 19 March 1945; and the final conference which was the General Arab Conference which met on 22 March 1945. At the first conference of this series Iraq and Lebanon each submitted a proposed draft of the League. They were then combined into a draft Pact of the League, and this was then made into the final Pact of the League by the Preparatory Committee. At the conference on 22 March 1945 which is called the General Arab Conference,

the final Pact was signed.

After an analysis of the actual minutes of the conferences, and other materials that were available, which included two visits to the Headquarters of the League of Arab States, the author came to the conclusion that the League of Arab States, is actually a looser organization than was envisioned in the Protocol of Alexandria. The League is a very loose knit regional arrangement with each member state represented equally, and each state represented has the power of veto over any proposal accepted by the majority. The League in its final form represents the greatest extent of cooperation between the Arab States at the time of its formation.

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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

On the 24th of July 1908 the Committee of Union and Progress, through a military revolution, forced on 'Abdul-Hamid a constitution. The Arabs thought this was the answer to their prayers. Censorship was abolished, and all political prisoners were released. A group of Arabs formed a society, known as the Ottoman Arab Fraternity, with the main objects being to protect the constitution, unite all races in loyalty to the Sultan, promote the welfare of the Arab provinces on a footing of real equality with the other races of the empire, spread education in the Arabic tongue and foster the observance of Arab customs.¹

However when the first elections for the new parliament were held the Arabs received very little representation in proportion to their numbers. Out of a total of 245 representatives, only 60 were Arabs.² The purpose of the Young Turks, as they became known, was basically reform. This reform took the nature of a Turanian movement much to the forlorn of the Arabs. Needless to say this caused a reaction among the leading Arabs of the time. Certain societies or

1. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening. p. 102.

2. Ibid.. p. 104.

clubs were started for the purpose of expressing the rights of the Arabs, of which one of the most important was Jam'iyat al-'Arabiyah al'Fatat, better known simply as Al-Fatat (The Young Arab Society).³ Dr. Zeine, in regard to this organization, stated: "No other society had played as determining a part in the history of the national movement. ... The purpose of the society was, politically, to obtain Arab independence within the framework of a bi-racial Ottoman Empire, Arab and Turk, on lines similar to the Austro-Hungarian Empire."⁴

With the outbreak of hostilities of World War I the Allies found it necessary to make certain wartime agreements to receive the support of various groups. One of the first of these was a series of correspondence conducted over an eight month period by Sharif Husayn and Sir Henry McMahon, the first British High Commissioner for Egypt. This correspondence, which became known as the Husay-McMahon Correspondence, led Sharif Husayn to understand that for Arab assistance in the course of the war, the Arab territories, then held by the Turks, would become independent at the conclusion of the war. This correspondence ultimately led to the "Arab Revolt" which assisted the Allied Armies in not a small way.⁵

Next came the Sykes-Picot Agreement in which Britain and France divided up the Arab lands between themselves, that were still under the Ottomans, and to which Russia agreed to, for a claim at territory in

3. For a listing of the others see: Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism. p. 80.

4. Ibid.. pp. 80-81.

5. Antonius, op. cit.. pp. 413-427.

northeastern Anatolia.⁶ It is interesting to note that this agreement came just a few months after the Husayn-McMahon correspondence had been completed.

Then on 2 November 1917, came the Balfour Declaration stating:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

Husayn eventually found out about the last two agreements, but any fears that he had, the British reassured him that the pledges they had made to him would be kept.

The end of World War I and the beginning of the peace conferences found that the above three instruments did exist, and it is obvious that they are in conflict with each other. Britain tried to reconcile her promises between the Arabs and the Zionists, but France insisted on implementation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. President Wilson sent a commission to the area to find out the desire of the people - known as the King-Grane Commission - but as it was purely an American group nothing ever came of their report.

The final settlement came at the San Remo Conference in April of 1920, in which Iraq and Palestine were assigned to Britain, while Syria and Lebanon to France. The mandate for Palestine, which was approved by the League of Nations, incorporated the Balfour Declaration

6. Ibid., pp. 428-430.

7. J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. Vol. II, p. 26.

in it.

The mandate system proved to be a big compromise since it implied the idea of international control and, at the same time, "provisionally" recognized the independence of the former Turkish provinces. The basis for the mandate system was article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which in part states:

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.⁸

Following the First World War, the desire for which the Arab nationalists had been working, that of unity, was sadly thwarted and no longer seemed to be an attainable goal. With every Arab country falling, directly or indirectly, under foreign rule, the making of one Arab nation was made virtually impossible. As a result the Arab countries directed their efforts not towards the making of one Arab nation, but towards the attainment of its immediate independence. Independence certainly was a prerequisite step for any kind of unity.

The history of the Arab countries, between the two World Wars, for our purposes may be summed up as a struggle for independence by the individual Arab States in general, and the growing problem of the Jews in Palestine. Iraq attained her independence in 1932; Egypt nominally in 1922 and actually in 1936 with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in London. In Palestine the number of recorded Jewish immigrants was

8. Eugenie Elie Abouchdid, 30 Years of Lebanon and Syria (1917 - 1947), p. 29.

367,000 between the two wars.⁹ As the number of Jews increased in Palestine the possibility of finding a solution became more futile. Various commissions and delegations were sent to Palestine to seek a solution but all in vain. As tension mounted the Arabs decided to call a general strike in 1936. The British forces were increased to a total of about 20,000 and with a promise of a Royal Commission to investigate the Arabs claims, the Arabs finally went back to their work. When the Royal Commissions report was published in July 1937, it suggested a partition of Palestine into a Jewish and Arab State with a small area to be left in charge of the Mandatory.

Troubles mounted again. The British Government invited Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen to a Round Table Conference on Palestine to be held in the months of February-March 1939. Following the Conference, the British Government issued a statement of her policy in Palestine in a White Paper. The White Paper, though attacked bitterly by the Arabs on the ground that it did not meet all of their demands, was a definite change in the policy which Great Britain had hitherto followed in Palestine, a change that was intended to win the Arabs. The White Paper promised (a) to grant Palestine its independence at the end of ten years, (b) to restrict Jewish immigration, and (c) to control the sale of lands from Arabs to Jews. With respect to the second point the White Paper declared that "Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country"; and, "After the period of five years no

9. G. Moussa Dib, The Arab Bloc in the United Nations.
p. 18.

further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it."¹⁰ The legality of this White Paper was actually carried all the way to the Council of the League of Nations, but due to the outbreak of World War II, the question was never completely settled.

When World War II broke out it is not surprising that the Allies again wanted the assistance of the Arab countries. It is not surprising also that with all the broken promises of World War I, the Arab countries were not exactly eager to believe any new promises by the Allies. However after an outbreak in Iraq, in April 1941, against the British, it was felt that to keep the Arabs out of the arms of the Nazis it would be necessary to court the Arabs, through their one great hope, and that was Arab unity. Therefore Anthony Eden reflected his government's position when he announced on 29 May 1941:

...This country has a long tradition of friendship with the Arabs, a friendship that has been proved by deeds, not words alone. We have countless well-wishers among them, as they have many friends here. Some days ago I said in the House of Commons that his [sic] Majesty's Government had great sympathy with Syrian aspirations for independence. I should like to repeat that now. But I would go further. The Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.¹¹

On 8 June 1941, General Georges Catroux, in the name of General Charles de Gaulle, issued a proclamation to the Syrians and Lebanese

10. J.C.Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 100.

11. The Times, 30 May 1941.

declaring that Free France had granted independence both to the Syrians and Lebanon.¹² Thus the Arabs were promised independence by both the British and the French.

With this British approval, Emir Abdullah felt that he had received his chance to unify Greater Syria. He had repeatedly tried to put forth his ideas in the past, but they had gone unheeded. First off, he corresponded with certain leading Syrian politician, and in particular one Faris al-Khuri, a notable Christian Syrian and Arab nationalist. In his correspondence, Abdullah pointed out that since Syria had been promised her independence, now was the opportune time to strive for Syrian unity. He also stressed that his motives were national rather than personal, as he was willing to let the Syrian people decide whether they wanted a monarchical or republican form of government. As Syria was in a struggle for her independence, his efforts came to nothing.

Abdullah then addressed a public appeal in the form of a proclamation to the Syrian people to unite divisions of Syria which had been divided, after World War I as a result of the mandates. He reminded the people of the Arab revolt and the subsequent struggle for independence. He then concluded saying that, "at the same time we call upon those concerned with this question in Syria to discuss Syrian union or federation through the medium of a special Syrian Congress which they are welcome to convene at our capital at any time they so desire."¹³

In spite of Britain's previous statements regarding her desire

12. The Times. 9 June 1941.

13. King Abdullah, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan. ed. Philip P. Graves, p. 267.

to help the Arabs in their steps toward unity, both she and the Free French authorities would not allow the publication of Abdullah's proclamation in the newspapers or its announcement over the radio stations of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.¹⁴

The Greater Syria Scheme as advocated by Abdullah is explained in his memoirs. It is actually two schemes for the unity of Greater Syria. Both solutions considered mainly the unity of Syria, but the first did envisage the inclusion of Iraq, with a proviso that the other Arab countries may join if they so wish. The only substantial differences were whether the form of government should be a united state under a constitutional monarch or an Arab Federation. In either case Abdullah proposed himself as the head of the Syrian State.

In the first solution the formation of a United Syrian State was proposed. It would be composed of Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Lebanon according to the resolution of the General Syrian Congress of 1920. Special administrations would be set up in parts of Palestine and Lebanon for the safeguarding of the rights of the Jewish minority and the preservation of the Holy Places, and for the protection of the special rights of Lebanon. The Balfour Declaration would either be withdrawn or reinterpreted to maintain Palestine at a one-third Jew, two-thirds Arab ratio. After the Syrian States had been formed, Iraq and the United Syrian State would unite to form the Arab Federation which would organize the common defense, the general culture and the national economy of the two states.¹⁵

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid... p. 264.

The second solution was the foundation of a Syrian Federation composed of the states of Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Palestine with a generally elected Legislature, a Council of Representatives and the Prime Minister and his Cabinet elected from the Legislative body. In the event that Lebanon declined to join the federation then "those Syrian territories which had been attached to the Lebanon against the will of their inhabitants would be allowed to revert to Syria by free plebiscite."¹⁶

Abdullah gave five reasons that he should be head of the new state, they were:

1. His established legal rights in the principality of Transjordan, which is an important part of Greater Syria.
2. His past and present effective aid to the allied cause, which in the present (Second World) War included action in the Syrian theatre.
3. His being the foremost heir of his father, King Husayn, in guarding Arab rights in general and Syrian rights in particular.
4. The British government's promise to him, in 1921, through its (present) Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, to head the Syrian state, and the disappearance, through the fall of France and the loss of its legal representation of the League of Nations, of the obstacles which have hitherto stood in the way of the fulfilment of that promise, particularly that Britain has now gained freedom of action throughout all Syrian territories.
5. Syrian preference and desire for a constitutional monarchy, in the event the country is either unified or federated.

The Arab governments varied in their opinions about the plan.

Iraq supported it because it would extend and enlarge Hashimite power.

16. Ibid... p. 265.

17. Nabih Amin Faris and Mohammed Tawfik Husayn, The Crescent in Crisis. p. 79.

Syria and Lebanon rejected it and would have nothing to do with it. Egypt viewed it with disfavor, while Saudi Arabia attacked it most violently.¹⁸

The next serious proposal came from Iraq, and is known as General Nuri al-Sa'id's Fertile Crescent Scheme. Nuri al-Sa'id was Prime Minister of Iraq at the time he presented his ideas on Arab unity in December 1942.

A summary of his plan, taken from Hurewitz, are:

... the only hope of securing permanent peace, contentment and progress in these Arab areas is for the United Nations to declare now:

1. That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan shall be reunited into one State.

2. That the form of government of this State, whether monarchical or republican whether unitary or federal, shall be decided by the peoples of this State themselves.

3. That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria will adhere at once and which can be joined by the other Arab States at will.

4. That this Arab League shall have a permanent Council nominated by the member States, and presided over by one of the rulers of the States who shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned.

5. The Arab League Council shall be responsible for the following:

- a. Defence. b. Foreign Affairs. c. Currency
- d. Communications. e. Customs. f. Protection of Minority rights.

6. The Jews in Palestine shall be given semi-autonomy. They shall have the right to their own rural and urban district administration including schools, health institutes, and police subject to general supervision by the Syrian State.¹⁹

Nuri al-Sa'id then goes on to make certain plans in regard to Jerusalem and the guarantee that all religions would have free access to the city. Also, should the Maronites in Lebanon demand a privileged

18. Ibid., p. 80.

19. J.C.Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, p. 236.

regime, such as they possessed during the last years of the Ottoman Empire, they should have it.

Nuri Pasha sent his plan in December 1942, to Richard Casey, British minister of state for the Middle East, and in 1943 circulated it privately among Arab leaders. Nuri's action had Britain's full endorsement, and on February 24, 1943, Eden reiterated British support for a scheme of Arab unity. He stated when asked in the House of Commons whether any steps were being taken to promote a greater cooperation between the Arab states with a view to an ultimate Arab Federation: "Clearly the initiative ... would have to come from the Arabs themselves, and so far as I am aware no such scheme, which would command general approval, has yet been worked out."²⁰ He thus referred to the fact that Nuri's proposals were not universally accepted.

With this latest encouragement from the British, the Egyptian Prime Minister al-Nahhas Pasha decided to take the initiative in the field of Arab unity and try to see if this hope could be realized. On March 30, 1943 a statement was read on behalf of al-Nahhas, due to his absence, in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies in reply to an earlier question in regard to Arab unity. It stated that the Arab governments themselves should take the steps toward Arab unity, and that Egypt should take the initial steps by inviting the other Arab countries to come to Egypt and give their opinions in regard to Arab unity. Then if possible Egypt would call a General Arab Conference to try to reconcile these various opinions. Further, an official invitation had been sent to His Excellency Nuri al-Sa'id Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq,

20. George Kirk, The Middle East in the War 1939-1946, p. 336.

and later other invitations would be sent out to the other Arab governments, so that these preparatory discussions could get under way.²¹

Iraq accepted the invitation as did Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and each sent its representative to Egypt in turn. The following chapter is a translation of the summary of the minutes of these consultations as published by the League of Arab States.

21. Al-Ahram, 25 September 1944, see appendix 1 for complete statement.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE CONSULTATIONS WITH IRAQ, TRANSJORDAN, SAUDI ARABIAN KINGDOM, LEBANON, AND YEMEN.²²

- (1) Summary of the discussions which took place between His Excellency al-Nahhās Pasha and His Excellency Nūri al-Sa'id for the information of the members of the other Arab delegations.²³

SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE FIRST SESSION.

Opinions are exchanged in this session in a general way and

22. Author's translation of original document, published by the League of Arab States in Arabic-attached as appendix 2 - and also was published as a daily series in al-Hayāt from 31 March 1960 to 14 April 1960.
23. Nūri al-Sa'id, the Prime Minister of Iraq, stayed a few days in Lebanon on his way to Egypt. He discussed Arab unity with the various officials of Lebanon and then went on to Jerusalem. He then made a statement to the press that he was on his way to Cairo to discuss an Arab Federation, and the means of achieving this goal. Nūri arrived in Cairo on 23 July 1943, accompanied by Khālid Bey al-Shūrbaji. He met al-Nahhās Pasha of Egypt, twice in Cairo. Once at a reception party and the second time for an informal preparatory discussion which was held on 26 July 1943. It is these two meetings that lead certain authors to state that there were six sessions in Alexandria. Actually there were only four sessions and the first one was held in Alexandria on 31 July 1943, in Antoniadēs Palace. It is interesting to note that before Nūri left for Alexandria, he held a one hour conference with the Iranian ambassador to Egypt, Mahmūd Jam, on the same day that he met with al-Nahhās, on 26 July. Al-Ansār 20, 24, 27, and 31 July 1943; also see Lord Birdwood, Nuri As-Said, p. 195.

ended in the following manner:

The opinion was held that the project of cooperation for creating Arab unity be confined to the independent Arab countries, and these countries shall consult their national governments in this respect.

His Excellency al-Nahhās Pasha asked His Excellency Nuri al-Sa'īd to show the different aspects of this cooperation, and it was suggested that the cooperation in the various aspects will be as follows:

1. - Political cooperation which will include defence, foreign affairs and the protection of minorities.
2. - Economical cooperation which will include currency, communications, customs, and commercial exchange in general.
3. - Cultural and social cooperation which will include education and related matters, and legislation.

Then the discussion moved to see into what will be the instrument for realizing the cooperation, and will there be besides the regional governments for each nation, of the nations which participate in it, a central government which will be entrusted with the great important problems, and what will be the authority of this central government and its relationships with the regional governments. And what will be the situation if agreement is not reached between it and those governments; and will execution in one way or another be possible in this case, or will the matter remain confined merely to consultations, and the big important matters come to a standstill, as was the case in the League of Nations? Or will there be created an executive assembly composed of representatives of the Arab countries participating in the cooperation

and having a basic system for the assembly drawn up and approved by these countries and its decisions issued with an executive force within the scope of its jurisdiction.

After the exchange of opinions it was suggested to delay this subject until a coming session.

SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE SECOND SESSION.²⁴

The aspects of cooperation mentioned in the previous session were reviewed and it was decided that they would be satisfactory as mentioned.

It was suggested that His Excellency al-Nahhās Pasha would take charge of negotiating with the independent Arab countries through their national governments. As for the countries under military rule or under the mandate or that have no national government this will be left to him to choose the means through which he will consult their people in the manner he deems proper.

(2) SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE THIRD SESSION²⁵

In answer to a question directed to His Excellency Nūrī al-Sa'īd, he said, "that the alliance or union if its realization is possible can only be among the independent countries. And this will not prevent the alliance or any member in it from presenting all assistance possible to the Arab Nations without sovereignty. As for the case of representing the Arabs in the peace conference, it will be the Arab Conference that will decide the manner of their representation in the peace conference."

24. 1 August 1943, Antoniades Palace, Alexandria, Egypt.
Al-Anṣār. 3 August 1943.

25. 2 August 1943, Antoniades Palace, Alexandria, Egypt.
Ibid.

SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE FOURTH SESSION²⁶

The following question was directed to His Excellency Nūri al-Sa'id: "If Arab unity is achieved what will be the type of central government of the union?"

His Excellency answered: "the union of the Arab countries and the creation of a central government for all of them can not be realized under the present circumstances even though that is what we want, not only because of foreign difficulties but also because of the conditions of the Arab countries themselves and their own special problems, and their economic and cultural differences in addition to the difficulties mentioned in articles eight and nine. All of this makes it impossible to imagine one central government for all of them. To discuss this is a waste of time."

It was decided with the approval of the two bodies to eliminate the idea of one central government for all of them.

His Excellency Nūri al-Sa'id said the cooperation in the aspects mentioned previously will not be possible except in one of two ways:

The first way - The formation of a union with executive authority. This authority and the means of execution will be defined in a basic system accepted by the Arab States which want to enter into the union. The union will have an assembly in which the participating Arab countries will be represented in proportion to their population and budgets according to what is established in the by-laws of the union. The union will have a president elected or appointed according to the provisions of this system. He will be assisted by an executive committee in which

26. 4 August 1943, Antoniades Palace, Alexandria, Egypt.
Ibid. 4 August 1943.

the cooperation will be represented in political, economical, cultural and social aspects. This committee may seek assistance of experts and communicate directly with the ministries concerned in the Arab States participating in the union. The executive committee will be responsible to the assembly. Its decisions will have an executive force on the States participating in the union. And in this case each country will be obliged to execute the decisions even though the decisions are in conflict with the opinion of its representatives.

The second way - If the Arab States do not accept this type of union which will result in each one giving up part of its sovereignty and limiting the freedom of its actions and binding it with the decisions issued by the union even though they are in conflict with its opinion, there only remains to form the union on the basis that its decisions will not be binding except to those that accept them. Then the instrument of the union will be as was mentioned previously, and not in connection with the method of the representation of the states participating in the union. In the latter manner, there will be no place for difference in the proportion i.e., the states participating in the union will be equal in the number of their representatives.

Here His Excellency [al-Nahhās] made the observation that this last manner of cooperation very closely resembles the organization of American States concluded between the United States of America and the states of Central and South America. It should be observed that this last system set aside political cooperation completely and was confined (3) to the commercial, industrial, agricultural, social / and cultural aspects.

Then His Excellency explained the system of the Organization of

American States mentioned above and summarized it according to part two of the second year of the International Law magazine published in 1938. His Excellency added that if it is decided upon to form a union among the Arab Nations, whether according to the first way or the second way, and whether it includes political cooperation or sets it aside, the American system however may be made use of in drawing up the rules of organizing the Arab union.

It was decided that the choice between the two ways calls for consultations with the various Arab countries so this was left to His Excellency [al-Nahhās] to carry out.²⁷

27. In answer to a question earlier, asking Nuri when a General Arab Conference would be held, he stated: "H.E. al-Nahhās is the one who would send out the invitations for the holding of a General Arab Conference. No doubt he will send out these invitations at a suitable time after the conclusion of these individual discussions." Ibid., 27 July 1943.

Sample 1

UNION EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

(possessing executive authority in accordance with a basic system approved by the Arab States participating in the union)


Union Assembly

(formed in proportion to the populations and budgets of the countries participating in the union as established by the basic system)

President of the Union Assembly

(elected or appointed in accordance with the basic system)

The Executive Council of the Union



The branch of this executive council will have the authority to contact and communicate directly with the ministries concerned in the Arab Countries participating in the union.

Sample 2

(4)

UNION NON-EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Union Assembly

(Represented equally by the Arab States participating in the union in accordance with a basic system)

The President of the Union

(Elected by the members of the Union Assembly)

The Council of Presidents of the Union Committees

Cultural and
Legislation Committee

Economical
Affairs Committee

Political
Affairs Committee

Legislation Education

Commercial Exchange
Customs

Communica-
tions

Currency

Foreign
Affairs &
Minority
Problems

Defence

These committees will have the authority to contact and communicate directly with the ministries and bodies concerned in the Arab States participating in the union.

- (5) In the name of God the merciful and compassionate the consultations relating to Arab Unity between His Excellency Mustafa al-Nahhās Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Egyptian Kingdom, and His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha Prime Minister of Transjordan.²⁸

MINUTES OF THE FIRST SESSION

On Saturday 28 August 1943, at 7:30 P.M. in Antonyades Palace, Alexandria.

Attending from the Egyptian side:

His Excellency Mustafa al-Nahhās Pasha - Prime Minister and Foreign

28. Prior to going to Egypt Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda received a letter of instructions from the Emir Abdullah, dated 24 August 1943. In it the Emir stated that: "H.E. Nuri al-Sa'id has acquainted you with the necessary points which have been the basis of the talks between the Egyptian and the Iraqi Prime Ministers concerning Arab unity. ... what took place between their Excellencies, is the maximum possible within that sphere. Transjordan is fully determined to support these efforts. ... if the question of unity is handled in a proper and coordinated manner by Iraq and Egypt, with an absolute insistence on either the unity of Syria or its federation, there would remain as far as Britain and America are concerned, no difficulties to be met by those who are working for Arab unity." The Emir then reviewed the situation within each country of the Arab world and the possibility of each one joining an Arab union at a time when their situation permits. He ended the letter stating: The Emir of Transjordan supports with all in his power the efforts of Egypt and Iraq, and insists that Egypt and Iraq should work for the unity or federation of Syria before any other Arab federation. Let, then, Your Excellency's discussions with H. E. the Egyptian Prime Minister be conducted on this basis. We give you guidance by these instructions and leave to your known sagacity and wisdom and new issues that might come up in the course of discussion." Jordanian Government, White Book, 1947, pp. 101-103.

Minister of the Egyptian Kingdom.

His Excellency Ahmad Najīb al-Hilālī Pasha - Minister of Public Education.

His Excellency Muḥammad Salāḥ al-Dīn Bey - Secretary General of the Council of Ministers and he acted as Secretary.

Attending from the Jordanian side:

His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha - Prime Minister of Transjordan.

Mister Sulaymān al-Sukkar - Assistant Director of General Customs of the Transjordanian Government and he came to Egypt as private secretary to His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha.

His Excellency al-Nahḥās Pasha opened the meeting by welcoming His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha and expressing his pleasure in knowing the opinion of His Excellency on behalf of His Highness Emir Abdallah the Prince of Transjordan, on the subject of Arab Unity. The president added that he had formerly sought the opinion of His Excellency Nūrī al-Sa'īd Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq, and that he will continue to seek the opinions of the representatives of other Arab States when the opportunity arises. Nothing will be decided as the matter in its present stage is nothing more than mere consultations for learning the various opinions. Then His Excellency mentioned that through his consultations with His Excellency Nūrī al-Sa'īd Pasha he had reviewed the ways of cooperation appropriate for the Arab countries to participate in, partially or completely. It was decided that they can be fixed as follows:

1. Political Cooperation, which will include defence and foreign affairs, and attached to this will be the protection of minorities.
2. Economic Cooperation which will include currency, communications,

customs and commercial exchange in general.

3. Social and Cultural cooperation which will include education and related matters, and legislation.

(6) Then His Excellency asked whether the Transjordanian government would like to participate in all of these aspects or would it be satisfied with some of them, and in the latter case what are the affairs in which it would like to participate?

His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha said: "before entering into the subject, and in preparation for it, please permit me to give some explanations about our position in Transjordan. Egypt, for instance, is a completely independent state having sovereignty, and political and geographical unity. Likewise Iraq has its sovereignty and independence. It is easy that agreement can be reached between Egypt and Iraq on cooperation in all these matters to which Your Excellency referred. The case is the same in relation to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, if it so desires. But the matter differs in connection with the four countries which comprised Greater Syria and they are: Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Lebanon. This is what I wanted to explain.

"The mandate over Syria although it was cancelled still exists in practice. The customs, general security and foreign affairs are still in the hands of the French, and there is no diplomatic or consular representation abroad. After the announcement of the Syrian independence by the two generals De Gaulle and Catroux, which was guaranteed by Great Britain through its representative in Egypt,

Sir Miles Lampson,²⁹ the two mentioned generals insisted on holding the mandate because they did not recognize the decision of the Vichy government to withdraw from the League of Nations and they adhered to the membership, and the instrument of the mandate. Therefore it is necessary before the Syrians are able to participate in any of the aspects of cooperation, to which Your Excellency referred, that they in fact get their independence, which they are doing their utmost to claim. They also should know the true position of France and The United Nations in the case of the mandate because they consider the mandate as cancelled, based on the recognition of the independence of their country, which was guaranteed by Britain. The proof for this is that His Majesty the King of England communicated with the president of the Syrian Republic congratulating him on being the head of an independent state. Many states recognized this independence and Great Britain and America each delegated a minister to Syria. After all of that to say that the mandate continues is not understood nor legitimate. The position of Lebanon

29. Now Lord Killearn; British Ambassador to Egypt, 1937-46. Birdwood, *op. cit.*, p. 208. On June 8, 1941, British troops, commanded by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, invaded Syria from Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. Free French elements accompanied them. After a month of fighting - on 14 July - an armistice was signed. On the day of the invasion, the French Commander, General Catroux, issued a proclamation in which he stated: "Inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon! At the moment when forces of Free France, united to the forces of the British Empire, her ally, I come to put an end to the mandatory regime and to proclaim you free and independent." He also stated that he was making this statement on behalf of General de Gaulle, Chief of the Free French. Also the same day Sir Miles Lampson the British representative in Cairo stated: "... I am authorized by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to declare that they support and associate themselves with the assurance of independence given by General Catroux on behalf of General de Gaulle to Syria and Lebanon." *The Times*, 9 June 1941; also see George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 277.

doesn't differ from the position of Syria. It announced its independence a month or two after Syrian independence. The president of the republic received congratulations for the independence of his country and some of the states delegated to Lebanon their political representatives.

"As for Transjordan, Sir Herbert Samuel, the British High Commissioner in Palestine, announced in 1923 that it would have independent government under His Highness Emir Abdallah on condition that His Highness rule in accordance with a constitution, through a constitutional government and that he conclude with Britain a treaty recognizing this independence. That was actually achieved in February of 1928. An agreement was concluded between the two parties and ratified by His Majesty the King of England and by the Legislative Council in Transjordan. This agreement is derived from the instrument of the mandate on Palestine and Transjordan with the exception of the provisions relating to the Jews.

"In accordance with this agreement Transjordan was given some rights, such as the right of delegating consular officials to the Arab States, and the right of issuing diplomatic privileges to all the consuls to Transjordan and the right to agree with any Arab State on economical, cultural, social and other matters.

"I am concerned here to show that Transjordan was always treated in a different manner than Palestine. Great Britain admitted in several 'White Papers', as well as in the conference of Palestine that was held in 1939, that the promises made by Sir McMahon to the late King Husayn in connection with the independence of the Arab Countries included Transjordan.

(7) "However, in relation to Palestine the matter was disputable. The Arabs rightly consider that these promises include Palestine as well

as Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and their coasts. While the English later said that these promises only include the interior of Syria (Hamah, Aleppo, Homs, Damascus and its attachments), and the countries placed under the mandate other than the countries located east of the Jordan River.

"Your Excellency can see from this that Transjordan and Syria have - by the admittance of the British themselves - a strong support in claiming independence and emerging finally from the mandate in execution of the promise made."

His Excellency [al-Nahās] mentioned here that he wrote in 1927 a report which the Egyptian foreign minister delivered before the League of Nations. He proved in it that the McMahon promises cover all of the Arab Countries mentioned, including Palestine. Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha answered that he was aware of that, and that they benefited from it in relation to Transjordan. His Excellency [al-Nahās] said: "but the matter concerning Transjordan was not disputable." His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha answered that he was eager nevertheless to raise it in the conference of Palestine which was held in London in 1939 in order to keep away Jewish ambitions from Transjordan, and he was successful in that and the problem ended.

Then His Excellency continued: "as for Palestine both the Arabs and the English kept their view points and the matter ended in the issuing of the 'White Paper' which provided for three matters: immigration, sale of lands, and political status relating to the establishment of the Palestinian government. The English fulfilled their promises in this paper with regard to limiting immigration and prevention of the sale of

land to the Jews. As for the third matter the 'White Paper' stated that the English government, in five years from the date of the issuance of this paper (i.e. next April) will call a committee from the people of Palestine to draw up its constitution and to establish the National Government in it."

Here His Excellency [al-Nahhās] remarked that the Arabs do not agree on that. His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha answered that he only wanted to clarify the present position, then continued saying: "each of the four countries is claiming its independence and they each have their own arguments upon which it is based, and all of these countries aim - after getting rid of their restrictions - at a union among themselves. His Excellency Nūri al-Sa'īd Pasha, aware of this, suggested in a letter that he had sent to Mister Casey to reinstate the Syrian unity so that these four countries would become one state or a united state, provided the authority in that state would be the desires of the inhabitants themselves. This group would then enter into an Arab Federation comprised of Egypt, Iraq and other Arab states.

"When His Excellency [al-Nahhās] issued his conclusive declaration which had great effect on all the Arab Countries, some news agencies, asked me, and I declared to them, that we are awaiting with pleasure the invitation addressed to us by His Excellency al-Nahhas Pasha to participate in this matter. We hope that the independent Arab states would use all their effective means so that the countries of which Greater Syria is composed, would obtain their true independence. Its unity or union would then be by agreement among its components, in order that there will be an independent Syrian bloc having rights of sovereignty as have the other Arab countries, so that they will participate in what the Arabs agree on

in connection with the subject of their union.

"I hope by this declaration that His Excellency, who kindly called for bringing together the Arab countries, will help us four countries in obtaining what we aspire, in order to be able to participate in the matters which he referred to, due to the position of Egypt and the personal influence of His Excellency in his capacity as a dual leader in (8) the Egyptian Kingdom. / If these countries remain partitioned they might be able to participate in some of these matters but can not participate in all of them, and the benefit which they would be able to obtain would be slight.

"This is a desire which I wanted to express before anything else. My opinion, as is the opinion of His Excellency Nūri Pasha, is that it is very important to try to create Greater Syria which should participate after its creation in all aspects of the cooperation mentioned previously.

"The Palestinians desire this unity in order to get rid of this Jewish danger. The Syrians desire it in order that their kingdom would be enlarged and their entity strengthened. The Jordanians desire it in order that their country will not remain as it is now, small and poor, depending on British aid for its expenditures. As for the Lebanese, I do not believe that they will agree due to the fact that Lebanon has special circumstances.

"All of us rely in the realization of this desire on His Excellency al-Nahhās Pasha in his capacity as the leader of the Arab Nations.

"This is the opinion of His Highness the Emir, his government and his people.

"As for the local difficulties and the obstacles which seem to be arising in the way of realizing this desire, it is easy to surmount, as long as the general interest is our mutual aim. What we hope is that the independent Arab states will help us, because the United Nations is inclined to satisfy Egypt and Iraq, therefore the endeavors of these two will have a good effect in support of our efforts.

I understood through my discussions with some of the English, that these four countries, if they agree on a matter there will be no obstacles at all put in their way, except in connection with securing a suitable status for the Jews in Palestine. This obstacle will be easily overcome thanks to Your Excellency's guidance. At any rate there is nothing to prevent the unity of Jordan with Syria immediately, if we agree on that, because there is no external difficulty."

Here His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha ended his statement.

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] said: "in the face of this detailed statement I will temporarily set aside his question which was asked in the beginning of the session, in order to go along with His Excellency (Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda) in the way he has been going." His Excellency added that, "in order to be able to exert the effort required from him there must be an agreement among the four countries on the manner of forming the unity or the union."

His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha - "What I understood from the declaration of Your Excellency and from His Excellency Nuri Pasha, is that you are now seeking the opinion of each government separately, so that when you find that the viewpoints are close you will call these governments for a conference. If I referred in my statement to the desires

of the people of Syria and Palestine, I do not claim that I have the right to speak in their name. However, if Your Excellency calls those who represent Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, and hears their opinions and inform them of the contents of my statement and finds that they share the same direction, then what Your Excellency is looking for will be discussed."

His Excellency [al-Nahās] - "But now I am seeking your opinion and I am interested in asking you what is your idea about the manner of realizing the unity and union between Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Would these countries merge into one state having one head and one government, or would they have one head and several central governments, or would each one of them be independent from the other joined by a union, the system of which would be agreed upon?"

His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha - "If the matter is confined to Syria and Transjordan the question of unity would be easy because the disagreement on the system of government will not be a reason to abandon unity. I believe that the members of the Syrian delegation if they see that it is in the interest [of unity] to change the system of government will not fail to do that, and will not sacrifice unity because of the system of government. If some of them have a different opinion they will give in to the opinion of the majority, but the difficulty comes from Lebanon and Palestine."

(9) His Excellency [al-Nahās] - "Then it is better to leave out the idea of unity."

His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha - "It is possible to form a unity from Syria and Transjordan, then Lebanon and Palestine each will be called to the union so the union will be trilateral between,

(1) Syria and Transjordan, (2) Palestine and (3) Lebanon."

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] - "But how will this unity between Syria and Transjordan be?"

His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha - "This unity will be on the basis of the system that is acceptable to the majority."

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] - "But what is your opinion?"

His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha - "My opinion is that the system be a monarchy."

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] - "But Syria is a republic."

His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha - "It is possible to replace the republican system with a monarchy. What leads me to say this is my knowledge that many of the Syrians favor the monarchy system. My conviction is that the rulers in Syria at the present time are sincere nationalists whose sincerity refuse to make the case of monarchy or republic a hinderance toward the realization of the interests of the country. If they find that it is in the interest of the people to change the form of the government they would have no objection to that."

Here His Excellency [al-Nahhās] asked about the way of the trilateral union between: (1) Syria and Transjordan, (2) Palestine, and (3) Lebanon.

After a short debate the discussion was postponed until the next session and His Excellency [al-Nahhās] delivered to His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha a copy of the minutes of the fourth session of the consultations of His Excellency [al-Nahhās] with His Excellency Nuri Sa'id Pasha, containing the latter's opinion about the method of forming the unity or union, so that he would have knowledge of the contents of

these minutes to facilitate the formation of an opinion.

Then it was agreed on issuing the following mutual communique:

"Today in Antoniades Palace the consultations concerning the Arab Unity began between His Excellency Mustafa al-Nahhās Pasha, the President of the Council of Ministers of Egypt, and His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha, the Prime Minister of Transjordan, in an atmosphere of true friendship and mutual desire to arrive at bringing together the Arab Nations and the realization of cooperation among them."

The next meeting will be held at 07:30 P.M. Tuesday, 31 August 1943.

Then the session was adjourned as it was 9:30 P.M. so that the second session will be held at 07:30 P.M. next Tuesday.

Mustafa al Nahhās

Signed:

Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda

Muhammad Salah-al-Din

(10)

MINUTES OF THE SECOND SESSION

7:30 P.M., Tuesday, 31 August 1943, in Antoniades Palace and the former attendants were present.

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] congratulated His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha for the beginning of the blessed month of Ramadan and thanked him for the talk His Excellency gave to the two newspapers, al-Muqattam and al-Wafd al-Misri which contained good thoughts about His Excellency [al-Nahhās Pasha].

Then the minutes of the first session were read, approved and signed by His Excellency [al-Nahhās], His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha and the Secretary of the Consultations Committee. The signed

original copy was kept by His Excellency [al-Nahhās] and a copy was given to His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha.

It was agreed that the minutes and the consultations should remain secret and nothing of them should be made public, neither to the newspapers nor to any others until it is deemed by agreement to the contrary and then it should be agreed on which material and the way in which it will be done.

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] said that the consultations stopped in the last session at the point where His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha gave his opinion about the way of the formation of the trilateral union between: (1) Syria and Transjordan, (2) Palestine, and (3) Lebanon.

Therefore a copy of the minutes of the fourth session of the consultations of His Excellency [al-Nahhās] with His Excellency Nuri al-Sa'id Pasha was given to His Excellency [Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda] in order that he would have knowledge of its contents in order to facilitate forming an opinion.

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] asked His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha about the opinion he had formed in this respect.

Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha: "I have thought fully about the subject of the re-formation of Greater Syria and found that the best practical arrangement is - if possible - to form a unity from the four countries. If the problem of Palestine stands in the way, it might be possible to give the Jews in Palestine administrative independence, provided this is achieved of course, by agreement of the people of the four countries. If obstacles arise in the way of complete unity it might be possible to realize unity between the smaller (interior) Syria and Transjordan. Then

a union will be formed from these two and the other two countries. As for the type of this union I do not see a practical benefit from it unless it is after the pattern of the United States or the Swiss Union. All of this depends of course on the agreement of those concerned in the four Arab countries.

"As long as Your Excellency [al-Nahhas] has undertaken to consider the matter of unifying the Arab countries and has shown in various occasions your sympathy with the Syrian case, and exerted commendable efforts for it, please allow me to express the hopes of the government of Transjordan in the Syrian Unity.

"When Mister Eden gave his first declaration about the Arab Unity, Transjordan was not in a position to discuss the matter of this unity in view of its small size and due to the existance of other Arab States more important and having independence and full sovereignty such as Egypt. But Transjordan did not find at that time any objection to discuss the matter of Syrian Unity or the Syrian Union.

"In 1941 Mister Lyttleton the former British Minister of State in the Middle East came to Amman and a talk took place between us on the subject of the Syrian Union.³⁰ I expressed to him our hopes that Great

30. In regard to this visit Lenczowski states: "In July 1941, right after the ouster of the Vichy French from the Levant, Abdullah declared that the union of Arab lands was the official aim of his policy. Such an open avowal of his ambitions proved somewhat embarrassing to the British, who believed it to be premature.... Soon after this declaration Britain's minister of state for the Middle East, Oliver Lyttleton, hurried to Amman to restrain Abdullah from further hasty actions. This action was not intended to deflect Abdullah from his objective as a long range policy." Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 507.

(11) Britain would help us in going this way / which is as important to Transjordan as it is to Syria, and which puts an end to many troubles that arose in Palestine, which England until now has not been successful in overcoming them completely. Then I drew his attention to the fact that the four countries: Syria, Leban, Palestine, and Transjordan were under the Ottoman Government a Mudiriyah, and a part of another Mudiriyah. Their interests are common and in the whole they form a geographic unity. His Excellency [Lyttleton] promised me at that time to report this desire to his government.

"By that I intended especially not to let the British prevent us from contacting the other Arab Governments in this respect, on the pretext that the agreement concluded with them stipulated that they take charge of our foreign affairs.

"After a period of time the answer of the British government arrived containing the following three matters:

1. The high ideal of Arab Unity and independence will receive full sympathy from the government of His Majesty the King of Britain. However this problem will be decided by the consideration of the Arabs themselves when the field is clearer.

2. His Majesty's government considers that any approach to the Syrian government or to any other government which the government of Transjordan puts in mind should be postponed until the position seems more stabilized.

3. His Highness the Emir and the government of Transjordan, toward whom His Majesty's government keep the feeling of thanks and harmony can be reassured that His Majesty's government will protect

their legitimate interest in due time.

"These are the contents of the reply of the British government which I received in the middle of 1941. I did not find any need at that time to insist on the subject because the government of Transjordan considered that the government present at that time in Syria was not constitutional nor legitimate as it was appointed by a foreign High Commissioner. So it did not derive its authority from the people, and discussion or dealing with it was useless.

"We made the English understand at that time that it was favorable to create more stabilized conditions in Syria by forming a legitimate government, and we asked them to exert their efforts towards the French in order that this government be formed so that we may be able to contact it, and so that it may be able to contact whomever it wishes.

"After another period of time other communications took place in connection with the issuance of letters of credentials, and we received the answer from the British government approving our request. But the following sentence in the answer drew my attention: 'any official movement towards the Arab governments about constitutional matters in dispute, will be under the present circumstances, a source of confusion and perplexity which we believe that His Highness the Emir, and the government of Transjordan desire to avoid.'

"When I read this sentence, I wrote a personal letter to the British Resident drawing his attention, in my capacity as a responsible person and friend, to the sentence referred to and I said among other things: 'You have known our view point based on the promises of the British government.' I do not think at all that these promises were

equivalent to political declarations, the fulfillment of which, will be prevented by private recommendations which would lead to hindering any endeavor which Britain announced she would favor. I believe that the confusion and perplexity referred to, were only meant to heed the position of the Free French in connection with Syria and Lebanon. This government (Transjordan) doesn't see any objection to contacting the independent Arab governments. However, in connection with Syria there is no legitimate government now to come to an understanding and act with it. The Syrians and all the Arabs view England with reproach and astonishment due to the position of the French and their obstinacy. Their indignation has included the English because they believe that they support the French in their attitude. There is no doubt that the existence of such a feeling would hinder many matters.

(12) "If the present position in Syria does not allow an official understanding as to the interests of the Syrians and the Arabs, it is not reasonable that I, in my official or personal capacity, should avoid contacts with organizations and influential men in Syria in order to arrive at that which is in our interest.

"This is some of what my letter contained and it appears that they, after communicating with London, were convinced that there is no objection for Transjordan to work for union with Syria, but we differed in one thing and that is the suitable time for this action. They regard that this time will not be before the end of the war, and we consider that the war does not prevent such an action. They finally agreed to discuss and deliberate on preparing projects which will be ready when the war is over, or when an opportunity arises before the war is over.

On this basis we prepared some of these projects. It is natural that what I mentioned in this session is the last thing I thought of in this respect."

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] here expressed his admiration and appreciation for the conclusive statements made by His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha in the last session and in this one. Since he explained clearly the position of Transjordan, its history, the development of conditions in it, and its aims and hopes. Then His Excellency [al-Nahhās] summarized the position of Transjordan in connection of re-forming Greater Syria as follows:

"The desire of setting up a unity of the four countries and overcoming an obstacle that might arise due to the Jews in Palestine, by giving them administrative independence.

"If the complete unity is not possible, a unity from smaller Syria might be formed, then a union from these two and from Palestine and Lebanon might be made provided this union would be after the pattern of the United States or the Swiss Union."

Then the discussion moved to what His Excellency [al-Nahhās] asked in the beginning of the last session in connection with the aspects of cooperation in which Transjordan desires to participate with the other Arab Nations. His Excellency Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda Pasha gave the following statement:

(A) Political Cooperation in Foreign Affairs:

Transjordan in its present position is tied in its foreign relations with Great Britain alone, but it has been able to conclude different treaties with some of the independent Arab States, signed by

the authorized representatives of these states.

Among them is the treaty of friendship and good neighborliness with the Saudi Arabian State in 1943.

A treaty wider than that was concluded with Iraq in 1931, and it is a treaty of reciprocal recognition, friendship and good neighborliness, which provided for the possibility of concluding agreements between the two countries in connection with extradition of criminals, and a customs union.

Transjordan also concluded treaties and agreements with the High Commissioner in Syria on behalf of Syria and Lebanon.

As well the matter of extradition of criminals takes place between it and Syria without intervention by the foreign authorities.

In brief Transjordan is endeavoring to participate in foreign matters, and desires - even if it remains in its present condition - to cooperate in them with the Arab nations in as much as the opportunity allows, and as much as is possible for them to get rid of the restrictions of the treaty concluded between it and Great Britain. If it obtains, God willing, its independence it will cooperate in foreign matters completely.

(B) Defence:

Transjordan enjoys, in accordance with the modification that occurred to the treaty two years ago, independence concerning its army.

(13) / The treaty had not permitted it to form military forces except by agreement with His Majesty's British government, but this restriction was removed after the modification mentioned and it has the right now to form and organize military forces without referring to any one.

(C) Protection of Minorities:

Transjordan is not concerned with this.

(D) Economical Cooperation:

The government of Transjordan in its present position, enjoys full freedom in making agreements with the Arab states in the economical matters and is desirous of cooperating with the Arab nations in this respect.

(E) Cultural Cooperation:

This matter is the same as economical cooperation.

(F) Social Cooperation including Legislation:

This matter is the same as the preceding two items. His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha added that Transjordan has a legislative authority independent from the British.

Then the discussion moved to the way of forming the instrument of cooperation among the various Arab countries. His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha decided that he, as Nuri al-Sa'id Pasha, does not approve of the idea of the central government and prefers the first of the two aspects mentioned in the minutes of the fourth session of the consultations between His Excellency [Nuri al-Sa'id] and His Excellency [al-Nahhās]. If the others do not agree on this aspect there is no objection of adopting the second aspect.

Then the session was adjourned as it was 9:00 P.M. and the third session will be held tomorrow at 1:00 P.M.

Signed:

Mustafa al-Nahhās

Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda

Muhammad Salah al-Dīn

(14)

MINUTES OF THE THIRD SESSION

1:00 P.M. Wednesday, 1 September 1943, in Antoniades Palace and the former attendants are present.

The minutes of the second session were read and approved and a copy was given to His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha and the signed copy was kept by His Excellency [al-Nahhās].

Then His Excellency [al-Nahhās] said that naturally he will inform His Majesty the King about what took place in the consultations as well as His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha will inform His Highness the Emir of Transjordan about it.

With the exception of that it was agreed on that the consultations will be kept secret as it was decided in the last session.

It was agreed to issue the following joint statement: "Today the consultations that began between His Excellency Mustafa al-Nahhās Pasha the Prime Minister of the Egyptian Kingdom and His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Prime Minister of Transjordan in connection with the unity and cooperation of the Arab Nations, have been completed after three sessions in which the consultations dealt with all aspects of the subject, and especially with regard to the present position of Transjordan and its prospective status whether in connection with its relations with Syria, Lebanon and Palestine or with its relations with all other Arab Nations.

"The spirit of great eagerness to make successful the efforts exerted to bring together the Arab Nations and direct their affairs satisfactorily prevailed in the consultations."

The minutes were read and approved, a copy was given to His Excellency Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha and the signed copy was kept by

His Excellency [al-Nahhās].

The session was adjourned as it was 1:30 P.M.

Mustafa al-Nahhās

Signed:

Tawfiq Abu-al-Huda

Muhammad Salah al-Din

(15) Summary of the discussions that took place between His Excellency al-Nahhās Pasha and the Saudi Arabian delegation.³¹

FIRST SESSION

1. The desire was expressed of working toward strengthening the relationship between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and Egypt especially, and all that is likely to lead to the welfare of the Arab Nation was discussed.

2. Our aim must be to do all that is possible in the interest of the whole Arab Nation regardless of the fact that some will benefit while others will not, or at the expense of others.

3. We must guard against dangers and traps which are detrimental to the Arab Nation.

4. Our steps in this field must be reasonable and precise in order that we do not come across hinderances that would delay us or block our way.

5. Our course, in our case, must be based on an accurate study of the circumstances of the Arab Nation, so that we will be able to

31. The first four sessions were held from 11 to 19 October 1943, and the fifth session was held on 2 November 1943. They took place in Antoniadis Palace, Alexandria, Egypt, and Shaykh Yūsuf Yasīn was the Saudi Arabian delegate. Majid Khadduri, "International Affairs Towards an Arab Union: The League of Arab States", American Political Science Review, p. 95.

prescribe an effective cure for them, because if we want, for example, to gather the whole Arab Nation in one single state, that would be inconsistent with the present conditions and might create a clash in which there would be no advantage to anyone.

6. Participation of the Arab countries must be on an equal footing with each other.

SECOND SESSION

1. View points in cooperation were reviewed and the subject was discussed in an explanatory way.

THIRD SESSION

1. The Aspects of cooperation were discussed orally.

FOURTH SESSION

1. The view points were recorded which include the following:

A. Individual efforts should be continued by the Arab Governments in the interest of any other Arab country in such a way that would lead to the desired result and that would not cause harm to the interest of the Arabs and their friends.

B. It is considered that discussion of the subject of political cooperation be postponed at the present time until the present conditions change.

C. The desire was expressed to develop the cultural and agricultural cooperation with Egypt and the other Arab countries.

(16) FIFTH SESSION

The view points in cooperation were discussed again and the final opinion was the following:

1. The expression of the wish of the Saudi Arabian Country that

the Arab countries obtain the prosperity and happiness that they desire.

2. The feeling of His Majesty the King towards all the Syrian countries and his wishes that they have dignity and independence in their present republican government in each of Syria and Lebanon.

3. The Saudi Arabian Kingdom is doing all that is possible to save Palestine from its present condition and considers that the final word in connection with Palestine should be what its people agree on, because it is for them to decide what they deem fit for their country.

4. The subject of cooperation among the Arab countries in economical and cultural matters or any possible cooperation will not be objected to by the Saudi Arabian Kingdom when that is possible and when time is suitable.

5. As for the meeting of a committee to discuss these matters when the date of its meeting comes, we will deliberate and agree as to the time and place of its meeting.

(17) In the name of God the compassionate and merciful.

Consultations relating to Arab Unity between: His Excellency Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Egyptian Kingdom, and His Excellency Sa'd-Allah al-Jabiri Bey, Prime Minister of the Syrian Republic, and Jamil Mardam Bey, Syrian Foreign Minister.³²

32. On 10 October 1943, the prime ministers of Syria and Lebanon, Sa'd Allah al Jabiri and Riyad al-Sulh, and their foreign ministers Jamil Mardam Bey and Salim Taqla, met in Lebanon in order to discuss the attitude to be taken in Cairo as to the future status of Syria and Lebanon within the scheme of Arab unity. Ibid.

MINUTES OF THE FIRST SESSION

6:30 P.M. Tuesday, 26 October 1943, Antoniades Palace,
Alexandria.

The following attended from the Egyptian Side:

His Excellency Muṣṭafa al-Nahhās Pasha ... Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister of the Egyptian Kingdom.

His Excellency Ahmad Najīb al-Hilālī Pasha ... Minister of Public
education.

His Excellency Muhammad Salah al-Dīn Bey ... Under Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and he acted as Secretary.

Mister Ahmad Ramzi ... Acting Charge d'Affaires of the Royal Egyptian
Legation in Damascus.

From the Syrian Side:

His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābirī Bey ... Prime Minister of the
Syrian Republic.

His Excellency Jamāl Mardam Bey ... Foreign Minister of the Syrian
Republic.

His Excellency Doctor Najīb al-Armanāzī ... Secretary General for the
Presidency of the Syrian Republic.

Mister Ṣabri al-Asali ... Deputy of Damascus.

Mister 'Ali Ḥaydar al-Rikābī ... Chief of the Bureau of the Syrian
Foreign Ministry.

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] - "I open the meeting in the name
of God the compassionate, the merciful, and you are all most welcome.
I want to express to all of you my greatest pleasure and happiness for
your kind response to my invitation and your coming to Egypt to participate

in the Arab unity consultations and express your opinions on what we might be able to achieve in order to bring together the Arab countries, realize their hopes and work for their interest now and in the future. It is my pleasure to congratulate Syria through you for its new status and new era and to repeat my sincere congratulations to His Excellency Shurki al-Qawatli the President of the Syrian Republic and to you and to all of your colleagues, ministers and deputies for this high confidence which the Syrian nation placed in you. You are its best representatives, (18) spokesmen and defenders / of the rights and interests of this nation.

The restoration of the conditions as they were before in the brother Syrian country has been a source of our happiness and pleasure and Almighty God has realized thereby our hope and rewarded our efforts and he is responsible to crown this effort - as he used to - with success."

His Excellency Sa'd-Allah al-Jābiri Bey - "Before everything else I want to give the most sincere thanks to His Majesty the King of Egypt for the kindness with which he accorded us and to present to Your Excellency our deepest thanks to you and to the Egyptian government for your welcome and attention and for the kind reception we received from the whole of Egypt. I want to mention with praise and appreciation the valuable help which Your Excellency is rendering in the various conditions and circumstances to all the Arab countries. I would also like to thank Your Excellency for the kind congratulations and true sentiments, and I believe that His Excellency the President of the Republic and my colleague Jamīl Bey and my other colleagues share with me all of that. I am also pleased to express to you the feeling of happiness and pride while we are meeting today before you in the land

of Egypt to discuss a question which was our concern, and was our aim since youth. We are now more eager to make it a success, so that this success would be your achievement. Therefore, please be sure that we are at your disposal in any of your demands and we shall do our best to work with you in order to arrive at the goal which you seek."

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] - "I am greatly pleased with these kind expressions which you have stated well, and which best expresses the great hopes which titillate our hearts and I hope to God that He will make us successful and help us realize our hopes and aspirations.

"It is important for me to begin my consultations with you by reviewing the opinions which I have gathered in connection with the realization of unity between the four countries of which Syria was composed i.e., Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan. Many opinions were put forward to me in this connection, whether in my previous consultations, or in the reports and letters that I have received. This matter will naturally be decided by the people concerned themselves. Therefore, I consider that the consultations enter today into an important phase, upon which depend much of what our next steps will lead to.

"Here is the summary of these opinions. Much talk evolved around the necessity of a complete merger of the four countries mentioned. I do not conceal from you that I have felt that there are difficulties obstructing the realization of this aim. I have frankly discussed them with those concerned. Each one of these countries has its entity, its system, its place, and its degree of progress. Some of them have republican governments and some of the others are headed by a Prince,

so what would be the form of the unified government in the case of a merger, and how would we overcome the difficulty arising from the concessions of the Maronites in Lebanon and the position of the Jews in Palestine.

"There is an opinion that the merger be confined to Syria and Transjordan, if obstacles prevent the merger of all of the four countries, then each of Lebanon and Palestine be called to join the union with Syria and Transjordan already merged, and accordingly the union will be trilateral between:

1. Syria and Transjordan merged.
2. Palestine.
3. Lebanon.

"The same difficulty arising from the difference of the system of government in Syria and Transjordan faces us here, as well as the concessions of the Maronites in Lebanon, and the position of the Jews in Palestine might obstruct the way toward union as well as the way toward the merger.

(19) "We also want to know how the position of Syria would be in relation to Iraq - which is the adjacent country that wants to have close contact with it, and that aims at finding an outlet on the Mediterranean Sea for the purpose of exchanging economic advantages.

"We want to know also what the position of Syria would be in relation to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, and the position of the other Arab countries in the whole Arab group in relation to each other. How would the cooperation sought after be achieved among all of them, and to what extent would it go, and what aspects would it cover. Would it be

confined to economical, cultural, and social cooperation, or would it be extended to political cooperation also. This might also depend on the situation of each country because the situation of some might allow them to participate in the economical, social, and cultural cooperation but would not allow it to participate in the political cooperation as an example.

"These and other problems we want to make clear, and want to seek your opinions about them. I have previously discussed them with the representatives of Iraq, Transjordan and the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. As for Lebanon I deemed fit not to direct to it an invitation to the consultations until opinions have been exchanged with you, although I had been greatly pleased with the developments of conditions in it, and the results of its elections, whether in connection with the house of parliament or with the presidency of the republic or with the premiership and the formation of the government.

"It is important for me here to tell you that my concern with these problems is not confined to the time during which I take charge of the government, but I am concerned with them, and I work for the interest of all the Arab countries, whether I am in the government or not. Almighty God, however, wished that these consultations take place while I am in the government, and in that I believe there is much good. Therefore, we must be eager, as much as possible, that matters should not go out from their official way in order that they will not branch out, or deviate, or be biased if dealt with by irresponsible people, and in order that the consultants carry out their mission in a calm atmosphere. It is also important to me to confirm to you, what you actually know, that

Egypt starts these consultations with no interest except that of the general welfare of the entire Arab countries and the service of God.

"If the consultations, God willing, reach an extent which would draw nearer the different points of view and promises success, it will be possible to form a committee in which the Arab countries concerned will be represented, to achieve discussions, coordinate actions, and pave the way for holding the Arab Conference for which we are considering calling.

"This is our direction, and I would like to add to the above by way of further elucidation, the summary of the contents of my discussions and talks with the French side in relation to Syrian problems especially, which are matters well known by His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey and I am sure he must have informed you about them.

"The French - who were the mandatory power in Syria and Lebanon - aspire to have a privileged position in Syria and Lebanon, and wish to conclude a treaty with both of them. I explained to General Catroux in my talks with him that the circumstances do not now allow concluding a final treaty, and that all that is possible to do is to conclude a temporary agreement which will conduct matters in a practical way until a suitable time comes to conclude a final treaty. I wanted by that to enable the governments of Syria and Lebanon to take over the national agencies which have been supervised until now by French officials. I believe the agreement of Syria and Lebanon on the mutual interests among them such as customs, general security, and food supply would make it easier to arrive at this aim.

"As the national government has now been formed in each of Syria

and Lebanon, I believe that the time has arrived to try to realize that.

"Then there is the British state which is our ally and there is the United States of America, its major partner in the course of the war. Each one of them has many declarations in favor of small nations as well as Britain has official declarations by which she guarantees the independence of Syria and the independence of Lebanon. So we must seize all of that in our effort to realize the hopes of the brother Syrian (20) people, and we / on our part are ready to present to you every possible help due to our good relations with the states I mentioned.

"This is a general review. I wanted to show to you the most important matters to be dealt with by our consultations with you and the difficulties which obstruct our way. I would like now to know your opinion in all of this in general, then we will discuss the details later."

His Excellency Sa'd-Allah al-Jabiri Bey - "The explanation which Your Excellency was so kind to give, approached the subject adequately and although I am ready to give it a general answer, I would prefer that Your Excellency prepare for me a statement confining the matters precisely defined, so we will discuss them and express our opinion about them with frankness and pleasure."

His Excellency al-Hilali Pasha - This is exactly what His Excellency [al-Nabhas] means.

His Excellency al-Nabhas Pasha - I want to ask first about your opinion in the formation of Syria.

His Excellency Sa'd-Allah al-Jabiri Bey - "His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey has wide knowledge of the subject and can clarify it thoroughly. Nevertheless I permit myself to say a word about the modern history of Syria and the history of its (national) struggle.

"Syria constitutes a geographic unit in which there is no doubt and which doesn't need any proof. This country was not partitioned in the past and before it was separated from the Ottoman State its borders extended from Cilicia to Rafah and Ma'an, and from the White Mediterranean Sea to the interior of the desert. It formed a cohesive Arab group and nothing violated its cohesiveness. It was divided into various Vilayets from the administrative aspect only and remained governed by many factors such as the unity of mentality, language and traditions.

"Then the Arab revolt of al-Ḥusayn broke out, supported by the allies, and the people had hopes in that movement which ended in victory, as the Arab countries were severed from the Ottoman State. It was expected that this would lead to its liberation and the rising of a unified Arab State within it, but the fact was that the armies of the allies occupied the country of Syria militarily and partitioned it into Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan. Whereas it was expected that these countries would be one state in addition to its union with Iraq, Hijāz and the Yemen.

"Before the country of Syria was separated from the Ottoman state, Lebanon did not have an independent existence in its present form but there was Mount Lebanon that was confined between Furn al-Shubbāk (outside Beirut) on the west and al-Mu'allaqah on the east and between the north of al-Batrūn and north of Sidon. This Lebanon was established on the heels of a movement in 1860 in which foreign hands meddled, and which the Ottoman government meant to exploit, in order to deceive the powers and prevent losing that district. The problem was settled by granting Lebanon special concessions, so it enjoyed a simple administrative

independence and a decentralized government and became a Mutasarrifiyah (Mudiriyah) supervised by a special administrative council and a Christian Mutasarrif (Mudir) on condition that he is from a sect not represented in it such as protestants and Latin in order to guarantee his complete neutrality.

"Before this, Lebanon was subject to the Vilayet of Sidon and sometimes to the vilayet of Damascus and its prince was from the Shihabis such as Emir Bashir or the Ma'nis such as Emir Fakhr al-Din. This prince was subject to the influence of the wali even in dismissing and appointing his officials. In that small area, Lebanon, the two sects Druze and Maronites, were always conflicting with each other. Sometimes the Shi'ah joined the Druze while the Sunnis remained without a great effect because of their small numbers. Therefore it can not be said that Lebanon was ever independent in the true sense of the word. As for the other areas that form today a part of Lebanon the great part of them before the separation of Syria from the Ottoman state was a coast for Syria. At the end of the last great war the English occupied that coast and handed over its civil administration to the French which was the result of the secret and open agreements between England, Russia and (21) France or between France and England (Sykes Picot Treaty) which partitioned that country so that Syria and Leban were allotted to France. France separated Lebanon completely from Syria and added to it some parts of Syria, so creating Greater Lebanon, formed from the ancient Mount Lebanon and added to it some Syrian districts which are Ba'alback, Biqa', Trablus, Sidon, Tyre, and Marj'uyun (Jabal 'Amil). The Railway line all of which was passing through the territory of Syria was cut off

so that part of it passed on Lebanese territory between two Syrian territories. This was achieved by force of arms after the fight that broke out between the Arab state in Damascus under King Faysal and the French. Therefore the present Greater Lebanon was created by the French with force.

"As for Palestine it was occupied by the English before any other part of Syria, so it differed from us in military circumstances. This was followed by delivering Syria to France and maintaining Palestine in the hands of the English which made separation complete between them.

"As for Transjordan it was, under the Ottoman regime, a district administratively under Damascus, but the Sykes-Picot agreement included it within the scope of English influence. When King Faysal went out from Syria the British occupied it, then King Husayn sent his son Emir Abdullah from Hijāz to Transjordan in order to save Syria and help his brother King Faysal. The conference of 1921 which was held in the Semiramis Hotel in Cairo, which was presided over by Mister Churchill, decided to separate Transjordan from Syria permanently, and declared it an Emirate with Emir Abdullah at its head. This was actually done, the Emir accepted it, and the French agreed on abandoning that Syrian district to the English.

"The partition therefore, was not a result of the political and geographical nature of Syria but was the result of agreements and foreign interests, secret and open, imposed upon the people of the country by force.

"The Syrians want the unity as does every sincere Arab, especially in times such as these which have witnessed the disappearance of small

nations and which gave proof that the big nations themselves cannot withstand violent currents, so that they look for helpers and supporters. The Syrians who want this unity, do not ignore the fact that many difficulties and numerous problems stand in its way, such as zionism in Palestine and the Christian trend in Lebanon which has not been proved that it is based on true calculations. Then he added saying, there is no doubt that each one of these problems has a possible solution, but its various aspects require study in order to clarify them in all respects. Therefore we want to postpone discussing them to a coming session so that our opinion in each one of the solutions be clear and precise. Nevertheless the subject may be referred to in a general way.

"Palestine which is the southern part of Syria suffered the Balfour declaration. The Jews poured into it, disturbances and revolt ensued. Those responsible began to think in arriving at solutions to the problem. Talks took place, investigating committees were sent and conferences were held, the last of which was the conference of Palestine which was held in London in 1939, and to which Syria was invited. However the French prevented the Syrian representative, who was at that time in Istanbul, from traveling, by asking for his passport on the pretext of giving him a visa. It was not returned to him. The conference ended in drawing up the White Paper after the two parties had failed to agree, and opinions about it at that time conflicted, because it was difficult to know whether a specific solution for the problem was useful and valid at the time of its issuance and experiment was necessary in order to know that. Perhaps the British knew that it was not possible for the delegates to agree, so they reconsidered the discussions of the

conference and published their decision in the White Paper mentioned previously and which was objected to by both parties. This objection had a weak side because the Arabs and the Jews had great hopes in the (22) conference so they considered that the contents of the White Paper ruined these hopes. A part of the objection also arose from the fear of each party to give in to the contents of the paper in order that the other party would not demand new concessions.

"As for the solution suggested in the White Paper the Arabs have become inclined to accept it by virtue of the status quo - as I think - after that which has happened, that is the immigration of the Jews to Palestine was actually established, and they have been settling there for twenty years. It contains the broad lines of basic solutions such as the prevention of the sale of lands, limiting immigration, formation of a national government and the guarantee of minority rights. These are reasonable general solutions, but the difficulty arises as to the details, and it is necessary to have a definition and clarification. Therefore we propose that the representatives of the Arab countries meet with the representatives of Palestine in a conference, as they met before, and decide the solution they deem suitable for the problem of Palestine.

"There is a serious point which must be considered in order to know its meaning and extent: that is the possibility of the spreading of Jews from Palestine, to the different Arab countries, if it agrees to join the unity. We do not accept this spreading of the Jews at all, nor do we agree to it.

"Whatever the matter may be it is better to revert to the opinion

of the Arabs of Palestine themselves and to consult them in their case. There is a body which represents Palestine and gathers the different parties and which participated in the conference of Palestine. I say out of courtesy, that all political parties participated in the conference and perhaps the invitation of that body, composed of the Arabs of Palestine, who participated in the conference, to come to Egypt and express their opinions on the subject of Palestine and the Arab Unity, would be useful and would help Your Excellency in forming a complete idea about the subject and truly clarify the situation there. This is a simple matter because all of those who participated in the conference are present with the exception of Jamāl al-Ḥusayni and Amīn al-Tamīmī and this is an implied request which I direct to Your Excellency in order to exert your efforts in this respect.

"It is not vanity nor pretense, but truth supported by reality. It is the generation in which we are living that carried the burdens of the Arab cause that emanated from Damascus, and neither Amman, nor Jerusalem, nor Aleppo can take its place. Damascus safeguarded Islam and protected the Arabic language. Its heart beats for every Arab and is troubled if any Arab is harmed, or if any of the Arab countries are ill treated. The Arabic speaking people have always found in it a shelter for them. Every general Arab cause is born in Damascus and spreads out from it. Perhaps if Your Excellency visits Damascus he will understand that, from the enthusiasm which his visit would create, and he will find out clearly the feeling which it gives him and the dear country which he represents. Damascus therefore cannot give up its position, and my words are inspired by two great reasons: the first is the close contact of

Syria with the Arab cause in its general aspect, and the second is that the Syrian cause occupies a great place - rather the first place - among the Arab affairs due to its numerous aspects and different causes. In addition to that Damascus is a republic and wants to keep this system because it believes that it is good for it and the Arabs and because it is an element of peace among the Arab countries.

As Your Excellency is frank, and likes frankness, I would like to be frank also, and say that Damascus is eager to maintain its position which it has deserved by its nature and its history and it doesn't accept a substitute for its republican system.

"Damascus admits two things: the first is that it is eager to set up the best ties between it and the Arab countries, and that these ties be among all the Arab countries and it will not be a cause for any dispute between one country and another. The second is, that it admits and approves of the leadership of Egypt willingly and voluntarily. It doesn't say that in a haphazard way but as a result of deep thinking and a study of the facts. Behind Egypt there is a history of national strife which helped it to establish its existence. It revolted at the time of (23) Muḥammad 'Ali Pasha / and obtained independence which formed it socially and culturally although some political upheavals occurred. Capable men arose in it and were able to take charge of directing the Arab cause with the qualities and means which they possess and with the harmony enjoyed among the people of Egypt in addition to the wealth, the population and the civilization which are elements of force by which Egypt is distinguished. Damascus was pleased when Your Excellency stood in the Senate and announced your plan commenting on what Mister Eden said in

his famous statement about the Union of the Arab States, and this is a wish carried by the hearts in Syria and when we saw the possibility of realizing it, we felt that we were in a dream.

"Syria is ready to follow the leadership of Egypt and to exert every sacrifice for the sake of the Arab cause for which it wishes every success. This position has also an internal motive, because Syria wants to tie its fate with the fate of the other Arab countries, and the obstacles, whatever they are, can not prevent us from trying to reach our goal.

"Syria is treating problems independently from the other Arab countries and I am afraid of Syria remaining isolated from the Arab countries and not tied to them by any tie whatsoever, thereby the elements of unity would disappear and that would threaten the existence and fate of Syria, and would expose its traditions and its language to dangers. This bitter truth leads me and my brethren to work seriously and diligently to tie the fate of Syria with the fate of its sisters in order to guarantee its future. Whatever that fate might be, it would be better for her than to be isolated from its sisters. I can assure that this body which is present in front of Your Excellency represent the Syrian people and have a true democratic feeling, and desires fully that you take the banner with your hand and march in the direction that you want.

"This is in brief what I am able to say expressing this remark. Many incidents happened to us and we again took over the reigns of the government. It is the habit of the foreigner to erase - when he regains his authority - all that the national elements have done and we resume

our actions as if we have seized the government for the first time. It is the same with us as to the Arab case if we did not cease working in its service and knowing all its affairs as nationalist men we now in our capacity as responsible men, start work in a way that needs many means and much knowledge of various matters. The Syrian side will be thankful if you have something to explain or state whether in connection with important Arab aspects or with foreign aspects.

"This is what I wanted to say in the beginning and I hope that I have not bored you with my long speech."

His Excellency [al-Nahhas]- " On the contrary, I am fully pleased with this conclusive, adequate statement and this flowing explanation and these noble generous sentiments and with the great hopes you have expressed, for which we all must work and exert every possible effort for, and we ask God to realize them. I have greatly benefited from the exact statements which you gave out in connection with the formation of Greater Syria. I am pleased to find that many of the remarks which you expressed fully, agree with the special observations I have formed for myself. While you were talking I was wandering with you, with my mind moving from one idea to another was pleased with the expressions and opinions I heard, and I assure you that during your long talk I only felt satisfaction, admiration, and pride with what you said.

"I was very moved by what came in your statement about the constitutional coups which were happening in your country, which is a matter which we experienced similarly in Egypt and tasted its bitterness. The coups which occurred in our country blew up the rights and interests of the country and ruined the useful projects that were started by the

popular governments. It is fortunate that the return to stability in Egypt was always a forerunner for the return to stability in your country.

"As for the opinions that you set forth in connection with the Palestinian question, they all agree with the opinion that we formed in (24) its respect / in 1937, and about which we wrote a note that was read by the Egyptian Foreign Minister at that time in the General Assembly of the League of Nations. I personally agree on your opinion not to permit or allow the Jews of Palestine to spread out into the other Syrian countries, if Greater Syria is formed, but I am concerned of course to know the opinions of all of the others in this connection.

"This is sufficient as a statement and I promise you to answer your demands in giving you a statement in which the matters will be confined and precisely defined so that you will study them and then give us your opinion on each one of them. We shall deliver to you this statement, with Gods will, at 9:00 tomorrow morning."

Then His Excellency [al-Nahhas] said that the consultations naturally are secret, nobody will know about them except the participating representatives and the heads of their states and nothing of them will be reported to the newspapers, nor others, with the exception of the mutual communiques that will be agreed upon for publication. This was then mutually agreed upon.

Then it was agreed upon to issue the following mutual communique:
"Today began in Antoniades Palace the consultations relating to the Arab unity between His Excellency Muṣṭafa al-Nahḥās Pasha - Prime Minister of Egypt - and between His Excellency Sa'd Allāh al-Jābirī Bey - Prime

Minister of Syria, and His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey - its Foreign Minister, and with them Dr. Najib al-Armanazi, the Secretary General of the Presidency of the Syrian Republic, and Mr. Sabri al-'Asali - Deputy of Damascus, and Mr. 'Ali Haydar al-Rikabi - Chief of Bureau of Syrian Foreign Ministry.

"His Excellency al-Nahhas Pasha warmly welcomed them and congratulated Syria through its representatives for its new status, and he repeated his sincere congratulations to His Excellency the President of the Republic and to the rest of their colleagues for the confidence of the noble Syrian nation which they obtained. His Excellency Sa'd Allah al-Jabiri Bey replied by expressing the most sincere thanks to His Majesty the King of Egypt, mentioned with praise and appreciation the kind reception they received from His Excellency the President and from all of Egypt, speaking highly of the valuable help which His Excellency presents to all of the Arab countries.

"Then consultations began in an atmosphere of true friendship and sincere love and mutual appreciation between Egypt and the Syrian republic. The two sides reviewed the subject of Arab unity in its various aspects. The first discussion indicated the eagerness of the two brotherly countries to arrive at the realization of the hopes of the Arab countries and at that which leads toward bringing them together and establishing cooperation among them. The next meeting will be held at 6:30 tomorrow evening."

The session was adjourned at 9:00 P.M. The next session will be held at 6:30 P.M. Wednesday, 27 October 1943.

(25)

THE MINUTES OF THE SECOND SESSION

Wednesday 6:30 P.M., 27 October 1943 in Antoniadès Palace,
Alexandria and the former attendants are present.

The minutes of the first session were read, approved and signed by His Excellency [al-Nahhās], His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābiri Bey, His Excellency Jamīl Mardam Bey and the Secretary of the Consultations Committee. The signed original was kept by His Excellency the President and a copy was delivered to His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābiri Bey.

Then His Excellency [al-Nahhās] mentioned that he sent on that morning - as he promised - a statement in which he confined the matters that were dealt with by the consultations, precisely defined. His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābiri Bey answered that this statement was handed over to him at exactly 9:00 A.M. and added that he was prepared to answer all the questions contained in the statement, and then he began to answer one question after the other. Then a long discussion took place between the two sides about each one of them, and His Excellency [al-Jābiri] promised to write his reply in the minutes of the next session at 11:00 A.M. next Saturday, 30 October 1943. The session was adjourned at 9:45 P.M.

(26)

THE MINUTES OF THE THIRD SESSION

Saturday 12:00 noon, 30 October 1943, Antoniadès Palace,
Alexandria, previous attendants were present.

The minutes of the second session were read, approved and signed by His Excellency [al-Nahhās], His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābiri Bey, His Excellency Jamīl Mardam Bey and the Secretary of the Consultations Committee. The signed original was kept by His Excellency [al-Nahhās] and a copy was delivered to His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābiri Bey.

Then His Excellency Sa'd-Allah al-Jābiri Bey mentioned that - as he promised - he had written down the answers which he gave in the last session in a written note in order to confirm them in the minutes of this session. But he would like to preface that by a simple verbal explanation, then he said: "The Syrian Problem occupies the first place among the Arab problems. You were kind and assigned to it eight questions while you singled out for the rest of the Arab problems four questions. The statement which I delivered in the first session contained the answers to most of them. It only remains for us to clarify as to how the solution will be.

"The Syrian problem is connected with four countries which are Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan.

"There are basic factors that call for the unification of these countries regardless of the type and form of this unification. This unification is the aim that we were working for in the past, in order to realize it unconditionally and willingly or unwillingly.

"However after the lapse of twenty years each country has been accustomed to its special life and its special character, so this has called for changing the manner and for taking the way of conciliation and persuasion.

"Maintaining Damascus as a capital, and the republican system as a basis, and insisting on unification, we leave for the people of the country the choice of which type of unification that they want.

"The population of Lebanon with their sweeping majority, and including many Christians, and all the Moslems especially in the parts that were affiliated with Lebanon after the last war, desire to join

Syria unconditionally. If they now feel some satisfaction, this feeling came to them through us because it is the hope for unification which keeps them silent. We are afraid that the leaders of Lebanon will throw themselves again into the lap of France, so that it will have a firm foot anew, after it was shaken by the war. Therefore we recognized and supported the independence of Lebanon on condition that it would demand as we did its full sovereignty and follow our steps in that, keeping their Arab nature and in agreeing on the administration of economical interests in such a way as would realize the interests of both sides. We in all of that do not have any ambition. In fact my colleague Jamil Bey started negotiations with the Lebanese government which resulted into concluding an agreement on mutual interests. The agreement contained a discussion of many of the problems which might be taken as an example for the rest of the Arab countries, such as customs, companies with concessions, permission of free passage between the two countries without passports or barriers and at the same time maintaining the independence of the two countries which would increase the strengthening of ties between them in the future.

"The result of our mutual understanding with the ruling men in (27) Lebanon was that the new president of the republic, his prime minister / and the members of the government pledged not to allow the foreigner to dominate Lebanon whether in the way of colonizing it, or using it as a means to colonize Syria. This was referred to by the Prime Minister Riyād Bay al-Şulḥ in his ministerial statement which he delivered in the house of deputies.

"This policy of ours is apt to keep away from us, and from

them, a danger that might harm either of us.

"This form of cooperation between us and Lebanon may be followed by the other parts of Syria if they so desire, otherwise there is no objection for us to follow another manner.

"We insist on unification but not through forcing the remaining Syrian parts into it. We are preachers and men of mission before we are men of position. We have acquired that from you and we follow your steps. We are concerned with unification and we will make every sacrifice for this purpose leaving to the others their choice, as we do not have any idea of domination and rule.

"I would like to make another remark in regard to Lebanon, the harm about which we are complaining might be a cause for good, since France was ruling the two countries through a central government, arising from the fact that it retained all the key positions for itself. When this government is transferred to each of the two countries we will find that this will help towards unity.

"I do not know whether this element of the elements of cooperation is ready for Transjordan and Palestine. Whatever the case may be, the declaration of Eden is known, and the position of England, as to the union of the Arabs is encouraging. Perhaps it will take a useful new step by allowing the parts under its domination in Syria to express their desires freely.

"This is concerning Lebanon, as for Palestine, I have shown that which is required in its connection in the memo, and I add, emphasizing my fears from the question of the spreading of the Jews through the other Arab countries.

"I now shift to the discussion of the problems relating to the other Arab countries. I have previously explained to Your Excellency that when we began the Arab movement the partition never occurred to our minds but our aim was the liberation of the Arabs and the formation of a unified Arab State. We are still, until this time, abiding by this doctrine seeking that goal.

"The Arab countries are divided into two parts: (the first) that part some of which was closed to each other and gathered by its relation with Britain, (the second) that which was under the French influence. We figure the ideal unity, as comprehensive to all of the Arab countries, whatever it is as is mentioned in the well known Arab poem: The countries of the Arabs are my homeland, from Damascus to Baghdad, from Najd to Yemen, and from Egypt to Tatwan.

"However we admit that the conditions of some of these countries prevent them from being covered by unity, but we find that the Arabs notwithstanding their work towards the realization of union among the parts that may be covered by it, must not neglect the other countries but work towards helping them in order to raise their standards and guide them.

"Accordingly it may be said that the Arab countries that can be gathered now are Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabian Kingdom and Yemen.

"We have not seen the result of the consultations of Your Excellency with the other representatives of the Arab countries. However we are ready to give you a blank paper signed by us and on which you will write what solutions you desire and we will execute them without hesitation. The most desirable type of union to us is that which has the executive type. We shall not fail to accept any other type if that

(28) type would be impossible, / even if the instrument were an economic agreement or a cultural cooperation and this is the minimum. If you have any specific idea we are ready to comply with it unconditionally. We say that motivated by the idea of sacrifice.

"My personal opinion is that if the country desires agreement that will be done, whether it takes it gradually or arrives at it at one time. This is natural as long as the aim is supreme.

"Finally I have a remark which I hope Your Excellency will attach to it some importance. Human beings are human beings. There are matters that need a psychological treatment and cannot be taken abstractly. The great treat the great. Egypt has become a narrow field not large enough for your activities and your aims and there is no doubt that you will find the great Arab field a wider horizon and a larger scope to deal with its problems with the same wisdom in which you excelled in local politics. There are among the Arab countries those who need to be conciliated and persuaded in one way or another. If your conciliations result into some points which are agreed upon there is no objection against forming a committee whose jurisdiction is confined to those points, and whose meetings would be rotated among the various Arab countries. If this is achieved it will have a good effect for those countries especially at this time in which great nations themselves are feeling the need for union and solidarity. This is not less important for the rising small states which are desirous of taking their appropriate place in international society. From these periodical meetings Your Excellency will form a clear idea about all these matters.

"This is a suggestion which I express to Your Excellency leaving

to you the problem of achieving it or not, according to what you deem appropriate to the circumstances.

"I would like to assure Your Excellency that I, with my colleague Jamil Bey put ourselves at the disposal of Your Excellency for any action you may call on us to do in order to eliminate any difficulties that might arise with any of the Arab countries, since it is necessary that mutual understanding should prevail among them. May you continue with the blessings of God and we are behind you. Egypt is the most fit to take the lead in this matter under the present circumstances. If we are successful, and this is what we are hoping for, the name of Mustafa al-Nahhas will be recorded in each Arab country because he will then become one of the men of history who built kingdoms."

His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābirī Bey here finished his oral explanations and began to read his written notes the text of which is as follows:

"The problems about which you wish to seek our opinion, are divided into two parts: the one is related to Syria and its various affairs. It contains eight problems. The other is connected with Arab unity and the aspects of cooperation among the participating countries. This contains four problems.

"As for the first part, most of its aspects have been treated including Palestine and Transjordan in the statement in which we delivered in a previous meeting, and I do not see any point in repeating what I have already mentioned. However I left for discussion a problem which I would like to draw attention to it because it shows in a practical way the direction which we want to head for, whether in matters connected with Syria or Arab unity.

"We were always demanding that Lebanon should be, in relation to Syria, in a natural status. Either the relations between us, and it should be based on union, or the parts which were taken, should be returned to Syria, and Lebanon should return to its former status. This is not the desire of the population of Syria alone, but it is also the desire of the population of those parts which were attached to Lebanon unwillingly and which they continue to oppose with all possible means the status to which they were forced to submit to. But now that it has begun to get rid of every influence that hinders its way, and prevents it from exercising the characteristics and powers of independence and (29) sovereignty, / we consider that we should follow a new plan and set up relations between us on the basis of cooperation in establishing the independence and settling the problems that were brought about by the past, through cooperation and agreement. We have deliberated with its representatives with friendliness, frankness and sincerity and we looked into the important political matters connected with the two countries, and we have actually begun to execute what has been decided. We signed an agreement on the mutual interests which will lead to other contracts and agreements. If Lebanon continues to hold fast to its independence adopting this method in solving the problems we shall continue on our part to abide by a new method that will strengthen our relations and ties.

"We are therefore eager to form Greater Syria and to eliminate the partition created by the victorious force, international greeds and political competitions. We want to arrive at this formation whatever type it may be and in whatever method desired by the countries that were separated from Syria. We do not deny that there are many difficulties

that must be surmounted, and this method of cooperation which we follow in our negotiations with Lebanon, may be taken as an example in treating the affairs of each of the countries which were taken from the brother homeland, until the union which we are seeking is realized, so that the effects of that historical injustice which tore up Syria and hindered its progress and growth, and drew it away from its worthy place are erased. While we want that this agreement and mutual understanding to be achieved without pressure or coercion, we repeat that which we said about the necessity of Damascus keeping its position, and the Syrian Republic its system of government. The second part contains the four problems relating to the Arab unity, its extent and the instrument of realizing it, the aspects of cooperation among the people of the Arab countries, and the union which will arise from that with or without executive authority. Syria wants to perform its duty which is the first element for right, fully and completely. It will accept all restrictions willingly and preferably, not placing any conditions and not refraining from giving any sacrifice for the sake of realizing the Arab union and strengthening the relationships among the Arab people. It will accept political cooperation which covers defence, foreign affairs, protection of minorities and the guarantee of Egypt for it which inspires confidence and reassurance and which gives help for the sake of settling its problems. It will accept economic cooperation which covers currency, communications, customs, commercial exchange, cancellation of passports and relative matters. It will also accept cultural and social cooperation which covers education and legislation. In relation to the instrument of mutual cooperation Syria prefers the strongest instrument which is the central

government although it does not ignore the obstacles that stand in the way of that. If that is impossible another system of union or agreement or pact will be set up deriving its basis and regulations from similiar conditions with other nations which treated such problems, or it will be established in a new manner that would agree with our desires and needs without being restricted by what others have done. We in establishing these principles are speaking in the name of Syria whether in its present status or in the status that it is seeking to realize which is Greater Syria.

"In our opinion union should include Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabian Kingdom, Yemen and also the countries that should form Greater Syria such as Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. As for the Arab countries under a protectorate or some countries in North Africa, there is no doubt that it is necessary to extend to them a helping hand in a way that may be agreed upon later and that they should be supported in raising their standards and forming their national existence. In this connection it is inevitable to say that the foreign influence which affected the Arab countries was varied in appearances and results, according to the policy that was put into force. One policy prevented the development of the country subject to it and deprived it from its racial characteristics and self formation, another policy - with maintaining the interests of its state - enabled a country under its domination to develop, form and walk towards independence and enjoy its advantages. Therefore we find wide differences between two Arab countries that were subject at the same time to a different foreign authority.

(30) "It appears to us, that when the Arab consultations reach their

conclusion, a committee should be formed from the representatives of the states which participated in them and agreed upon them, so that timely meetings will be held in Egypt, Saudi Arabian Kingdom, Iraq, and Syria, in order to pave the way for holding the conference and completing its conditions and that is to reaffirm some wishes and to show concern for all the countries.

"The last great war untied the Arab countries from their bonds and realized many hopes for parts of it. This war came and placed the problem of the Arab countries another time under discussion in more appropriate conditions. It drew attention to it and many statesmen talked about their potential political and economical cooperation and which depends upon the people themselves before anyone else. If international politics after that war, stood in the way of realizing that aspiration which is dear to the Arab countries separated from the Ottoman Empire, perhaps the peace desired to be established will safeguard the rights of the people and will guarantee the reassurance of the weak as well as that of the strong and will result into the cooperation and agreement which the Arab countries desire. It is not strange that the Arab countries which disagreed for a time demand the setting up of a union system among them after their relations and their ties were strengthened by the realities of life based on geographical, historical, racial, and linguistic factors.

"The present war has brought about new fears and awakened many problems. The struggle that occurred in 1919 between the conservative old principles and the free new principles, and which ended by the victory of the former, might happen again at the end of this war. So

we have to be ready and fully prepared to realize the aspirations desired in all the Arab countries by the believers in high ideals, the rights of man and his dignity.

"If union is a source of force to others it is for us a source of life through which we look for preservation and safety after we witnessed before and during this war how the small states disappeared and lost their independence. The strength of this East, its security, the interest of peace in it, its safety from the dangers and changes of politics, and the facing of possibilities and incidents, all of this calls upon it to strengthen the relationships and ties. Those who carry the responsibility in the country of Syria cannot but express the feeling and aspirations of their country of the frank call for the union of the Arab countries and for doing everything possible for that purpose. We do not want to become contented with a little effort nor be satisfied with weak hopes confined to our small boundaries, but we want to participate in the creation of a great world full of great hopes realized by union and strengthened by cooperation. That is the Arab world which is looking forward to higher levels and which looks for reaching the noble position helped by its history and the nature of the countries, and the abundance of its populations and the vast area of its territory which is connected together, and by its position allotted to it by God between the east and the west."

His Excellency [al-Nahhās] - "I am in fact unable to describe to you my pleasure, my happiness and my appreciation about this strong and true spirit and this flowing noble sentiment and these brilliant valuable thoughts based on valor and determination on the one hand,

and on an exact study of the problems in question on the other hand. This is proved by the noble preparedness for sacrifice which you have shown for the sake of arriving at the supreme aim sought by all of us and the deep eagerness for the success of the mission we assume. This eagerness was made clear in what you have mentioned, that you accept political cooperation as you accept economical, cultural and social cooperation and that you prefer the strongest instrument for the cooperation, and that if this is impossible you will accept any other system that would guarantee the realization of the purpose hoped for. It was also made clear in what you referred to as the weakness of the human soul and the treatment which must be made and which requires working towards conciliation of all and adherence to the attractive means which would persuade them to accept the project and direct them to it even though it be gradual.

- (31) "This is all very beautiful and very wise and worthy of facilitating our mission and would lead the conciliations towards the success hoped for. You have covered, in your preliminary statement and in your written statement, thoroughly all the aspects of the subject. I am pleased to see that we agree on the remarks and directions which you put forward, and I am happy to work with brotheren like you, who put foremost in their minds, the general interest of all the Arab countries and who would exert every effort and make any sacrifice for the sake of bringing the Arabs together and resurrect their glory.

"The internal problems of Egypt are countless and require a supreme effort from us, but we shall not refrain from exerting any effort however great it is in the service of the Arab countries and for the realization of their aspirations.

"As for your suggestion about the formation of a committee from representatives of the states which participated in the consultations that would hold its meetings in turn, in Egypt, Saudi Arabian Kingdom, Iraq and Syria, to pave the way for holding the Arab Conference and fulfill its conditions, such a suggestion was submitted to me. I noticed that the holding of the committee referred to in turn, in the various countries, might create some difficulties. However you explained your purpose in your oral statement and mentioned that what is meant by the formation of this committee, which you suggest to hold in turn in the various Arab countries, is to record the points agreed upon after ending the consultation stage. I think that the suggestion within these limits, is worthy of thought and consideration.

"It remains to me to repeat to you my sincerest thanks and greatest appreciation for the high spirit which you showed in these consultations and the nationalistic ideas and the valuable practical opinions you put forward. I assure you that this short period which you have spent among us, has had in my heart and the hearts of my colleagues, a deep good effect which time will never erase. May Almighty God lead our steps and our efforts to success."

Then it was agreed to hold the next session at the Foreign Ministry in Cairo, Wednesday, 3 November 1943, at 5:30 P.M., and the session was adjourned as it was 1:30 P.M.

(32) MINUTES OF THE FOURTH SESSION

Wednesday, 5:30 P.M., 3 November 1943, at the Foreign Ministry in Cairo, and the former attendants were present.

The minutes of the third session were read, approved and signed

by His Excellency [al-Nahhas], His Excellency Sa'd-Allah al-Jabiri Bey, His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey and the Secretary of the Consultations Committee. The signed original was kept by His Excellency [al-Nahhas] and a copy was delivered to His Excellency Sa'd-Allah al-Jabiri Bey.

After reviewing the discussions and deliberations of the past three sessions, the two sides found that they had covered the subject, in all its aspects, and realized the purpose desired from the consultations, and that the consultations had been completed.

Then it was agreed to issue the following mutual statement: "The consultations which began on Tuesday, 27 Shawwal 1362 - equivalent to 26 October 1943 - were completed today between His Excellency Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of the Egyptian Kingdom; and His Excellency Sa'd-Allah al-Jabiri Bey - the Prime Minister of the Syrian Republic, and His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey - its Foreign Minister in connection with Arab unity and the cooperation of the countries of the Arabs.

"The committee of consultations held four sessions in which this subject was discussed from all its aspects in an atmosphere of true love and relations of long friendliness between the two brother countries. The discussions of the two sides were prevailed by reciprocal inclinations and mutual view points and strong feeling for the necessity of connecting the Arab countries tightly with bands of reciprocity and cooperation for the welfare of all of them and the welfare of the whole world.

"May God crown this action with success as he is the guardian of prosperity."

Then these minutes were read, approved, and signed by His Excellency

[al-Nahhās], His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābiri Bey, His Excellency Jamīl Mardam Bey and the Secretary of the Consultations Committee. The signed original was kept by His Excellency [al-Nahhās] and a copy was delivered to His Excellency Sa'd-Allāh al-Jābiri Bey.

The session was then adjourned as it was 7:30 P.M.

(33) SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED BY THE LEBANESE DELEGATION
IN THE CONSULTATIONS OF ARAB UNITY.³³

Lebanon will do its best for the sake of cooperation and solidarity among the Arab countries, because in that there will be much good for all.

There are three factors that made it approach the Arab case and participate in it:

1. The weakening of foreign influence which was dominating it during the last twenty five years.
2. The understanding by its Arab sisters of its reserved position as to Arab unity which made them recognize its entity and its present borders as a sovereign independent state.
3. The understanding by Lebanon of the necessity for cooperation with the neighboring sister countries for the interests of its political and economic entity.

That which concerns the Arab countries in connection with Lebanon in the first place is not to be an instrument for the foreigner which he would use in a way that would prejudice the interests of the Arab countries - and this is what the first constitutional government of Lebanon pledged after its independence in its statement of policy and

33. 9-13 January 1944. The Lebanese delegate was Riyād al-Ṣulḥ. Ibid.

approved unanimously by the house of deputies in October 1943.

Lebanon therefore is not less convinced and not less desirous than the rest of the Arab countries by the benefits of the mutual cooperation. Its first practical steps were the connections it set up between it and its sister Syria, and it hopes that similiar connections will arise between it and the rest of the sister countries.

The reservation that was expressed by Lebanon in the past and is expressed here today, is but the result of the foreign influence that strove to alienate Lebanon and Syria, but now that this influence has lessened and it will disappear in the future, the burden of this reservation will lessen and disappear.

As for the instrument of cooperation between Syria and Lebanon it is the establishment of a joint council to administer the mutual interests from the legislative and executive aspects. This council has actually begun its functions and it may be said that this cooperation has become a true economical unity.

Lebanon has preferred to act alone in the questions of defence and foreign affairs. A close cooperation maybe created between the two countries in the cultural and social aspects which would lead to the unification of the regulations and programs of education.

As for the position of Lebanon as to the Arab case it will be similiar to the position of Egypt. It desires that its cooperation with all the Arab countries be on the basis of sovereignty and equality.

The case of Palestine preoccupies the minds of the Lebanese as much as it does the minds of the other Arab peoples if not more so, and that is because of the proximity of Palestine to Lebanon.

The truth is that the Arab idea is indivisible as to the general welfare and the cooperation among all the Arab countries. It is natural that the independent countries are more capable of cooperation and exchange of benefits freely. The countries under a protectorate or with incomplete sovereignty should not be deprived of these benefits but cooperation between the independent states should aim at extending help to their other sisters. We must be on our guard against the foreign states dominating the non-independent countries to exploit the affairs of the union for its own benefit on the account of the countries under a protectorate or with incomplete sovereignty.

(34) SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE CONSULTATIONS WITH YEMEN.³⁴

The summary of the previous talks is that Yemen welcomes the idea of cultural and economic cooperation among the sister Arab countries in such a way that each state maintains its full sovereignty and rights, and that it will not be bound by any [agreement] by which any other state is bound to another state such as a treaty which would make obligations on her to the benefit of another state or something similiar to this. This cooperation should also be based on equality among all the Arab states in the rights and mutual interests. When we were approached as to the best manner of cooperation required, I promised to submit to His Majesty, Our Lord, Emir of the Believers, the King of the Yemen, may God support him, the idea of the formation of a committee from all the cooperating countries to take charge of supervising that and make the necessary contacts in order to execute all that which we deem necessary.

34. 6-9 February 1943. The delegate from Yemen was Mr. Husayn al-Kabsi. Ibid.

If any aggression or threat - God forbid - takes place against any of the Arab states bound by this agreement, the state threatened or attacked will be entitled to ask for all possible help. If the country is Arab but not bound by this agreement, any Arab state will be entitled to demand helping it. In both cases all the Arab states will have to fulfill that request and present every possible material and moral help.

CHAPTER III

THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE GENERAL ARAB CONFERENCE-ALEXANDRIA

There was sufficient unanimity of opinion among all those who took part in the individual consultations with al-Nahhās Pasha to induce him to call a General Arab Conference. All the countries that participated in the original consultations were invited to take part in this conference to be held in Alexandria, Egypt.

Invitations were prepared and sent out. At 7:00 P.M., Monday, 8 Shawwāl 1363 (25 September 1944) following the inaugural ceremonies, the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference began in Antoniadēs Palace, in Alexandria, under the chairmanship of H. E. Mustafa al-Nahhās Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.³⁵ Those attending were:

Attending from the Syrian side:

H.E. Sa'd-Allah al-Jābirī	Prime Minister	Chairman
H.E. Jamil Mardam Bey	Foreign Minister	Member

35. The League of Arab States, The Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference, Alexandria, p. 8. Author's translation and summarization of this document, which is actually the minutes of the sessions which were held in Alexandria, Egypt, from 25 September to 8 October 1944, and culminated with the issuance of the Alexandria Protocol.

H.E. Doctor Najīb al-Armanāzi Secretary General for the Member
Presidency of the Republic in the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary

H.E. Sabri al-'Asali Deputy of Damascus Member

Attending from the Jordanian side:

H.E. Tawfīq Abu-al-Huda Pasha Prime Minister and Foreign Chairman
Minister

H.E. Sulaymān al-Sukkar Bey Financial Secretary of the Member
Foreign Ministry

Attending from the Iraqi side:

H.E. Hamdi al-Bājahji Prime Minister Chairman

H.E. Arshad al-'Umari Foreign Minister Member

H.E. Nūri al-Sa'id Former Prime Minister Member

H.E. Tahsin al-'Askari Iraqi Minister Pleni- Member
potentiary in Egypt

Attending from the Lebanese side:

H.E. Riyād al-Ṣulḥ Bey Prime Minister Chairman

H.E. Salīm Taqla Bey Foreign Minister Member

H.E. Mūsa Mubarak Director of the Bureau of H. E. Member
the President of the Republic

Attending from the Egyptian side including al-Nahhās Pasha:

H.E. Ahmad Najīb al-Hilālī Minister of Education Member

H.E. Muhammad Sabri Abu-'Alam Pasha Minister of Justice Member

H.E. Muhammad Salāḥ al-Dīn Bey Deputy Foreign Minister Member

At the inaugural session it was decided to send a telegram to the King of Saudi Arabia and to the King of Yemen, requesting them each to send a delegate to the conference in Alexandria, as a vacuum existed

without them. The telegrams were sent on 25 September 1944, signed by all the representatives in attendance.³⁶

An answer was received on the following day, 26 September from King 'Abdul-'Aziz, in which he stated that he and the Imam of Yemen agree and accept this invitation to send delegates to this conference. He then stated that he hoped for the interests of the Arabs and their unification that this conference would be blessed. Further that he was sending his special secretary Shaykh Yūsuf Yāsīn, and Khayr al-Dīn al-Zirikli from the Saudi Arabian Legation in Egypt, to participate in these meetings, and may God grant success to these actions.³⁷

It was decided after a short debate, to invite a representative from Palestine. The Palestinian delegate, Mūsa Bey al-'Alami, arrived in Alexandria on 26 September.³⁸

On 28 September 1944, a cable was received from the King of Yemen in which he stated that he was sending a representative to the conference.³⁹ The following day the Saudi Arabian representative arrived as did Husayn al-Kabsi, the representative from Yemen.⁴⁰ This then accounts for all that attended the conference at Alexandria, 25 September - 8 October 1944.

36. Al-Ahram. 27 September 1944.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid. It is interesting to note that the Palestinian representative was related, by marriage, to the Syrian Prime Minister, Sa'd-Allah al-Jābirī, and also to the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riyād al-Ṣulḥ Bey. J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 192.

39. Al-Ahram. 28 September 1944.

40. Ibid. 29 September 1944. On 28 September the conference moved to Fāruq I, University, In Alexandria.

The agenda of the Preparatory Committee was then presented as one of the first order of business. It was as follows:⁴¹

1. Investigate the possibility of informing each government about the minutes of the consultations relating to the other governments; or their summaries.⁴²
2. Register the matters which were agreed upon in the consultation stage.
3. Reconciliation of the points of view in the other matters.
4. Resume discussion of matters if needed.
5. Investigate the possibility of holding the General Arab Conference, its place and date, and the subjects to be discussed.
6. Some suggestions presented to H. E. al-Nahhās Pasha which he deemed necessary to submit to the committee.
7. Fresh suggestions and actions.

It was then decided to set up branch committees to deal with the various problems, they were: economic and financial affairs; communications; cultural affairs; nationality and passports; social affairs; and health affairs.⁴³

Summaries of the individual consultations were then distributed among the members and then they began to discuss the various aspects of cooperation. In regard to cooperation in the political aspect, which includes defence and foreign affairs, cooperation in this field was believed to be possible by Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. The Saudi

41. Minutes of the Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference - Alexandria, p. 12.

42. This refers to the contents of Chapter II, this work.

43. Minutes of the Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference - Alexandria, p. 16.

Arabian delegate suggested a postponement on the discussion of this aspect of cooperation, while the Lebanese delegate suggested that defence and foreign affairs should be singled out from political cooperation, and the delegate of Yemen stated that it would not be possible to realize political cooperation.

The idea of the central government was then discussed. The following were against the idea of a central government: Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen. Syria was the only country that was in favor of a central government, and if that was not possible, another system of union or agreement or pact should be set up.⁴⁴

The Lebanese delegate, commenting on the idea of a central government said that the Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon had said to him that, "it is very reasonable that there be one government in the Arab countries, but unfortunately there are actual conditions that should be taken into consideration." The Lebanese delegate said that the problem of independence must come before discussion on the details of cooperation. He then added, "We have declared in our parliament, in as much as we are eager for the independence of Lebanon, yet we ask for a complete and comprehensive cooperation with the Arab countries. So long as you have discarded the creation of a central government, I think that our cooperation should be based on respecting the independence of each Arab country, and its sovereignty."

The Syrian delegate suggested the unification of foreign affairs and defence. The Lebanese delegate agreed on the principle and stated that Lebanon should be considered an Arab country, and that Lebanon refuses to

44. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

be a settling place for imperialism and a passage to other sister Arab countries. When Lebanon asks that its historical and actual circumstances should be considered, this should be looked at with reason, and Lebanon hopes that the other Arab countries will not consider it an obstacle in the way of Arab unity, just because it wants to put off discussing political cooperation, as do some of the other delegates. "In brief, Lebanon wants independence and also wants cooperation with all the Arab countries." After much debate in which the independence of each Arab country was reaffirmed, this meeting was adjourned.⁴⁵

After discussing all points of view in regard to the formation of the instrument of cooperation the ideas were summarized as follows: first, the formation of an Arab union which would have an executive power, and this union would have an assembly also, in which the participating Arab countries would be represented in proportion to the number of population, or the budget or another system for determining the number of representatives. This idea was refused unanimously.

The second idea was the formation of a union whose decisions would not be binding except by those that accepted it. The instrument of the union would be as mentioned above, except in relation to the method of representation of the states participating in the union, i.e., the states participating in the union would be represented equally in the number of representatives.

The delegates then discussed the name of the union. It was suggested that it be named the Society of Arab States, or the League of

45. Ibid... pp. 25-28.

Arab States. The Syrian delegation suggested that it be named Pact instead of League, but this was objected to because of the fact that it might be interpreted to mean federation, confederation or entente. Finally it was agreed upon, unanimously, that the name should be The League of Arab States.

The Lebanese delegate suggested that the dispute in which the ruling of the assembly would be binding should not deal with matters of independence and boundaries, and this was acceptable to all.⁴⁶

Three points were then put forth by the Iraqi delegation, they were:

1. If any dispute arises between one Arab state and another, force should not be used to settle the dispute.
2. The avoidance of adopting a foreign policy detrimental to the policy of all the Arab States.
3. The observance of international commitments concluded by the majority of the Arab States, and based on the general interest of all.

The Lebanese delegate suggested a preamble to the plan with the following: (1) The respect of independence and sovereignty of the participating countries; and (2) The cooperation by all to repulse any aggression against any country participating in this League. By cooperation "I mean by heart, by spirit, and by announcing general support."⁴⁷ He then objected to point three of the Iraqi delegation (above) and suggested that political agreements should not be mentioned, but other ways of

46. Ibid., pp. 29-35.

47. Ibid., p. 42.

cooperation for the general interest of all be maintained such as, fighting locusts, diseases, etc.

A vote was then taken on the proposed article and was passed unanimously. This article dealt with disputes and their settlement between member states, and ultimately ended up as Article 5 of the pact of the League of Arab States.⁴⁸

The fourth point on the agenda was then discussed. That included Syria and Palestine.

The independence of Lebanon was again reaffirmed and a discussion of Lebanon was excluded. It was suggested that as long as Palestine is under the mandate, and Jordan is bound with Britain by a treaty which is similar to a mandate, and is not free in its foreign relations, the discussion of a Greater Syria plan or the creation of a central government between Syria and Jordan, be postponed until the conditions of Jordan are changed and the situation in Palestine is cleared up. Then the Syrian delegation suggested the following: "The Arab States represented in the preparatory committee support unanimously its respect to the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon with its present boundaries and this is what the governments of these states have already recognized after Lebanon had adopted a policy of independence, announced by its government in its statement of policy on which the Lebanese Parliament agreed unanimously on 7 October 1943." This was put to a vote and accepted unanimously.⁴⁹

The Iraqi delegation put forward a memo that was classified as top

48. Ibid., p. 44.

49. Ibid., pp. 48 - 51.

secret, suggesting the creation of two offices for Arab propaganda in London and Washington, for securing the Arab interests in general and the defence of the problem of Palestine in particular, which would guarantee the rights of the Arabs before and during the peace conference which will be held at the end of the war. There was unanimous agreement among the delegates that the two information offices should be established.⁵⁰

The delegate from Palestine then gave a resume of the history of Palestine in which he mentioned that the main problem in Palestine is the direct rule of the British, based on the mandate, and the policy of creating a Zionist national home. The Arabs on their side had their own national pact based on two points: (1) the refusal of the Balfour Declaration, and (2) independence within Arab unity. He then related the consequences of the Balfour Declaration, mentioning that the Jews prior to the Balfour Declaration were only 50,000 and now they amount to 750,000 in Palestine. The land that the Jews had possessed were very meager, but now they own two million dunums out of a total of six and one half million dunums, and as a result of this more than one hundred Arab villages became nonexistent. The Arabs have no hand in the government while the Jews have an internationally recognized agency, which the British government must consult in the administration of the country. Since 1919 the Arabs sent nine delegations to England and the League of Nations, and six bloody revolts broke out in the country, and about 16 commissions were sent by the British government to Palestine to investigate and discuss the causes of the trouble, and furthermore the British government issued 10 white papers, but all of this was fruitless in solving the problem.

50. Ibid., pp. 53-56.

The British government alleges that the policy which it applies to Palestine is in compliance with the White Paper of 1939. This White Paper deals with three matters, immigration, lands, and constitution.

The White Paper stated that at the end of five years, the end of March 1944, immigration would cease completely, whether the 75,000 immigrants allowed by the White Paper, entered Palestine or not. The fact is in 1939 the number of Jews were 400,000. Then 50,000 entered by virtue of the White Paper and another 50,000 were born so the number should be only 500,000, but we know that the Jews are 750,000, while they themselves admit that they are 650,000. This increase came about through illegal immigration.

The restrictions laid down on the sale of lands to the Jews were not enforced and so the quantity of lands purchased by the Jews has been increasing, while that owned by the Arabs is decreasing rapidly, notwithstanding the increase of births among them.

As to the third point, the question of the constitution, the British government postponed the settlement of this question because of the war.

In 1940 there was an agreement to modify the White Paper, between the Arab leaders and the British, and to solve the problem of Palestine in a way that would be satisfactory to the Arabs. The Iraqi government decided to declare war on the Axis and join the Allies and place its army at the disposal of the British, but the British did not execute that agreement.

The Palestinian delegate then discussed in detail the sale of lands to the Jews and the means to stop this and thereby save the remaining

lands for the Arabs, by establishing an Arab national fund, in which all the Arab countries would participate and execute control. The function of this would not only be the buying of lands in danger of being sold to Jews but also for the improvement of lands now held by Arabs.

He then asked that the Jewish industry in the Arab States be discouraged and stopped through effective legal measures, and that the Arab States must not permit the passage of Jews through their countries to enter Palestine secretly.

The committee then agreed that each Arab country would do their utmost to assist the Arabs in Palestine and that the idea of a central fund would be referred to the economic committee.⁵¹

The committee agreed on a draft of a protocol for forming a League of Arab States. After some discussion this draft was signed, on October 7, 1944, by each representative of all the delegations with the exception of the representatives of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, who stated that they would have to confer with their governments before signing. This document has become known as the Alexandria Protocol in as much as it was drawn up in Alexandria, Egypt.⁵²

The Alexandria Protocol consists of a preamble and five articles, basically it stated: a League of Arab States will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join; the decisions of the

51. Ibid., pp. 57-67.

52. For original Protocol, see Ibid., pp. 75-78; also published in al-Ahram, 8 October 1944; for English translation see: The Arab Information Center, Basic Documents of the League of Arab States, pp. 5-8.

Council of the League will be binding on those who have accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two member states of the League in which the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council of the League for solution, and in this case the decision of the Council will be binding; in no case will any member state resort to force to settle a dispute; in no case will the adoption of a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League or to a member state be allowed; the Council will intervene in every dispute that may lead to war; and a subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the political questions which may be the object of agreement among Arab States. It went on to state that the member Arab States will closely cooperate in economic, cultural, social and other matters (Article 2). There was an article in regard to strengthening the ties in the future (Article 3), and the last two articles concerned the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon (Article 4), and an article concerning Palestine (Article 5).⁵³

On the following day, 8 October 1944, al-Nahhās received a letter from King Fārūq, of Egypt, which stated: "As I am anxious to see my country governed by a democratic Ministry working for the fatherland and

53. The Alexandria Protocol is attached to this work as appendix 3. The representatives of Saudi Arabia and Yemen were not empowered to sign the Protocol without reference to their respective sovereigns. These countries later signed the Protocol-Saudi Arabia on 7 January 1945, and Yemen on 4 February 1945. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 411, 18 May 1947, p. 965. Kirk states that the dates were-Saudi Arabia, 3 January 1945 and Yemen, 3 February 1945. Kirk, op. cit., p. 341.

enforcing the laws of the Constitution in the spirit as well as in the letter, giving equality to all Egyptians in rights and duties and bringing to the masses food and clothing, I have decided to dismiss you from office." The letter then ended with thanks "for what services you were able to render during your term of office."⁵⁴

Unfortunately al-Nahhās, who had guided the conference up to this time, did not have the opportunity to complete the work that he had begun. Ahmad Māhir became the new Egyptian Prime Minister, and so ended the leadership by al-Nahhās, in this series of conferences.

54. The Times. 9 October 1944. Ahmad Māhir succeeded al-Nahhās Pasha as premier. He was assassinated on 24 February 1945, and was succeeded by Mahmūd Fahmī al-Nuqrāshī. Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples. p. 515.

CHAPTER IV

THE FINAL STEPS IN THE FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

A. Meetings of the Political Branch Committee for drawing up a Draft Pact of the League of Arab States.⁵⁵

In accordance with the decision of the Preparatory Committee of the Arab Conference, which met in Alexandria from 8 to 20 Shawwāl 1363, (25 September - 7 October 1944), in its sixth session, to form a Branch Committee for preparing draft byelaws for the Council of the Arab League, and for discussing political matters, these sessions are being held.

The Political Branch Committee held its first session at 11:00 A.M., Wednesday, 1 Rabi' I 1364 (14 February 1945), at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, His Excellency Mahmūd Fahmi al-Nuqrāshi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, presided.⁵⁶

Attending from the Syrian side:

H.E. Jamil Mardam

Foreign Minister

55. On 4 February 1945, it was announced that the Egyptian Foreign Minister, al-Nuqrāshi, had invited the Foreign Ministers of the other Arab States to Cairo to draft a Constitution for the proposed League. They met from 14 February 1945-3 March 1945, holding sixteen sessions. The League of Arab States, Minutes of the Sessions of the Political Branch Committee for drawing up a draft of a pact for the League of Arab States.

56. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

Attending from the Jordanian Side:

H.E. Samīr al-Rifā'i Pasha Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs

H.E. Sulaymān Sukkar Bey Financial Secretary of the Cabinet

Attending from the Iraqi side:

H.E. Nūrī al-Sa'id Former Iraqi Prime Minister

H.E. Tahsīn al-'Askari Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary to Egypt

Attending from the Saudi Arabian side:

H.E. Khayr al-Dīn al-Zirikli Chancellor of the Saudi Arabian
Legation in Egypt

Attending from the Lebanese side:

H.E. Henry Pharaon (Fir'awn) Foreign Minister

H.E. Fu'ad 'Ammun The Attorney General, State
Consultative Judiciary Council.

Attending from the Egyptian side: (including H.E. Mahmūd Fahmī al-Nuqrāshi)

H.E. 'Abd-al-Rahmān 'Azzām Bey Minister Plenipotentiary at the
Foreign Ministry.

A telegram was received from Yemen in which she stated her acceptance of the Protocol of Alexandria, which her representative had not signed. Apologies were also given for the fact that her representative would not be able to attend these sessions due to lack of time.⁵⁷

A long discussion was then held as to whether or not a representative of Palestine should be invited. Mr. Mūsā al-'Alami was then invited to participate in the conference, and he arrived shortly thereafter.

57. Ibid., p. 2.

A letter dated 3 January 1945, from Yūsuf Yāsīn of Saudi Arabia, was then read to the committee. The letter stated that basically Saudi Arabia accepts the Protocol of Alexandria, but with certain reservations. Among those reservations were: Syria and Lebanon should remain independent as republics as they now are; the effort to unify culture and legislation cannot be agreed upon by the Saudi Arabian Kingdom due to its special status, having the holy places located in it; and Saudi Arabia will not execute any principle in education and legislation that is contradictory to the laws of Islam. Further, economic and commercial cooperation would not be objected to but should not deprive each Arab State of its freedom to have its own administration over its economic system.⁵⁸

Iraq and Lebanon each submitted a proposed draft of the pact of the League.⁵⁹ The delegates then began to discuss the two drafts. The Lebanese delegate stated that one draft should be used as a basis for study, and inasmuch as their draft was consistent with the Alexandria Protocol, their draft should be used and not the Iraqi draft. Further, the Lebanese draft did not create any ambiguity about the definition of the League, the manner of executing its decisions, and the evaluation of acts that might constitute aggression and thereby would enable the League to take the necessary measures to repulse that aggression.

The Lebanese delegate then stated that he objected primarily to four points in particular in the Iraqi draft.⁵⁹ They were:

1. Article 5 of the Iraqi draft which states, "The Council of

58. Ibid., pp. 17-18, complete letter attached as Appendix 4.

59. Ibid., pp. 19-24, both the Iraqi and the Lebanese drafts are attached as Appendix 5, and Appendix 6, respectively.

the League shall guarantee the execution of the agreements concluded by the member states of the League with each other."

2. Article 9 of the Iraqi draft which states, "Each of the member states of the League shall undertake to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the other states...."

3. Article 11 of the Iraqi draft which states, "... Any member state which does not have a representative in any foreign country, shall charge any other member state of the League with representing it in that country."

4. Article 12 of the Iraqi draft which states, "In the event of a dispute between two or more member states of the League, and if this dispute cannot be settled through diplomatic negotiations, they shall present the whole matter under dispute for arbitration by the League...."

After these four points were discussed, it was decided that the best method would be to read both the Lebanese draft, and the Iraqi draft, article by article, and take the best points from each. This was then done, differences were resolved, and a draft was made combining the two drafts.⁶⁰

In the final form, this draft included a preamble, 22 articles, and two annexes. The main points were: the purpose of the League was in the preamble; membership in the League (Art. 1); the League shall have a Council, and each member shall have but one vote in this Council (Art. 2); duties of the Council were outlined (Art. 3); member states shall cooperate in economic and financial affairs, communications, cultural affairs, affairs relating to nationality, social and health affairs (Art. 4);

60. Ibid., pp. 97-101, this draft is attached as Appendix 7.

Cairo will be the permanent headquarters for the League (Art. 6); in the event of aggression the state which is being aggressed shall request the Council to convene, and the Council shall adopt any possible means to repulse that aggression (Art. 12);⁶¹ any state that desires closer cooperation than stipulated in this pact, has the right to conclude, with any other member state, any agreements that they desire, to realize this cooperation (Art. 14); each member state shall respect the system of government in the countries participating in the League (Art. 15); and two annexes, the first in regard to Palestine, and the second in regard to the bases of cooperation.

This then completed the work of the Political Branch Committee, on 17 February 1945, when all delegates agreed on this final draft of a pact for the League of Arab States, and the conference was adjourned.

B. The Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference.

The Political Branch Committee then sent its proposed draft, of

61. In a letter addressed to the chairman of this committee, from Tahsin al-'Askari, of Iraq, dated 11 March 1945, he said that he felt that three articles of this draft should be clarified so that there would be no misunderstanding. He then stated: "... Article 12: The States of the League may not interfere, jointly or severally in any dispute, of whatever nature, that may arise between the State of Iraq and any other State or States of the League, except at the request of the State of Iraq and the State or States which are a party to the dispute. Article 14: ... This authorization is, needless to say, only an admission of the right which is now enjoyed by the member states of the League. ... Article 15: The choice of the system of government in each State of the League is the exclusive right of the people of that State. But since the text of Art. 15 of the draft does not adequately clarify this principle, it should be made clear that the Iraqi Government cannot accept any departure from this principle which is recognized by all the countries of the civilized world...." Jordanian Government, White Book. pp. 107-108.

the pact for the League of Arab States, to the Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference which held its first session in al-Za'farān Palace in Cairo, 5:30 P.M., Saturday, 3 Rabī' II 1364 (17 March 1945).⁶²

H.E. Maḥmūd Fahmi al-Nuqrāshi Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, presided. The following representatives of the Arab States were present:

Attending from the Syrian Side:

H.E. Fāris al-Khūrī	Prime Minister
H.E. Jamīl Mardam Bey	Foreign Minister

Attending from the Jordanian side:

H.E. Samīr al-Rifā'i Pasha	Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
H.E. Sa'id al-Mufti Pasha	Minister of the Interior
H.E. Sulaymān al-Nābulsi Bey	Administrative Secretary of the Cabinet

Attending from the Iraqi side:

H.E. Arshad al-'Umari	Foreign Minister
H.E. 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyūbi	Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington
H.E. Tahsīn al-'Askari	Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary to Egypt

62. The League of Arab States, Minutes of the Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference, p. 1. This Conference consisted of two working sessions, held on 17 and 19 March 1945. This group then transformed itself into the General Arab Conference in which the final draft of the League was approved on 22 March 1945. Hurewitz states that between 24 February and 1 March 1945, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia declared war on the Axis, bringing the number of Arab countries at war with the Axis to five, inasmuch as Iraq had declared war previously. J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 193.

Attending from the Saudi Arabian side:

H.E. Shaykh Yūsuf Yāsīn	Deputy Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister
H.E. Khayr al-Dīn al-Zirikī	Chancellor of the Saudi Arabian Legation in Egypt.

Attending from the Lebanese side:

H.E. 'Abd-al-Hamīd Karāmī	Prime Minister
H.E. Yūsuf Salīm	Minister Plenipotentiary of Lebanon in Egypt
Mr. Fu'ad 'Assuūn	Attorney General, State Consultative Council of Lebanon
Mr. Subhī al-Mahmāsānī	Chief of the Court of Appeal, Lebanon

Attending from the Egyptian side: (including al-Nuqrāshī)

H.E. 'Abd-al-Hamīd Badawī Pasha	Foreign Minister
H.E. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal Pasha	President of the Senate
H.E. Makrām 'Ubayd Pasha	Minister of Finance
H.E. Muḥammad Ḥafīz Ramadān Pasha	Minister of Justice
H.E. 'Abd-al Razzāq Ahmad al-Sanhūrī Bey	Minister of Education
H.E. 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Azzām Bey	Minister Plenipotentiary in the Foreign Ministry

The following did not attend:

Mr. Mūsā al-'Alamī, Representative of the Palestinian Parties, who did not attend due to his illness, however, he sent a telegram stating that he hoped his health would permit him to travel to Egypt to participate in the sessions of the Committee.

H.E. Judge Husayn ibn-'Ali al-Hilālī, representative of the Yemenite Government, because he was not able to come on time.

The draft of the pact of the League of Arab States as approved by the Political Branch Committee, was presented at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference. It was then decided to discuss this draft in detail, and rewrite and/or rearrange the articles.

On Article 14 of the Political Branch Committee's draft of the Pact, which ultimately became Article 9 of the final pact, there was a long discussion as to whether the member states could be bound by an agreement or treaty made by another member state, either prior to the date of the League or subsequent to it. They then agreed unanimously that no member state, in an agreement or treaty with another member state or a non-member state, could obligate the other member states not involved in that treaty or agreement.

After general agreement was reached on this point, the committee, with only slight changes to the draft that had been presented to them, came to a unanimous agreement on a draft of the Pact for the League of Arab States, and this turned out to be the final pact that was signed on 22 March 1945, in the General Arab Conference.⁶³

63. To facilitate comparison of the draft as drawn up by the Political Branch Committee, with the final pact, the following should prove useful: the first number represents an article from the draft of the Political Branch Committee and the number following represents the number of the article in the final pact of the League of Arab States. See appendices 7 and 8 of this work. Art. 1 remained Art. 1, Art. 3 & 4 became Art. 2, Art. 2 and 2nd para. of Art. 3 became Art. 3, Art. 5 became Art. 4, Art. 13 became Art. 5, Art. 12 became Art. 6, para. 1 from Art. 18 became Art. 7, Art. 15 became Art. 8, Art. 14 became Art. 9, Art. 6 became Art. 10, Art. 7 became Art. 11, Art. 8 became Art. 12, Art. 9 became Art. 13, Art. 10 became Art. 14, Art. 11 became Art. 15, 2nd para. Art. 18 became Art. 16, Art. 17 remained Art. 17, Art. 16 became Art. 18, Art. 19 remained Art. 19, and Art. 20, 21 and 22, all remained the same number.

The pact, as drawn up by the Preparatory Committee and submitted to the General Arab Conference, contained 20 articles and three annexes.⁶⁴ The main points in it were: the Preamble stated that because of the desire of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States, and to support and stabilize these ties, this pact has been concluded; The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States that have signed this pact and any independent Arab State may join if it so desires (Art. 1); the purpose of the League is coordination and cooperation in economic and financial affairs, communications, cultural affairs, nationality and related affairs, social affairs, and health problems (Art. 2); the League shall have a Council, and each member shall have but one vote in the Council (Art. 3); a special committee for each of the items in Art. 2, shall be set up (Art. 4); there shall be no resort to force in order to settle a dispute, and the system of settling disputes (Art. 5); any aggressed state may request a special session of the Council, to determine the measures necessary to repulse the aggressor (Art. 6); unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding on all the member states of the League, majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them (Art. 7); each member state shall respect the system of government in the other member states (Art. 8); member states may conclude agreements to establish close cooperation and stronger bonds, should they so desire (Art. 9); a state may withdraw from membership in

64. The League of Arab States, Minutes of the Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference, pp. 59-66. For English translation, The Arab Information Center, Basic Documents of the League of Arab States, pp. 9-16; also see appendix 8 this work.

the League by giving a one year notice of that intention (Art. 18); and the pact may be amended by the consent of two-thirds of the states belonging to the League (Art. 19). The first annex was in regard to Palestine, and stated that until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should take charge of the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine. The second annex was in regard to cooperation with the Arab countries which are not members of the League. The third annex appointed the first Secretary General of the League, 'Abd-al-Rahmān 'Azzām Bey, and stated his term of office.

C. The General Arab Conference.

After all these years of trying to come to an agreement in regard to forming a League of Arab States, the General Arab Conference finally met on 22 March 1945.⁶⁵

The Minutes of the committee that had examined the credentials of the members of the delegations were read. The representatives were all authorized to sign the original document of the Pact of the League of Arab States.⁶⁶

65. The League of Arab States, The Minutes of the General Arab Conference. p. 1. This conference took place in al-Za'farān Palace in Cairo, from 4:00 until 5:15 P.M.

66. Ibid., p. 2. The delegates that attended this conference were exactly the same as attended the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, of 17-19 March 1954, with the following exceptions: Lebanon had only two representatives at this conference, they were: H.E. 'Abd al-Hamid Karāmi, and H.E. Yusuf Salim, the other two representatives of Lebanon absented themselves from this conference. The Palestinian representative, Musa al-'Alami, was present at this conference, but was not authorized to sign the Pact.

The chairman of the conference gave a speech followed by the speeches of the delegates of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Secretary General of the League.

At the conclusion of these speeches the Pact was signed by each authorized representative of every state in attendance, with the exception of the Palestinian representative who was not authorized to do so.

A telegram was received from the King of Yemen during this conference which read as follows: "We received your kind telegram and we thank you for your kind thoughts toward us and for the high aims and what you will send to us will receive our complete attention and consideration, God willing."⁶⁷

With the speeches completed, and the Pact signed, the General Arab Conference was then adjourned.

67. Ibid., p. 10.

CHAPTER V

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

A. EVALUATION

The signing of the Pact of the Arab League was cause for much rejoicing throughout the Arab World. A 19 gun salute was fired at al-Za'farān Palace in Cairo, on 22 March 1945, to commemorate the occasion.⁶⁸ Under the provisions of Article 20, the pact was to come into force 15 days after the Secretariat General of the Council of the League had received the instrument of ratification from four member states. By April 25, 1945, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq had deposited their ratifications, and the League came legally into existence on May 10, 1945.⁶⁹ However, inasmuch as this was a mere formality, the anniversary of the League is considered to be on 22 March.

Before examining the League itself, it should prove worthwhile

68. The Times, 23 March 1945. This article, as do many others, states that the representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, signed the Pact of the League of Arab States, on 22 March 1945. Yemen did not sign the pact that date, nor did she even have a representative at the General Arab Conference. Yemen did accept the Pact, but not until 11 May 1945. See George Kirk, The Middle East in the War, p. 341.

69. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 411, 18 May 1947, p. 965.

to compare the Alexandria Protocol with the Pact of the League.⁷⁰

The Protocol starts out, "Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries... "; while the Pact states, "Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States; and anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, ..." It seems that in the Protocol the ties were binding ties, while in the Pact they became linking ties. Also it should be noted that the independence and sovereignty of each state was recognized, while this was not mentioned in the Protocol. The Protocol was anxious to strengthen the ties, while the Pact was desirous of supporting and stabilizing these ties.

The Protocol, in Section I, states: "...every state shall be free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions." And, "In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed." These restrictive clauses are not found in the Pact. The only thing that the Pact says in this regard, as found in Article 9 (2nd paragraph), is: "Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future between a member state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members."

Section 3 of the Protocol states: "While expressing its satisfaction

70. All quotes are taken from Appendices 3 and 8, this work. Also see Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity, pp. 119-130; and Cecil A. Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective," The Middle East Journal, Vol. I, No. 2, April 1947, pp. 125-136; and T.R. Little, "The Arab League: A Reassessment," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 1956, pp. 138-150.

at such a happy step, the Committee hopes that Arab States will be able in the future to consolidate that step by other steps..."; while the Pact in Article 9 (first paragraph) states: "States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and stronger bonds than are provided by this pact may conclude agreements to that end." It seems that the Protocol had hopes for future consolidating steps, while the Pact would only permit it.

The Protocol states: "The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two member states of the League in which the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for solution. In this case the decision of the Council of the League will be binding." The Pact states: "If there should arise among [the member states] a difference which does not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory." Notice that in the Pact it is stated that if the parties of the dispute have recourse to the Council, whereas the Protocol stated that the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council.

Finally, the last difference between the Protocol and the Pact, is in regard to Lebanon. The Protocol had a special annex guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. The Pact had no such annex but would hardly be necessary when one considers Article 8 of the Pact, which states: "Each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive

concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government." There was no such clause found in the Protocol.

The next question is just what is the League of Arab States.⁷¹ The League is a legal entity composed of many legal personalities. It is not, however, a federal union, since the latter is a perpetual union of several states with a central government invested with power not only over the member states, but also over their citizens, and to which, from the international view point, the conduct of all foreign relations is confided. It has already been shown that by the Pact of the League, the sovereignty and independence of each member state is guaranteed. Article 19 states, "This Pact may be amended If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such times as the amendment goes into effect." In a federal union the member state doesn't have the authority to withdraw.⁷² To be sure the Arab League cannot conduct foreign affairs in the name of the member states, because a member state need not accept majority decisions of the Council, which is found in Article 7 of the Pact, and each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states, which is found in Article 8.

The League does not have an international character as did the League of Nations, or as does the United Nations. The jurisdiction of the League is limited within a certain geographical area, and restricted to a

71. See Majid Khadduri, "The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement," The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, 1946, pp. 756-777.

72. Ibid., p. 769.

special national group. Article 1 states: "The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States"

It may be an oversimplification to say that the purpose of the League is found in Article 2, which states: "The League has as its purpose the strengthening of relations between the member states; the coordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close cooperation of the member states, with due regard to the organization and circumstances of each state, on the following matters: A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry. B. Communications; this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs, and posts. C. Cultural affairs. D. Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition of criminals. E. Social affairs. F. Health Problems."

At an address given by Abd-al-Khalek Hassouna, the present Secretary General of the League of Arab States, he said: "Let me, at the outset, state emphatically that the League of Arab States is not an end in Arab aspirations for unity, nor the ultimate in unity. It is not a super-state, nor is it a federation of states. It is not even a confederation of states. It is a regional organization including every Arab state from Morocco, on the shores of the Atlantic in the west, to Iraq on the Arab Gulf in the east."⁷³ He then added, "The Arab League is composed

73. The League of Arab States, Arab League: Goals and Achievements. p. 3.

of member-states who have the same language, the same culture, the same traditions, the same trials and tribulations of the past, the same aspirations for the future in addition to geographic proximity.... Moreover, the League of Arab States views itself as a stepping stone toward complete unity.... In fact, the Pact establishing the League of Arab States was signed before the majority of the signatory states enjoyed full sovereignty, in order to satisfy, at least partially, the constant demand of Arab nationalists to unite their states.⁷⁴

This is a very interesting point that some of the states actually were not independent at the time that they signed the Pact. Syria and Lebanon, had both been recognized as independent by the Mandatory, France, however with certain reservations. The situation in Palestine and Transjordan was different however. Palestine was not allowed to sign the Pact, but Transjordan did sign it, even though not independent. Great Britain formally recognized the independence of Transjordan, in 1946.⁷⁵ Keeping in mind Article 1 of the Pact: "The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States ...", how then could Transjordan be eligible to sign the Pact and become one of the original members. The answer seems to be that the Arab countries never recognized the Mandates, and therefore, Transjordan was considered independent by the Arab States.⁷⁶

In regard to the financial expenditures of the League, each country was given a fixed percentage to pay, as was adopted by the Council,

74. Ibid... p. 6.

75. Majid Khadduri, op. cit... p. 766.

76. Ibid.

5 November 1945, Resolution No. 7. The percentage for each country was: Egypt 42%, Iraq 20%, Syria 16%, Saudi Arabia 7%, Lebanon 6%, Yemen 6%, and Jordan 3%.⁷⁷ As new members joined the League of course the percentages had to be shifted slightly.

It is apparent from the early pages of this work that several of the leaders of the Arab countries wanted to form some type of an Arab union. We have seen that several plans were proposed for the unity of the Fertile Crescent. Egypt, under the leadership of al-Nahhās, then took the lead and commenced consultations which ultimately led to the formation of the League of Arab States. Although each country's representative stated that Arab unity was the goal, no country, with the exception of Syria, was willing to give up any degree of its sovereignty or independence to form a new Arab State, made up of the composite states which had been formed by foreigners. Even Syria, who said that she was in favor of the strongest form of unity that could be agreed upon, would not join in Emir Abdullah's Greater Syria plan, because the resultant state was to be a monarchy with Abdullah as king, and this was not acceptable to the Syrian Republic.

In the final form, the League members actually have the power to

77. B.Y. Boutros-Ghali, The Arab League 1945-1955. p. 443. According to Resolution No. 577, adopted by the Council, 9 May 1953, the percentages were: Egypt 40%, Iraq 17%, Syria 13.5%, Saudi Arabia 15.5%, Lebanon 6%, Yemen 3%, Jordan 3%, and Libya 2%. Mr. Daly, of the Political Section of the League of Arab States, in answer to a question of mine, states: "The exact amount paid by each member-state is not available to the public, nor would I care to comment as to whether each State is paid up in full." I had heard that some member states refused to pay the percentage allotted to them, but could not substantiate this. Interview with Mr. Daly, Cairo, 15 August 1960.

veto anything that comes before the Council. Article 7 states, "... majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them." It then adds, "... the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws." This would seem to indicate that if any state should not happen to care to agree to any proposal, whether their representative had voted for it or not, it is not necessarily bound by it.

The final question that should be answered is: Was the formation of the Arab League a step toward Arab unity? It would not be proper to try and predict just what would have happened, in regard to Arab unity, if the League of Arab States had not been formed. It can definitely be said, however, that with the formation of the League, the idea of a Greater Syria plan, or a unified Fertile Crescent, was squelched, at least for the time being. That is, to date no union has come about because of the Arab League. If we accept the Syrian delegates words at face value, Syria would have been glad to form a union, the stronger the better, at the very early consultation stage. It would not seem fair, then to give the League credit for any union that Syria might join, subsequent to the formation of the League, when she was fully prepared to join such a union prior to the birth of the League. As is well known, Syria did join eventually with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic.

Lebanon, with her large Christian population, has been accused of being the stumbling block to unity within the Arab League. The facts show that not only Lebanon, but Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, all refused to give up their sovereignty to a greater state.⁷⁸

78. See Chapter II, this work.

The League was formed with the "green light" from the British. We have seen that the consultations, which ultimately led to the formation of the League, began shortly after Anthony Eden made his famous statement of 29 May 1941, in which he stated, "... His Majesty's Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval." Also, later he said, "Clearly the initiative ... would have to come from the Arabs themselves." To say that the League was formed as a tool of the British does not seem justified. The leaders of the various countries individually, and then jointly, came to Egypt for the purpose of seeing what amount of cooperation could be agreed upon. The final form that the League took was their own doing, and was the strongest form of union that they could all mutually agree upon. It appears that George Kirk is correct when he states: "While there is no disputing the close and constant official association of Clayton in particular with most of the leading personalities of the Arab League, both before and since its inception, to represent him or British policy in general as a parent of the League was a considerable exaggeration. British policy probably went no farther than acquiescing in what the Arab politicians were doing on their own initiative."⁷⁹

To go into the accomplishments and failures of the Arab League subsequent to its formation would not be within the scope of this paper. However, suffice it to say that if the independent Arab States desire to cooperate with each other, or as a bloc in international fields, or if they should desire to strengthen their ties with each other, the League

79. George Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 344. The Clayton referred to above is Brigadier (later Sir) I. N. Clayton, Arab Adviser to the Minister Resident and subsequently to the British Middle East Office.

of Arab States can assist them in so doing.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The Pact of the Arab League is actually a weaker, or looser tie toward Arab unity than was the Alexandria Protocol.

The League of Arab States is a very loose knit regional arrangement with each member state represented equally, regardless of size or population. Each member state has veto power over any proposal brought before the Council of the League. The Pact may be amended. However, any state that doesn't accept an amendment that is passed, may withdraw from the League. A state may withdraw from the League for any reason whatsoever by giving proper notice.

The League in its final form represents the extent to which the various Arab representatives could mutually agree to cooperate with each other.

The League of Arab States may be considered a step toward Arab unity, but only a weak and feeble step at that. To this date, it has brought about no new unions within the Arab World. It is a common meeting ground where internal cooperation may be extended, and a common front decided upon in the international field, but no decision may be forced upon a member state.

APPENDIX 1

STATEMENT OF AL-NAHHAS PASHA TO EGYPTIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ⁸⁰

"I have been long ago interested in the affairs of the Arab countries and in the cooperation for the realization of their aspirations towards independence and freedom.... In this respect I have been able to reach some successful steps; one of them was that the system of government in certain Arab countries has been modified in order to fulfill their real national aspirations.

"Ever since Mr. Eden had made his declaration I have given (the problem of Arab unity) my consideration; and I thought that the matter should be undertaken by the official Arab Governments themselves. I came to the conclusion that it would be better if the Egyptian Government itself should take the initial steps in this respect. First, the opinions of each Arab Government would be sounded as to what would be its aspirations. Then (the Egyptian Government) will then proceed to invite (the Arab Governments) to a friendly meeting in Egypt in order that the movement towards Arab unity would proceed to an effective agreement.

80. Majid Khadduri, "International Affairs Towards an Arab Union: The League of Arab States," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 40, 1946, p. 93. This was delivered in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies, on behalf of al-Nahhas, by Sabri Abu-'Alam, Minister of Justice, on 30 March 1943. Transliteration of names was done by Khadduri and not changed by this author. For Arabic version see: Al-Ahram, 25 September 1944.

Should such an agreement be reached, a conference will then be called in Egypt, presided over by the head of the Egyptian Government, in order to continue discussions of the subject and to make certain proposals for the realization of the objects aimed at by the Arab countries. These are the best possible steps to be taken in order that the scheme would be successful.

"Last Saturday I discussed the matter with His Excellency Tahsin beg al-Askari, Iraq's Minister of Interior, and His Excellency Jmil beg al-Midfai Moreover, I sent an official invitation to His Excellency Nuri-al Said Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq, who, should he agree with the procedure, will study the matter from the Iraqi point of view politically, economically, and socially, but especially from the political point of view. Then I shall send invitations to the various Arab Governments to send their representatives to Egypt in order to sound out their views respectively on the same subject.

"When such preparatory discussions have been completed and, I hope, will have been successful, the Egyptian Government will then invite (the Arab Governments) to a conference to be held in Egypt."

APPENDIX 2

SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE CONSULTATIONS WITH IRAQ, TRANSJORDAN,

SAUDI ARABIAN KINGDOM, LEBANON AND YEMEN.⁸¹

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81. The League of Arab States, Summary of the Minutes of the Consultations with Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabian Kingdom, Lebanon and Yemen, pp. 1-34. This document consists of thirty four pages in Arabic and has been translated by the author and which constitutes Chapter II, of this work.

ملخص محاضر المشاورات مع اليمن

خلاصة الأحداث السابقة أن اليمن ترحب بفكرة التعاون الثقافي والاقتصادي بين البلدان العربية الشقيقة بحيث تحتفظ كل دولة منها بكامل سيادتها وحقونها وألا تكون مقيدة بشيء ارتبطت به دولة أخرى كعاهدة توجب عليها شيئاً لبعض الدول الأخرى أو ما يشبه ذلك ويكون هذا التعاون قائماً على التساوي بين جميع الدول العربية في الحقوق والمصالح المتبادلة . ولما كانت المراجعة في الكيفية التي يحسن أن يكون التعاون المطلوب عليها ، وعدت بأن أعرض على جلالة مولانا أمير المؤمنين ملك اليمن أيده الله فكرة تأليف هيئة من جميع البلدان المتعاونة لتتولى الإشراف على ذلك والمراجعة فيما يلزم لتنفيذ كل ما تنفق على لزمه .

وإذا حصل - لاسمح الله - أي عدوان على أي بلد من بلدان الدول العربية المرتبطة بهذا الاتفاق أو تهديد له فللدولة المعتدى عليها أو المهتدة أن تطلب مساعدتها بكل ممكن وإن كان البلد عربياً غير مرتبط بهذا الاتفاق فلكل دولة عربية أن تطلب مساعدته ويكون على جميع الدول العربية في صورتين معاتلية هذا الطلب وتقديم كل ممكن من المساعدات المادية والمعنوية .

محضر الجلسة الرابعة

في منتصف الساعة السادسة من مساء يوم الأربعاء ٣ نوفمبر سنة ١٩٤٣ بدار وزارة الخارجية بالقاهرة بالهيئة السابقة .

تلى محضر الجلسة الثالثة وصادق عليه ووقعه رفعة الرئيس ودولة سعد الله الجابري بك ودولة جميل مردم بك وسكرتير هيئة المشاورات ؛ وحفظ الأصل الموقع عليه لدى رفعة الرئيس وسلمت نسخة منه إلى دولة سعد الله الجابري بك .

وبعد استعراض ماتم في الجلسات الثلاث الماضية من مباحثات ومذاكرات، رأى الجانبان أنها قد تناولت الموضوع من جميع نواحيه وحقت الغرض المقصود من المشاورات وبذلك تكون المشاورات قد تمت .
ثم اتفق على إصدار البيان المشترك الآتي :

« تمت اليوم المشاورات التي بدأت يوم الثلاثاء ٢٧ شوال سنة ١٣٦٢ - الموافق ٢٦ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٣ بين حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع مصطفى النحاس باشا رئيس وزراء المملكة المصرية ووزير خارجيتها .
« وبين حضرة صاحب الدولة سعد الله الجابري بك - رئيس مجلس وزراء الجمهورية السورية - وجميل مردم بك - وزير خارجيتها - بشأن الوحدة العربية وتعاون بلاد العرب .

« وقد عقدت هيئة المشاورات أربع جلسات بحثت فيها هذا الموضوع من جميع نواحيه في جو من المحبة الصادقة وعلاقات الود القديم المتصل بين القطرين الشقيقين وقد سادت مباحثات الجانبين ميول متبادلة ووجهة نظر مشتركة وإحساس قوى بوجود ربط البلاد العربية برباط متين من التكافل والتعاون لخيرها جميعاً وخير العالم بأسره .

« والله المستول أن يكمل هذا العمل بالنجاح وهو ولي التوفيق . »

ثم تلى هذا المحضر وصادق عليه ووقعه رفعة الرئيس ودولة سعد الله الجابري بك ودولة جميل مردم بك وسكرتير هيئة المشاورات وحفظ الأصل الموقع عليه لدى رفعة الرئيس وسلمت نسخة منه إلى دولة سعد الله الجابري بك .

ثم رفعت الجلسة حيث كانت الساعة السابعة والنصف مساء .

ملخص البيان الذي أدلى به الوفد اللبناني

في مشاورات الوحدة العربية

إن لبنان لا يألو جهداً للعمل في سبيل التعاون والتكاتف بين البلدان العربية لما في ذلك من الخير العميم للجميع وهناك عوامل ثلاثة جعلته يقترب من القضية العربية ويقبل على المشاركة فيها :

١ - ضعف الاثرات الأجنبية التي كانت تسيطر عليه خلال السنوات الخمس والعشرين الأخيرة .
٢ - تفهم شقيقاته العربية لموقفه المتحفظ من « الوحدة العربية » تقهماً جعلها تعترف بكيانه وحدوده الحالية دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة تامة .

٣ - تفهم لبنان لضرورات التعاون مع البلدان الشقيقة والمجاورة لمصلحة كيانه السياسي والاقتصادي معاً . والذي يرمي البلدان العربية في أمر لبنان بالدرجة الأولى ، ألا يكون أداة للأجنبي يستعملها بما يضر مصالحه .
البلدان العربية - وهذا ما تعهدت به أول حكومة دستورية للبنان بعد استقلاله في بيانها الوزاري وأقره المجلس النيابي بالإجماع في أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٣ .

فلبنان إذن لا يقل اقتناعاً ورغبة عن بقية الأقطار العربية بفوائد التعاون المشترك ، وقد كانت أولى خطواته العملية ما أقامه من صلات بينه وبين شقيقته سوريا ، ويأمل أن تقوم صلات مماثلة بينه وبين سائر البلدان الشقيقة . وما التحفظ الذي أبداه لبنان في الماضي ويديه اليوم إلا نتيجة للنفوذ الأجنبي الذي عمل لا يبعاد ما بين لبنان وسوريا ، أما الآن وقد تضائل هذا النفوذ وسيزول غداً فسوف تخف وطأة هذا التحفظ وتزول .

أما أداة التعاون بين سوريا ولبنان فهي تأسيس مجلس مشترك لإدارة المصالح المشتركة من الوجهتين التشريعية والتنفيذية وقد باشر هذا المجلس أعماله بالفعل ويمكن القول إن هذا التعاون قد أصبح وحدة اقتصادية صحيحة .

وقد أثر لبنان الانفراد في مسألتى الدفاع والشئون الخارجية ، ويمكن إيجاد تعاون وثيق بين البلدين في الناحيتين الثقافية والاجتماعية يؤدي إلى توحيد أنظمة التعليم ومناهجه .

أما موقف لبنان من القضية العربية فيكون مماثلاً لموقف مصر منها ، وهو يرغب في أن يكون تعاوناً وجميع الأقطار العربية على أساس السيادة والمساواة .

أما قضية فلسطين فهي تشغل خواطر اللبنانيين كثيرهم من أبناء الأقطار العربية إن لم يكن أكثر وذلك لمناختها الحدود اللبناني .

والحقيقة أن الفكرة العربية لا تقبل التجزئة من حيث الخير العام والتعاون بين جميع الأقطار العربية ، ومن الطبيعي أن الأقطار المستقلة أقدر على التعاون وتبادل المنافع بحرية ، ويجب ألا تحرم الأقطار المحمية أو غير المستقلة لسيادتها من هذه الفوائد ، بل يجب أن يرمى التعاون بين الدول المستقلة إلى مديداً المساعدة إلى شقيقاتها الأخرى ، ويجب الحذر من أن تستثمر الدول الأجنبية المسيطرة على الأقطار غير المستقلة شؤون الاتحاد لمنفعتهم الخاصة على حساب البلدان المحمية أو غير المستقلة السيادة .

و بلوح لنا أنه يستحسن عند ما تبلغ المشاورات العربية غايتها أو تكاد ، أن تؤلف لجنة من مندوبي الدول التي اشتركت بها و وافقت عليها ، فتعقد اجتماعات موقوتة في مصر والمملكة العربية السعودية والعراق والشام ، لتمديد السبيل لعقد المؤتمر واستكمال شروطه وذلك تظميناً لبعض الرغبات وإظهاراً للعناية بجميع الأقطار . ولقد أطلقت الحرب العظمى الماضية البلاد العربية من عقابها وحقت آمالاً كثيرة لأجزاء منها ، وجاءت هذه الحرب فوضعت قضية البلاد العربية مرة ثانية موضع البحث في ظروف أكثر ملائمة ، فوجهت إليها الأنظار وتحدث كثير من رجال السياسة عن تعاونها السياسي والاقتصادي الذي يتوقع حدوثه ويتوقف القيام به على أبنائها قبل كل أحد . وإذا كانت السياسة الدولية بعد تلك الحرب قد حالت دون تحقيق هذه الأمانة العزيزة للأقطار العربية التي انفكت عن الامبراطورية العثمانية ، فمسي أن ينجلى السلم الذي يراد تأسيسه بحيث يكون حافظاً لحقوق الشعوب ضامناً لعلمائنا الضعفاء كعلمائنا الأقوياء عن بلوغ ما تريده البلاد العربية من تعاون واتفاق ، وليس يدع أن تطالب البلاد العربية التي فترقت حيناً بإقامة نظام اتحادى بينها بعد أن أحكمت علاقاتها وروابطها حقائق الحياة المؤسسة على العوامل الجغرافية والتاريخية والعنصرية واللغوية .

وقد بعثت الحرب الحاضرة مخاوف جديدة ، وأثارت من مرقدتها مشاكل عديدة ، والنضال الذي حدث في سنة ١٩١٩ بين المبادئ القديمة المحافظة والمبادئ الحديثة الحرة وانتهى بفوز الأولى ، قد يحدث مثله عند انتهاء هذه الحرب ، فعلينا أن نأخذ أهميتها ونكون على أتم استعداد لتحقيق الأمانى التي تتوجه إليها في جميع البلاد العربية قلوب المؤمنين بالمثل العليا وبحقوق الانسان وكرامته .

وإذا كان الاتحاد مصدر قوة لغيرنا ، فهو لنا مصدر حياة ، تتطلع من خلاله إلى البقاء والسلامة ، بعد أن شهدنا في هذه الحرب وشهدنا من قبل ومن بعد كيف نضمحل الدول الصغيرة وتفقد استقلالها . وإن عزة هذا الشرق ومنعته ومصالحة السلام فيه وأمانه من أخطار السياسة وتقلباتها ومواجهة الاحتمالات والحوادث ، كل ذلك يدعو لتعزيز الأواصر وتوثيق الروابط . فلا يسع الذين يحملون عبء المسؤولية في ديار الشام إلا أن يعربوا عن شعور بلادهم وأمانها بالدعوة الصريحة إلى اتحاد البلاد العربية والقيام بكل ما يستطاع في سبيلها ونحن لا نريد أن نقنع باليسير من مجهودنا ، ولا أن نكتفى بأمال ضئيلة متضائلة مقصورة على حدودنا الصغيرة بل نريد أن نشاطر في إنشاء عالم كبير حافل بالأمال الجسام التي يحققها الاتحاد ويعززها التعاون . ذلك هو العالم العربي ، الذي يسمو مرة أخرى لاعلاء شأنه ، ويتطلع إلى إدراك المنزلة الشريفة التي يساعده على نيلها تاريخه وطبيعة بلاده ، وكثرة سكانه وسعة أرضه المتصلة بعضها ببعض ومكانه الذي خصه الله بين الشرق والغرب .

رفعة الرئيس - إتي في الحق عاجز عن أن أصف لكم مقدار اغتباطى وسرورى وتقديرى لهذه الروح القوية الصادقة وهذه العاطفة النبيلة المتدفقة وهذه الأفكار القيمة النيرة المبنية على الاقدام والعزم من جهة وعلى دراسة دقيقة للمسائل المطروحة من وجهة أخرى . ذلك إلى ما أبدىتموه من استعداد كريم للتضحية في سبيل الوصول إلى الهدف السامى الذى نرى جميعاً إليه ، ومن حرص بالغ على نجاح المهمة التي نضطلع بها . وقد تجلّى هذا الحرص فيما ذكرتموه من أنكم ترضون بالتعاون السياسى كما ترضون بالتعاون الاقتصادى والثقافى والاجتماعى وتؤثرون أقوى أداة لتعاون ، فإن تعذرت فانكم تقبلون أى نظام آخر يكفل تحقيق الغرض المنشود . كما تجلّى فيما اشترتم إليه من ضعف النفس البشرية وما يجب لها من معالجة تقتضى العمل على استرضاء الجميع والتزام الوسائل الجذابة التي تجلبهم في المشروع وتوجههم إليه ولو بالتدرج .

كل هذا جميل جداً وحكيم جداً وجدير بأن يسهل مهمتنا ويسير بالمشاورات في سبيل النجاح المأمول . ولقد المغم في بيانكم التميدى وفي بيانكم المدون إلماً شاملاً بجميع نواحي الموضوع ويسرني أن أرى أننا متفقون في الملاحظات والتوجيهات التي أدليتكم بها . وأنى لسعيد بأن أعمل مع إخوان منلكم يضعون نصباً بينهم المصلحة العامة للبلاد العربية قاطبة ولا يألون جهداً أو تضحية في سبيل اجتماع كلمة العرب وبعث مجدم .

إن مسائل مصر الداخلية كثيرة لا تحصى وتستلزم منا مجهوداً فوق الطاقة ، ولكتنا مع ذلك لن نبخل من جهتنا بأى مجهود مهما عظم في خدمة البلاد العربية وتحقيق أمانها .

أما اقتراحكم الخاص بتشكيل لجنة من مندوبي الدول التي اشتركت في المشاورات تعقد اجتماعاتها دورياً في مصر والمملكة العربية السعودية والعراق والشام لتمهيد السبيل لعقد المؤتمر العربى واستكمال شروطه ، فقد سبق أن اقترح على مثل هذا الاقتراح فلاحظت أن عقد اللجنة المشار إليها دورياً في بلدان مختلفة قد يكون فيه أحياناً حرج لبعض العناصر ، وقد تنشأ عنه بعض الصعوبات ولكنكم قد فسرتم غرضكم في بيانكم الشفوى وذكرتم أن المقصود بتشكيل هذه اللجنة التي تقترحون عقدها دورياً في مختلف الأقطار العربية هو أن تسجل النقط المتفق عليها بعد الانتهاء من مرحلة المشاورات . وأظن أن الاقتراح في هذه الحدود جدير بالتفكير والاعتبار . بقى أن أكرر لكم خالص شكرى وعظيم تقديرى للروح السامى الذى تجلّى منكم في هذه المشاورات وما أدليتكم به فيها من الأفكار الوطنية والآراء العملية القيمة . وأؤكد لكم أن هذه الفترة القصيرة التي قضيتها في قضيتكمها يتناكس لها في نفسى ونفوس زملائى أثر طيب عميق لن تمحوه الأيام . والله تعالى يوفق خطانا ويكمل مسعانا بالنجاح والتوفيق .

تم انفق على أن تعقد الجلسة التالية بوزارة الخارجية بالقاهرة في يوم الأربعاء ٣ نوفمبر سنة ١٩٤٣ في منتصف الساعة السادسة مساء .

ورفعت الجلسة حيث كانت الساعة الواحدة والنصف بعد الظهر .

التنوع حتى ولو كانت الأداة اتفاقاً اقتصادياً أو تعاوناً ثقافياً وهذا أضعف الايمان . وإذا كانت عندهم فكرة معينة فنحن مستعدون للعمل بها بلا قيد ولا شرط .
« تقول ذلك بدافع فكرة التضحية .

« إن رأي الشخصى هو أن البلاد إذا رغبت في الاتفاق تم ذلك سواء سارت على أسلوب التدرج أو الوصول دفعة واحدة . وهذا أمر طبيعى مادام الهدف سامياً .

« ولى أخيراً ملاحظة أرجو أن تنال من رفعتكم شيئاً من الاهتمام . البشر بشر . وهناك مسائل تحتاج إلى معالجة نفسانية ولا ينظر إليها نظرة مجردة . والعظيم يعالج العظيم . وقد باتت مصر ميداناً ضيقاً لا يتسع لنشاطكم وأهدافكم ولا شك أنكم واجدون في الميدان العربي الكبير أفقاً أوسع ومجالاً لمعالجة قضاياها بالحكمة ذاتها التي برعتم فيها في السياسة المحلية . فبين البلاد العربية من تقتضى الظروف استئثاره واسترضاءه بوجه أو بآخر فإذا أسفرت مشاوراتكم عن بعض النقاط المتفق عليها فلا بأس من أن تشكلوا لجنة ينحصر اختصاصها في تلك النقاط وتكون اجتماعاتها دورية في مختلف الأقطار العربية . وأمر كهذا إذا تم يكون ذا أثر طيب عند تلك الأقطار وبخاصة في هذا الوقت الذى أصبحت الأمم الكبيرة نفسها تشعر فيه بحاجة إلى الاتحاد والتكامل فكيف بالدول الصغيرة الناهضة والراغبة في أن تأخذ مكانها اللائق في المجتمع الدولى . ومن هذه الاجتماعات الدورية يتكون لدى رفعتكم فكرة واضحة عن جميع المسائل .

« هذا اقتراح أبدية لرفعتكم تاركاً لكم أمر تنفيذه أو عدمه حسبما يترامى لكم بالنسبة للظروف .

« وأود أن أؤكد لرفعتكم بأنى مع زميلى جميل بك نضع نفسي تحت تصرف رفعتكم للقيام بكل عمل تدعوننا إليه لتذليل أية صعوبة تنشأ مع أى قطر من الأقطار العربية إذ ينبغي أن يسود التفاهم بينها جميعاً .
« فسبروا على بركات الله ونحن وراكم فإن مصر أولى من يزعم هذا الأمر في مثل هذه الظروف . فإذا كتب لنا النجاح — وهذا هو المأمول — فسيسجل اسم مصطفى النحاس في كل بلد عربى لأنه يصبح آتد من رجال التاريخ الذين شيدوا الممالك .

وهنا انتهى دولة سعد الله الحبارى بك من إيضاحاته الشفوية ثم أخذ يتلو مذكرته المكتوبة وهذا نصها:
« تقسم المسائل التي ترغبون استطلاع رأينا فيها إلى قسمين: أحدهما يتعلق بسورية ومختلف شئونها وهو يشمل على ثمانى مسائل وثانيها يتعلق بالوحدة العربية ووجوه التعاون بين البلاد التي تنتمى إليها وهو يشمل على أربع مسائل .

« أما القسم الأول فقد جرت معالجة أكثر نواحيه وفي جملها فلسطين وشرق الأردن في البيان الذى أدلىنا به في اجتماع سابق ولا أرى حاجة إلى إعادة ما ذكرته . غير أنى أقيمت للبحث قضية أحب أن أوجه الانظار إليها لأنها تبين بطريقة عملية الاتجاه الذى نريد أن نسير فيه سواء في الأمور المتصلة بسورية أو بالوحدة العربية .

« فقد كنا دائماً نطالب بأن يكون لبنان بالنسبة إلى سورية في وضع طبيعى ، فاما أن تكون الصلات بينه وبيننا قائمة على أسس الاتحاد وإما أن ترد إلى سورية الأجزاء التي أنزعت منها ويعود لبنان إلى ما كان عليه من قبل . وليست هذه رغبة سكان سورية وحدهم ، بل هي كذلك رغبة سكان هذه الأجزاء التي ألحقت بلبنان مرعومة كارهة وظلت معارضة للوضع الذى أجبرت على الخضوع له بجميع أساليب المعارضة . ولكن الآن وقد أخذ يتخلص من كل نفوذ يفرض سبيله وبحول دون ممارسته الخصائص الاستقلال والسيادة وصلاحياتهما ، فإنا

رأينا أن نهج خطة جديدة ؛ فنقيم الصلات بيننا وبينه على قاعدة التعاون في تهيئة الاستقلال وتسوية المشاكل التي أحدثها الماضى بالتعاون والاتفاق وقد تذاكرنا مع ممثليه بود وصراحة وإخلاص ، ونظرنا في مهمات الأمور السياسية التي تتعلق بالبلدين ، وبدأنا فعلاً بتنفيذ ما قررناه ، فوقعنا اتفاقاً على المصالح المشتركة سيكون مقدمة لسواه من العقود والاتفاقات . وإذا استمر لبنان متمسكاً باستقلاله سالكاً هذه الطريقة في حل المشاكل ، بقينا من ناحيتنا آخذين بأسلوب جديد يعزز صلاتنا ويوثق روابطنا .

« فنحن إذن حريصون على تأليف سوريا الكبرى ، وإزالة التجزئة التي أوجدتها الثورة الغالبة والمطامع الدوابة والمنافسات السياسية ، وتريد الوصول إلى هذا التأليف بأية صيغة كانت وبأى طريقة أرادتها البلاد التي فصلت عن سوريا . ولا ننكر أن هناك مصاعب كثيرة ينبغي تذليلها . وهذا منهاج التعاون الذى نسير عليه في مفاوضاتنا مع لبنان يمكن أن يتخذ مثالا في معالجة أمور كل قطر من الأقطار التي انسلخت عن الوطن الأخر حتى يتحقق الاتحاد الذى ننشده وتطمس آثار تلك الظلمة التاريخية التي مزقت سورية وعاقبت سيرها ونموها واقصتها عن المكان الذى هي جديرة به ، وفي الوقت الذى نريد أن يتم ذلك بالاتفاق والتفاهم وبدون ضغط أو إكراه نكرر ما قلنا من وجوب احتفاظ دمشق بمقامها والجمهورية السورية بأصول الحكم فيها .

« أما القسم الثانى الذى يحتوى على المسائل الأربع المتعلقة بالوحدة العربية ومداهما وأداة تحقيقها ، وفي وجوه التعاون بين أبناء البلاد العربية وما ينشأ عن ذلك من اتحاد تكون له سلطة تنفيذية أو اتحاد ليس له سلطة تنفيذية ، فإن سورية تريد أن تؤدي واجبها الذى هو العنصر الأول للاحق على أكل وجهه ، فهي تقبل القيود كلها برغبة وإيثار ، غير مشترطة شرطاً وغير محجومة عن بذل أية تضحية في سبيل تحقيق الاتحاد العربى وتوثيق الرى بين أبنائه ، فترضى بالتعاون السياسى الذى يشمل الدفاع والشؤون الخارجية وحماية الأقليات وضمانه مصر لها بما توحيه من الثقة والطمأنينة وتبذله من المساعدة في سبيل تسوية أمورها ، وترضى بالتعاون الاقتصادى الذى يشمل النقود والمواصلات والجارك والتبادل التجارى والغاء الجوازات وما يتصل بذلك ، وترضى أيضاً بالتعاون الثقافى والاجتماعى الذى يشمل التعليم والتشريع ، أما بالنسبة لأداة التعاون المشترك فإن سورية تؤثر أقوى أداة وهي الحكومة المركزية ، وإن كانت لا تنجح ما يذوم في سبيل ذلك من عقبات ، فإذا تعذر ذلك أقيم نظام آخر من الاتحاد أو الاتفاق أو الحلف تستمد قواعده ونظمه من أوضاع متشابهة عند غيرنا من الأمم التي عالجت مثل هذه المشاكل ، أو تيسر على طريقة جديدة تتفق مع رغائبنا وحاجاتنا من غير تفيد بما صنعه غيرنا . ونحن في تقرير هذه المبادئ نتكلم باسم سورية سواء أكانت في وضعها الحاضر أم كانت في الوضع الذى تسمى لتحقيقه وهو : سوريا الكبرى .

« وفي رأينا أن يشمل الاتحاد مصر والشام والعراق والمملكة العربية السعودية واليمن وكذلك الأقطار التي ينبغي أن تولى سورية الكبرى كلبنان وفلسطين وشرق الأردن . أما الأقطار العربية المحمية أو بعض الأقطار في شمال أفريقيا ، فلا شك أنه ينبغي أن تمد لها يد المعونة على طريقة يتفق عليها فيما بعد ، وأن توازر في رفع مستواها وتكوين وجدانها القومى ، ولا بد لنا في هذا الصدد من القول إن البلاد العربية التي تأثرت بنفوذ أجنبي كان هذا النفوذ فيها متبايناً في مظاهره ونتائجه بحسب السياسة التي تطبقه وتنفذه ، فقد حالت سياسة دون تطور البلاد التي تخضع لها وحرمتها من مييزات العصرية ومن تكونها الذاتى ، ومكنت سياسة أخرى — مع الاحتفاظ بمصالح دوائها — بلاداً تسيطر عليها من التطور والتكون والسير في سبيل الاستقلال واتمتع بمظاهره . ولذلك فإنا نجد بوناً شاسعاً بين قطرين عربيين خضعاً في وقت واحد لسطان أجنبي مختلف .

محضر الجلسة الثالثة

في الساعة الثانية عشرة ظهر يوم السبت ٣٠ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٢ بقصر أنطون نبادس بالاسكندرية وبالمهنة السابقة .

تلى محضر الجلسة الثانية وصدق عليه ووقعه رفعة الرئيس ودولة سعد الله الجابري بك ودولة جميل مردم بك وسكرتير هيئة المشاورات وحفظ الأصل الموقع عليه لدى رفعة الرئيس وسلمت نسخة منه إلى دولة سعد الله الجابري بك .

ثم ذكر دولة سعد الله الجابري بك أنه - كما وعد - قد دون الردود التي أدلى بها في الجلسة الماضية في مذكرة مكتوبة لاثباتها في محضر هذه الجلسة . ولكنه يود أن يمد لذلك بإيضاح شعوى بسيط . وهنا قال دولته :

« إن المشكلة السورية تحتل المكان الأول بين القضايا العربية . ولقد تفضلتم فخصصتم لما يمانية أسئلة بينما أفردتم لباقي القضايا العربية أربعة أسئلة . وقد تضمن البيان الذي ألقيته في الجلسة الأولى الردود على أكثرها . ولم يبق لدينا إلا أن نوضح كيف يكون الحل

« إن المشكلة السورية تتعلق بأربعة أقطار وهي سورية - ولبنان - وفلسطين - وشرق الأردن . « إن هناك عوامل أساسية تدعو إلى توحيد هذه الأقطار دون النظر إلى صبغة هذا التوحيد أو شكله . وهذا التوحيد هو الهدف الذي كنا نسعى إليه في الماضي لنعمل على تحقيقه بلا قيد ولا شرط ورضاء أو كرها . « غير أنه بعد مرور عشرين سنة تعود فيها كل قطر على حياته الخاصة وطابعه الخاص ، قد استهدى ذلك تبديل الأسلوب وسلوك طريق الاسترضاء والاستئالة .

« فع المحافظة على دمشق كعاصمة والنظام الجمهوري كأساس ، فاننا مع إصرارنا على التوحيد ، نترك لسكان البلاد الخيار في صبغته .

« إن سكان لبنان بأكثرهم الساحقة ، وبضمنها الكثيرون من المسيحيين وجميع المسلمين ولا سيما في الأجزاء التي ضمت إلى لبنان بعد الحرب الماضية يرغبون في الانضمام إلى سورية بلا قيد ولا شرط . وإذا كانوا يشعرون الآن بشيء من الارتياح فانما أنام هذا الشعور عن طريقنا نحن لأن الأمل في التوحيد هو الذي يسكتهم . ونحن نخاف أن يعود قادة الرأي في لبنان إلى الارتواء في أحضان فرنسا فتصبح لما قدم راسخة من جديد بعد أن زعزعتها الحرب . ولذلك اعترفنا باستقلال لبنان وأيدناه على شرط أن يطالب مثلنا بسيادته الكاملة ويقتني خطواتنا في ذلك محتفظاً بوجهه العربي وفي الاتفاق على إدارة المصالح الاقتصادية بشكل يحقق مصلحة الطرفين . ونحن في كل ذلك ليس لدينا أي مطمع . وقد باشر الأخ جميل بك فعلا مفاوضات مع الحكومة اللبنانية توصل بنتيجتها إلى عقد اتفاق على المصالح المشتركة وقد تضمن الاتفاق بحث كثير من المسائل يمكن أن تتخذ مثالا لسائر الأقطار العربية كالجمارك والشركات ذات الامتياز والسماح بحرية المرور بين البلدين دون جوازات أو حواجز . وهذا كله مع المحافظة على استقلال البلدين بما سيزيد في توثيق الروابط بينهما في المستقبل .

« وقد كان من نتيجة تفاهننا مع رجال الحكم في لبنان أن تعهد رئيس الجمهورية الجديد ورئيس وزرائه

وأعضاء الحكومة بالألا يسمحوا للاجنبي بالسيطرة على لبنان سواء كان ذلك لاستعمارهم هو أو لاتخاذهم لاستعمار سوريا . وقد أشار إلى ذلك رئيس الوزارة رياض بك الصلح في بيانه الوزاري الذي القاه في مجلس النواب .

« إن سياستنا هذه من شأنها أن تبعد عنا وعنهم خطراً يؤذيها ويؤذيهم . وهذا الشكل من التعاون بيننا وبين لبنان يمكن أن تحتديه أجزاء سوريا الأخرى إن شامت . وإلا فلما نمنع من أن نسلك أسلوباً آخر .

« إننا نلح على التوحيد . ولكن لا عن طريق إكراه باقي الأجزاء السورية . « إننا ندعاه ومبشرين قبل أن نكون أصحاب كراسي . وقد اقتبسنا ذلك منكم ونسير على خطواتكم . فنحن يهمننا التوحيد وبذلك كل تضحية في سبيله تاركين الخيار للآخرين وليس لدينا فكرة السيطرة أو الحكم . « وأحب أن أبين ملاحظة أخرى بالنسبة إلى لبنان . فان الأذى الذي نشكو منه قد يكون سبباً للخير إذ كانت فرنسا تحكم البلدين حكماً مركزياً ناشئاً عن كونها احتفظت بكل عناصره لنفسها فحين انتقل هذا الحكم لكل من البلدين نجد أن ذلك مما يساعد على الوحدة .

« ولست أدري ما إذا كان هذا العنصر من عناصر التعاون مهيأ بالنسبة إلى شرق الأردن وفلسطين . فهما يكن من أمر فان تصريح ايدن معروف وموقف اجلترنا من اتحاد العرب مشجع وعساها أن نخطو خطوة جديدة نافعة بأن تسمح للأجزاء الواقعة تحت سيطرتها في سوريا بالانفصاح عن رغبتها بحرية . « وهذا ما يتمنى بلبنان . أما فلسطين فقد بينت ما يلزم بصددنا في المذكرة وأضيف مؤكداً مخاوف من مسألة انتشار اليهود في سائر الأقطار العربية .

« والآن انتقل إلى بحث القضايا المتعلقة بالأقطار العربية الأخرى . فقد كنت عرضت لرفعتم سابقاً أننا حين بدأنا في الحركة العربية لم تكن التجزئة لتخطر في بالنا بل كان هدفنا تحرير العرب وتشكيل دولة عربية موحدة . وما زلنا حتى الآن على تلك العقيدة ساعين وراء ذلك الهدف . « إن البلاد العربية تنقسم إلى قسمين : (الأول) ما كان بعضه قريباً من البعض ويجمعه صلته مع بريطانيا (والثاني) ما يدخل تحت النفوذ الفرنسي . ونحن تصور الوحدة المثلى شاملة لجميع الأقطار العربية مهما كانت كما ورد ذكرها في النشيد العربي المعروف :

بلاد العرب أوطاني من الشام لبغدان
ومن نجد إلى يمن إلى مصر فطوان

« على أننا نعترف أن ظروف بعض هذه الأقطار تحول الآن دون شمول الوحدة لها . ولكننا نرى أن العرب مع عملهم على تحقيق الاتحاد بين الأجزاء التي يمكن أن يشملها يجب عليهم ألا يهملوا الأقطار الأخرى بل يعملوا على مساعدتها لرفع مستواها وتوجيهها . « وعلى هذا فيمكن القول بأن البلاد العربية التي يمكن العمل الآن على جمعها هي مصر - والعراق - والشام والمملكة العربية السعودية - واليمن .

« ونحن لم نطلع على نتيجة مشاورات رفعتمكم السابقة مع غيرنا من ممثلي الأقطار العربية ومع ذلك فنحن مستعدون أن نسلم لكم ورقة بيضاء موقفة تخطون فيها ما تشاؤون من الحلول ونحن ننفذها بلا تردد . إن أحب أنواع الاتحاد لدينا هو الاتحاد ذو الصيغة التنفيذية . ومع ذلك فنحن لا تأخر عن قبول أي نوع آخر إذا تعذر هذا

منذ سنة ١٩٣٧ ووضعنا عنه مذكرة القاها وزير الخارجية المصرية إذذاك في الجمعية العمومية لعصبة الأمم . كما أتى أنا شخصياً أوافق على ماتروته من عدم السماح ليهود فلسطين بالانتشار في الأقطار السورية الأخرى إذا تم تكوين سوريا الكبرى ، ولكن بمعنى بالطبع أن أعرف آراء الجميع في هذا الشأن .

وأني الآن أكتفي بهذا القدر من البيان وأعدكم بإجابة ما طلبتموه من إعطائكم بياناً تحصر فيه المسائل محددة بالدقة لتفكروا فيها ثم تدلون إلينا بآرائكم في كل منها . وسنسلم اليكم هذا البيان بمشيئة الله في الساعة التاسعة من صباح الغد .

ثم قال رفعة الرئيس إن المشاورات بطبيعة الحال سرية . لا يقف عليها غير المتدوين الذين يشتركون فيها ورؤساء دولهم ولا يذاع شيء عنها للصحف ولأنه لئلا يفسد فيها عدا البلاغات المشتركة التي يتفق على إصدارها . وقد تم التفاهم على ذلك .

ثم اتفق على إصدار البلاغ المشترك الآتي :

« ابتدأت اليوم بقصر أنطونينادس المشاورات الخاصة بالوحدة العربية بين حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع مصطفى النحاس باشا - رئيس وزراء مصر - وبين حضرة صاحب الدولة سعد الله الجابري بك - رئيس وزراء سوريا ، وحضرة صاحب الدولة جميل مردم بك - وزير خارجيتها - ومعهما الدكتور نجيب الارمنازي أمين السر العام لرياسة الجمهورية السورية ، والسيد صبري العملي - نائب دمشق - والسيد علي حيدر الركابي رئيس ديوان وزارة الخارجية السورية .

« وقد رحب رفعة النحاس باشا بحضراتهم أجمل ترحيب وهنأ سوريا في أشخاصهم بوضعها الجديد وكرر تهنئته الخاصة لحضرة صاحب الفخامة رئيس جمهوريتها ولحضراتهم وباقي زملائهم على مانالوه من ثقة الأمة السورية الكريمة . فرد دولة سعد الله الجابري بك رافعاً أصدق آيات الشكر الى حضرة صاحب الجلالة ملك مصر ذا كرا بالثناء والتقدير ما لا قوه من حفاوة رفعة الرئيس وحفاوة مصر كلها منوها بما يقدمه رفعتهم من المعاونة القيمة لجميع البلاد العربية .

« ثم بدأت المشاورات في جو من المودة الصادقة والمحبة الخالصة والتقدير المتبادل بين مصر والجمهورية السورية . وقد استعرض الجانبان موضوع الوحدة العربية في مختلف نواحيه فهدت المباحثات الأولى على حرص القطرين الشقيقين على الوصول الى ما يحقق آمال البلاد العربية ويؤدي الى جمع كلمتها وتوطيد التعاون بينها .

« وسيعقد الاجتماع الثاني في منتصف الساعة السابعة من مساء الغد » .

ثم رفعت الجلسة حيث كانت الساعة التاسعة مساء على أن تعقد الجلسة التالية في الساعة العادسة والنصف من مساء يوم الأربعاء ٢٧ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٣ .

محضر الجلسة الثانية

في منتصف الساعة السابعة من مساء يوم الأربعاء ٢٧ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٣ بقصر أنطونينادس بالاسكندرية وبالهئية السابقة .

تلى محضر الجلسة الأولى وصادق عليه ووقعه رفعة الرئيس ودولة سعد الله الجابري بك ودولة جميل مردم بك وسكرتير هيئة المشاورات . وحفظ الأصل الموقع عليه لدى رفعة الرئيس وسلمت نسخة منه الى دولة سعد الله الجابري بك .

ثم ذكر رفعة الرئيس أنه أرسل في صباح اليوم - كما وعد - بياناً حصر فيه المسائل التي تناولها المشاورات محددة بالدقة . فرد دولة سعد الله الجابري بك بأن هذا البيان سلم إليه في تمام الساعة التاسعة صباحاً وأضاف دولته أنه على استعداد للرد على جميع الأسئلة التي تضمنها هذا البيان . ثم أخذ يرد عليها سؤالا بعد الآخر . وجرت مذكرات طويلة بين الجانبين عن كل منها ثم وعد دولته بتدوين رده في محضر الجلسة التالية واتفق أن تعقد هذه الجلسة في الساعة الحادية عشرة من صباح يوم السبت المقبل ٣٠ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٣ . ثم رفعت الجلسة حيث كانت الساعة التاسعة والدقيقة الخامسة والأربعين مساء .

الكتاب الأبيض قد هدم تلك الآمال فانهارت ، كما أن بعض الاعتراض ناشى من خوف كل فريق بأن يسلم بما ورد في هذا الكتاب حتى لا يطلب الفريق الآخر امتيازات جديدة .
أما الحل المقترح في الكتاب الأبيض فقد أصبح العرب ميالين لقبوله بحكم الأمر الواقع - على ما أظن - بعد أن حصل ما حصل وثبتت هجرة اليهود إلى فلسطين فعلاً واستقروا فيها مدة عشرين عاماً وهو بحرى الخطوط الكبرى لحلول أساسية كمنع بيع الأراضى وتحديد الهجرة وتشكيل حكومة وطنية وضمان حقوق الأقليات . وهذه حلول عامة معقولة ولكن الصعوبة تنشأ لدى التفصيل فلا بد من تحديد وتوضيح ولذلك فأتانا نرى أن يجمع ممثلو البلاد العربية مع ممثلي فلسطين في مؤتمر كما اجتمعوا من قبل ويقرروا الحل الذى يرونه موافقاً لقضية فلسطين .

وهناك نقطة خطيرة يجب التفكير فيها لمعرفة معناها ومداهما . تلك هي إمكان انتشار اليهود من فلسطين إلى الأقطار العربية المختلفة وذلك إذا وافقت على الانضمام للوحدة . وهذا الانتشار لا نرضى مطلقاً ولا نوافق عليه . ومهما يكن من الأمر فإنه من المستحسن الرجوع إلى رأى عرب فلسطين أنفسهم لاستشارتهم في قضيتهم . وهناك هيئة تمثل فلسطين وتجمع الأحزاب المختلفة وهي التي اشتركت في مؤتمر فلسطين . وأنا أقول على سبيل المجاملة إن جميع الأحزاب اشتركت في المؤتمر ، ولعل دعوة تلك الهيئة المؤلفة من عرب فلسطين الذين اشتركوا في مؤتمرها للرجوع إلى مصر وإبداء رأيهم في موضوع فلسطين والوحدة العربية تكون مفيدة وتساعد رفعتكم على تكوين نظرة كاملة للوضوع وجلاء الموقف هناك على حقيقته وهذا أمر سهل لأن جميع من اشتركوا في المؤتمر موجودون باستثناء السيد جمال الحسينى والسيد أمين التيمى وهذا التماس ضمنى أوجهه إلى رفعتكم لتبذلوا نفوذكم في سبيلهما .

لا غرور هناك ولا ادعاء وإنما هناك حقيقة يؤدها الواقع . فالجيل الذى نشأنا فيه هو الذى حمل أعباء الدعوة العربية التي كانت دمشق مبعثها فلا تستطيع عمان أو القدس أو حلب أن تحل محلها . فدمشق هي التي حفظت الاسلام وصانته العربية وهي التي يخفق قلبها لكل عربى وتضطرب إذا لحق الأذى بأى عربى أو أسوى إلى أى قطر من الأقطار العربية وفيها وجد الناطقون بالضاد دوماً ملجأ لهم وكل قضية عربية عامة تولد في دمشق وتنتشر منها ولعل رفعتكم إذا زرتهم دمشق تدركون ذلك من الحماسة التي ستثيرها زيارتكم وأسيديون ما نكته لكم وللقطر العزيز الذى تمثلونه . فدمشق إذن لا تستطيع أن تتنازل عن مركزها وإني أستلمهم كلامى هذا من سببين عظيمين : الأول هو اتصال سوريا الوثيق بالقضية العربية من ناحيتها العامة والثانى كون القضية السورية تحتل مكاناً كبيراً - بل المكان الأول - بين الشؤون العربية بسبب تعدد وجوهها واختلاف عللها . ثم إن دمشق بالإضافة إلى ذلك جمهورية وتود أن تحافظ على نظامها هذا لأنها تعتقد فيه الخير لها وللغرب ولأنه عنصر سلام بين البلاد العربية .

وكما أن رفعتكم صريح وتحبون الصراحة فاني أريد أن أكون كذلك صريحاً فأقول إن دمشق تحمض على الاحتفاظ بمكاتها التي استحققتها بطبيعتها وتاريخها وأنها لا ترضى عن نظامها الجمهورى بديلاً .

ودمشق تقر أمرين : الأول أنها حريصة على إقامة أحسن الروابط بينها وبين البلاد العربية وأن تكون هذه الروابط على أحسنها بين جميع البلاد العربية كذلك وهي لن تكون سبباً لاي خلاف بين بلد وآخر . والثانى إنما تعترف وتسلم بزعامة مصر راضية محتارة . وهي لا تقول ذلك اعتباطاً بل نتيجة تفكير عميق ودراسة للواقع . فان وراء مصر تاريخاً من الجهاد القومى ساعدها على تركيز كيانها فقد ثارت في زمن محمد على باشا

وحصلت على استقلال كونها اجتماعياً وثقافياً وإن طرأت عليها بعض التقلبات السياسية . وقد نشأ فيها رجال يستطيعون أن يتولوا توجيه القضية العربية بما لديهم من مزايا ووسائل وبما تتمتع به مصر من انسجام بين أهلها وذلك علاوة على الثروة والعدد والحضارة وهذه كلها عناصر قوة تتميز بها مصر . ولقد اغتبطت دمشق حين وفتتم رفعتكم في مجلس الشيوخ وأعلنتم خطتكم تعقياً على ما قاله المستر إيدن في بيانه المشهور عن اتحاد الدول العربية وهذه أمنية كانت تشتمل عليها القلوب في الشام فأصبحنا عندما رأينا إمكان تحقيقها نحسب أننا في حلم . فسوريا مستعدة للسير وراء مصر وبذل كل تضحية في سبيل القضية العربية التي تمنى لها كل نجاح . ولهذا الموقف أيضاً دافع داخلي فان سوريا تريد أن تربط مصيرها بمصير البلدان العربية الأخرى وما كانت العقيات مهما بلغت لتحول دون سعينا بلوغ الغاية .

إن سوريا تعالج مشاكل مستعجلة عن سائر البلاد العربية وإني لأخشى من بقاء سوريا مصير في معزل عن البلاد العربية لا تربطها بها رابطة ما فتزول بذلك عناصر الوحدة ويهدد ذلك كيان سوريا ومصيرها ويعرض تقاليدنا ولغتنا للأخطار وهذه الحقيقة المرة هي التي تدفعني وإخواني إلى العمل بجد واجتهاد على ربط مصير سوريا بمصير أخواننا ضمناً لمستقبلها ومهما كان ذلك المصير فإنه أفضل لها من أن تكون في عزلة عن شقيقاتها . وأستطيع أن أؤكد أن هذه الهيئة الماثلة أمام رفعتكم تمثل الشعب السوري وتشر بشعور ديمقراطى صحيح وترغب كل الرغبة في أن تأخذوا بيدكم الغلواء وتسيروا في الوجهة التي تريدونها .

هذا ما أستطيع قوله الآن بإيجاز مبدياً هذه الملاحظة . فقد تقلبت بنا الحوادث وجئنا إلى الحكم من جديد ومن عادة الأجنبي أن يحمو - عندما تعود إليه سلطته - كل ما تكون قد وضعته العناصر الوطنية ونحن نستأنف العمل كأننا استولينا على الحكم بدون سابق عهد وكذلك شأننا في القضية العربية فإذا كنا لا نبرح نعمل لخدمتها ونعرف جميع شؤونها كرجال وطنيين فتحن الآن بصفة كوننا رجالاً مسئولين مباشر العمل مباشرة تحتاج الى وسائل كثيرة واطلاع على أمور مختلفة . والجانب السوري يكون ممثلاً إذا كانت لديكم ما تفضلون به من إيضاح أو بيان سواء أكان متصلاً بالنواحي العربية ذات الشأن أم بالنواحي الاجنبية . هذا ما أردت قوله بادية الأمر وأرجو ألا أكون قد أمثلتكم بالاطالة عليكم .

رفعة الرئيس - إننى على العكس معتبط كل الاغتياب بهذا البيان الشافى الوافى وهذا الشرح المستفيض وهذه العواطف الكريمة النبيلة وما أعربتم عنه من آمال كيار يجب علينا أن نعمل جميعاً لها ونبذل كل جهد مستطاع في سبيلها وندعو الله أن يحققها . وقد أفدت فائدة كبيرة من البيانات الدقيقة التي أدليتكم بها بشأن تأليف سوريا الكبرى . ويسرنى أن أرى أن كثيراً من الملاحظات التي أبدتتموها تنفق تماماً مع ملاحظاتي الخاصة التي كوتها لنفسي . ولقد كنت وأتم تكلمون أجول معكم بخاطري منتقلاً من فكرة إلى أخرى مسروراً بما أسمع من العبارات والآراء وأؤكد لكم أنه لم يخالفني في أثناء حديثكم الطويل غير شعور الارتياح والاعجاب والفخر بكل ما تقولون .

كذلك تأثرت كثيراً لما ورد في بيانكم عن الانقلابات الدستورية التي كانت تحدث عنكم وهو أمر عانيتنا مثله في مصر وذقتنا مره ، فكانت الانقلابات التي تحدث عندنا نصف بحقوق البلاد ومصالحها وتفضى على المشروعات المفيدة التي تشرع الحكومات الشعبية في تنفيذها ، ومن حسن الحظ أن عودة المياه إلى مجاريها في مصر كانت دائماً بشيراً بعودة المياه إلى مجاريها عنكم .

أما الآراء التي بسطتموها بشأن المسألة الفلسطينية فهي في مجموعها تنفق مع الرأى الذى كونه بصدها

من جانبنا مستعدون لأن تقدم إليكم كل ما نستطيع من معونة بما لنا من علاقات طيبة بالدول التي أشرت إليها. هذا عرض عام أردت أن أبرز لكم فيه أهم المسائل التي تتناولها مشارراتنا معكم والصعوبات التي تعترض سيلنا. وأحب الآن أن أعرف رأيكم في هذا كله إجمالاً ثم نبحث في التفاصيل بعد ذلك.

دولة سعد الله الجابري بك — إن الشرح الذي تفضلتم به رفعتكم وأف ومحيط بالموضوع، وإنى وإن كنت مستعداً لأن أردرداً عاماً فإني أؤثر أن أتمدوا رفعتكم لي بياناً تحصر فيه المسائل محددة بالدقة فنبجها ونبدى رأينا فيها بصراحة وبكل سرور.

معالي الملالي باشا — إن هذا هو عين ما يقصده رفعة الرئيس.

رفعة النحاس باشا — أريد أن أسأل أولاً عن مآزونه في تأليف سوريا.

دولة سعد الله الجابري بك — إن دولة السيد جميل مردم بك ذو المام أوسع في الموضوع ويستطيع أن يقيه حقه من الايضاح، ومع ذلك فإني أسمح لنفسي بأن أقول كلمة عن تاريخ سوريا الحديث وتاريخ نضالها. تؤلف بلاد الشام وحدة جغرافية لاشك فيها ولا تحتاج إلى برهان. وهذه البلاد لم تكن مجردة فيما مضى وقبل أن تنفصل عن الدولة العثمانية كانت حدودها تمتد من كليكية إلى رفح ومعان. ومن البحر الأبيض المتوسط إلى داخل الصحراء. وكانت تؤلف مجموعة عربية متماسكة لا يخجل بتماسكها شيء. وكانت منقسمة إلى ولايات متعددة من الوجهة الادارية فقط، وبقيت تجمع بينها عوامل كثيرة كوحدة الخلق واللغة والتقاليد. ثم قامت ثورة الحسين العربية وعاضدها الحلفاء وعقد الناس الآمال على تلك الحركة التي تكلمت بالفوز إذ انسلخت البلاد العربية عن الدولة العثمانية وكان المتوقع أن يؤدي ذلك إلى تحررها وقيام دولة عربية موحدة فيها. ولكن الواقع أن جيوش الحلفاء احتلت بلاد الشام احتلالاً عسكرياً وعملت على تجزئتها فكانت سوريا وكان لبنان وفلسطين وشرق الأردن على حين أنه كان يتظر أن تكون هذه البلاد دولة واحدة فضلاً عن اتحادها مع العراق والحجاز وايمن.

وقبل ان نسلخ بلاد الشام عن الدولة العثمانية، لم يكن للبنان وجود مستقل بشكله الحالي بل كان هناك جبل لبنان الذي ينحصر ما بين فرن الشباك (خارج بيروت) من ناحية الغرب، والمعلقة من ناحية الشرق، وما بين شمالي البترون وشمالي صيدا. وقد أنشئ لبنان هذا على أثر حركة سنة ١٨٦٠ التي لعبت فيها الأيدي الأجنبية وقصدت الحكومة العثمانية أن تستغلها لتحتال على الدول فتحول دون خروج تلك المقاطعة من يدها، وسويت القضية بمنح لبنان امتيازات خاصة فكان يتمتع باستقلال إداري بسيط أو حكم لامركزي، وأصبح متصرفية (مديرية) يشرف على أمورها مجلس إدارة خاص بها ومتصرف (مدير) مسيحي بشرط أن يكون من المذاهب غير الممثلة فيها كالبروتستنت واللاتين حتى يضمن حياده التام.

كان لبنان قبل ذلك مرتبلاً بولاية صيدا وأحياناً بولاية دمشق وأميره من الشهابيين كالأمير بشير أو المعنيين كالأمير فخر الدين. وكان هذا الأمير خاضعاً لنفوذ الوالي حتى في العزل والنصيب، وفي تلك البقاع الصغيرة لبنان؛ كانت الطائفتان الدرزية والمارونية تصادمان دائماً وينضم الشيعة أحياناً للدروز بينما يبقى السنيون بدون أثر كبير بسبب ضآلة عددهم. وعلى هذا فلا يمكن القول بأن لبنان كان مستقلاً بالمعنى الصحيح في يوم من الأيام. أما البقاع الأخرى التي تكون الآن جزءاً من لبنان، فقد كان القسم الكبير منها قبل انسلاخ بلاد الشام عن الدولة العثمانية ساحلاً لسوريا. وفي نهاية الحرب العظمى الماضية احتل الإنجليز هذا الساحل وسلخوا إدارته المدنية للفرنسيين وكان ذلك نتيجة الاتفاقات السرية والعلمية بين إنجلترا وروسيا وفرنسا وأبين فرنسا وإنجلترا

(معاهدة سايكس — بيكو) التي جزأت تلك البلاد فكانت سوريا ولبنان من نصيب فرنسا، وفصت فرنسا لبنان عن سوريا فصلاً تاماً وضمته إليه بعض أجزائها فخلق لبنان الكبير المؤلف من جبل لبنان القديم مضافاً إليه بعض المناطق السورية وهي بعلبك والبقاع وطرابلس وصيدا وصور ومرجعيون (جبل عامل) وقطع الخط الحديدي الذي كان يمر كله في أرض سوريا فأصبح يمر بعضه في أرض لبنانية بين أرضين سوريين وقد تم ذلك بقوة السلاح وبعد القتال الذي نشب بين الدولة العربية في دمشق وعلى رأسها الملك فيصل وبين الفرنسيين. وعلى هذا فإن لبنان الكبير الحالي خلقه الفرنسيون بالقوة.

أما فلسطين فقد احتلها الإنكليز قبل غيرها من بلاد الشام فآقرقت عنا بالظروف العسكرية ثم أعقب ذلك تسليم سوريا لفرنسا وبقاء فلسطين في يد الإنكليز مما جعل الاتصال يتم بينهما.

وأما شرق الأردن فقد كانت في العهد العثماني مقاطعة تابعة لدمشق ولكن اتفاقية سايكس — بيكو أدخلتها ضمن نطاق النفوذ الإنجليزي. فلما خرج الملك فيصل من سوريا احتلها البريطانيون ثم أرسل الملك حسين ابنه الأمير عبد الله من الحجاز إلى شرق الأردن لانهاد سوريا ومساعدة أخيه الملك فيصل. ولكن مؤتمر سنة ١٩٢١ الذي عقد في فندق سميراميس في القاهرة برئاسة المستر تشرشل قرر فصل شرق الأردن نهائياً عن سوريا وإعلان الأمير عبد الله أميراً عليها فتم ذلك بالفعل ورضى به الأمير ووافق الفرنسيون على التخلي عن تلك المقاطعة السورية للإنكليز.

فالتجزئة إذن لم تكن نتيجة لطبيعة بلاد الشام السياسية أو الجغرافية وإنما كانت وليدة اتفاقات ومصالح أجنبية سرية وهلنية، وقد فرضت على أهل البلاد بالقوة.

إن السوريين يريدون الوحدة كما يريدونها كل عربي مخلص ولا سيما في زمان كهذا شهد اضطهاد الأمم الصغيرة وقام فيه البرهان على أن الأمم الكبيرة نفسها لا تستطيع الصمود أمام التيارات العنيفة فهي تبحث عن المساعدين والمؤازرين. وهذه الوحدة التي يريدونها السوريون لا يجهلون أن مصاعب كثيرة ومشاكل عديدة تعترض سبيلها، من ذلك مشكلة الصهيونية في فلسطين والنزعة المسيحية في لبنان، تلك النزعة التي لم يثبت بعد أنها تستند إلى عملية حماية صحيحة. ثم استطراداً قائلاً: لا شك أن لكل واحدة من هذه المشاكل حلولاً ممكنة ولكن وجوهها المختلفة تحتاج إلى أعمال الفكر حتى توضح من جميع نواحيها. ولذلك فإننا نريد أن نؤجل البحث فيها لجلسة قادمة حتى يكون رأينا في كل حل من الحلول واضحاً ودقيقاً.

ومع ذلك فيمكن الإشارة إلى الموضوع بصورة عامة.

إن فلسطين وهي القسم الجنوبي من سوريا قد أصيبت بوعده بلفور وتدقق اليهود إليها وما أعقب ذلك من اضطراب وثورات وراح أولو الأمر يفكرون في الوصول إلى حلول للشكوك لجزت محادثات وأرسلت لجانب تحقيق وعقدت مؤتمرات كان آخرها مؤتمر فلسطين الذي عقد بلندن سنة ١٩٣٩ ودعيت إليه سوريا إلا أن الفرنسيين حالوا دون سفر مندوب السوري بأن طلبوا منه وهو باستانبول جواز سفره بدعوى لزوم تأشير عليه ثم لم يردوه إليه. وقد انتهى المؤتمر إلى وضع الكتاب الأبيض بعد أن عجز الفريقان عن الاتفاق، وتضاربت الآراء فيه آتت إذ من الصعب معرفة ما إذا كان حل معين لمشكلة ما مفيداً وصالحاً في وقت صدوره ولا بد من التجربة لمعرفة ذلك. ولعل الإنكليز أدركوا أن المؤتمرين لا يمكن أن يتفقوا فأعادوا النظر في أبحاث المؤتمر ونشروا قراراتهم في الكتاب الأبيض المذكور الذي اعترض عليه الطرفان. وقد كانت لهذا الاعراض ناحية ضعف لأن كلا من العرب واليهود كان يعقد الآمال الحسام على المؤتمر فاعتبر أن ما ورد في

عن حقوقها ومصالحها وكانت عودة المياه إلى مجاريها في القطر السوري الشقيق مصدر غبطتنا وسرورنا فقد حقق الله بهار جانا وكافاً بمجهودنا وهو سبحانه وتعالى المسئول أن يكمل هذا المجهود - كما عودنا - بنجاح والتوفيق .

دولة سعد الله الجابري بك - أريد قبل كل شيء أن أرفع أخلص آيات الشكر إلى حضرة صاحب الجلالة ملك مصر المعظم على ما غمرنا به من العطف الكرم وأن أقدم لرفعتكم أجزل شكرنا لكم وللحكومة المصرية على ما لاقيناه من حفاوتكم وعنايتكم ومن حفاوة مصر كلها وأن أذكر بالثناء والتقدير ما تقدمتموه لرفعتكم في مختلف الظروف والمناسبات من معونة قيمة للبلاد العربية قاطبة كما أتى أشكر لرفعتكم ما أعربتم عنه من التهانى الرقيقة والعواطف الصادقة واعتقد أن نخامة رئيس الجمهورية وزميلى جميل بك وحضرات زملائى الآخرين يشاركوننى ذلك كله ويسرنى أن أعرب لكم أيضاً عن شعور الفرح والفخر الذى يساورنا ونحن مجتمعون اليوم أمامكم فى أرض مصر للباحثة فى مسألة كانت موضع اهتمامنا ونصب أعيننا منذ الصبا ونحن الآن أكثر حرصاً على نجاحها ليكون هذا النجاح على أيديكم ولذلك أرجو أن توقنوا أننا رهن تصرفكم فيما نطلبون ولن نألو جهداً فى العمل معكم على الوصول إلى الهدف الذى تنشدون .

رفعة الرئيس - إننى أعظم السرور بهذه العبارات الكريمة التى عبرتم بها أحسن تعبير عما يحتاج قلوبنا جميعاً من آمال كبار وأدعو الله أن يوفقنا وإياكم ويحقق آمالنا وأمانكم .

هذا ويهمنى أن أبدأ مشاوراتى معكم باستعراض الآراء التى تجمعت لدى بشأن تحقيق الوحدة بين الأقطار الأربعة التى كانت تألف منها سوريا وهى سوريا ولبنان وفلسطين وشرق الأردن ؛ فقد أبدت لى فى هذا الصدد آراء كثيرة سواء فى مشاوراتى السابقة أو فيما وصل إلى من التقارير والرسائل . ولكن مرجع الأمر فى ذلك هو بطبيعة الحال إلى أصحاب الشأن أنفسهم . ولذلك أعتبر أن المشاورات تدخل اليوم فى دور هام يتوقف عليه الكثير مما تتوجه إليه فى خطواتنا التالية .

وإليكم الآن بجمل هذه الآراء .

دار كلام كثير حول وجوب اندماج الأقطار الأربعة المشار إليها اندماجاً تاماً . ولست أخفى عنكم أتى أحسست أن هناك صعوبات تعترض تحقيق هذه الغاية ، وقد صارت بها من تحدثوا إلى فى هذا الشأن ، فإن لكل قطر من هذه الأقطار كيانه ونظامه ومكاته ودرجة تقدمه ، وحكومة بعضها جمهورية ، وعلى رأس حكومة البعض الآخر أمير ، فكيف يكون شكل الحكومة الموحدة فى حالة الاندماج ، وكيف تتغلب على الصعوبة الناشئة من امتيازات الموارثة فى لبنان ومن مركز اليهود فى فلسطين .

وهناك رأى بأن يقتصر الاندماج على سوريا وشرق الأردن ، إذا حالت الحوائل دون اندماج الأقطار الأربعة كلها ، ثم يدعى كل من لبنان وفلسطين إلى الاتحاد مع سوريا وشرق الأردن المندمجين وبذلك يكون الاتحاد ثلاثياً بين :

- (١) سوريا وشرق الأردن المندمجين
- (٢) فلسطين
- (٣) لبنان

ولكن تعترضنا هنا أيضاً نفس الصعوبة الناشئة من اختلاف نظام الحكم فى سوريا وشرق الأردن ، كما أن امتيازات الموارثة فى لبنان ومركز اليهود فى فلسطين قد تعترض سبيل الاتحاد كما تعترض سبيل الاندماج .

ثم إننا نريد أن نعرف كيف يكون مركز سوريا بالنسبة للعراق - وهو القطر المجاور الذى يريد أن يكون له بها اتصال وثيق ويرمى إلى إيجاد منفذ له على البحر الأبيض المتوسط بقصد تبادل المنافع الاقتصادية .

كذلك نريد أن نعرف كيف يكون مركز سوريا بالنسبة للمملكة العربية السعودية ومركز هؤلاء فى المجموعة العربية كلها ، وكيف يتم التعاون المنشود بين الجميع ؛ وإلى أى مدى يسير وأى الوجوه يشمل . وهل يقتصر على التعاون الاقتصادى والنقائى والاجتماعى ، أم يمتد إلى التعاون السياسى أيضاً ، وقد يتوقف ذلك على حالة كل قطر فإن حالة البعض قد تسمح له بالاشتراك فى التعاون الاقتصادى والاجتماعى والنقائى ولكن لا تسمح له بالاشتراك فى التعاون السياسى مثلاً .

هذه وغيرها مسائل نريد أن تبينها ونستطلع آراءكم فيها . وقد سبق أن تشاورت بشأنها مع مندوبى العراق وشرق الأردن والمملكة العربية السعودية . أما لبنان فقد رأيت ألا أوجه إليه دعوة المشاورات حتى يتم تبادل الرأى معكم وإن كنت قد سررت سروراً كبيراً بتطورات الأحوال فيه وبنتيجة انتخاباته سواء فيما يتعلق بالمجلس النيابى أو برئاسة الجمهورية أو برئاسة الحكومة وتكوينها .

ويهمنى هنا أن أقول لكم إن اهتمامى بهذه المسائل لا يقتصر على الوقت الذى أتولى فيه الحكم بل أنا أهتم بها وأعمل لمصلحة البلاد العربية قاطبة سواء كنت فى الحكم أو خارج الحكم ولكن أراد الله جل شأنه أن تجرى هذه المشاورات وأنا فى الحكم وفى ذلك كما أعتقد خير كثير . ولذلك يجب أن نحرص قدر المستطاع على الانخروج الامور عن طريقها الرسمى حتى لا تشعرب أو تتحرف أو تدخلها الاغراض إذا تناولها غير المسئولين ولكن يقوم المتشاورون بمهمتهم فى جو هادى . وكذلك يهمنى أن أؤكد لكم ما نعرفونه فعلاً من أن مصر تباشر هذه المشاورات وهى مجردة عن كل غرض إلا وجه الله ومصلحة البلاد العربية قاطبة .

فاذا بلغت المشاورات بأذن الله حداً يقرب وجهات النظر المختلفة ويؤذن بالنجاح ؛ أمكن تأليف لجنة تمثل فيها البلاد العربية صاحبة الشأن لاتمام الابحاث وتنسيق الاعمال والتمهيد لعقد المؤتمر العربى الذى نفكر فى الدعوة إليه .

هذا هو اتجاهنا ، وأحب أن أضيف إلى ما تقدم استيفاء لليان بجمل ما تضمنته أبحاثى ومخادئاتى مع اللجنة الفرنسية بالنسبة للمسائل السورية خاصة وهى أمور يعرفها دولة جميل بردم بك حق المعرفة ولا بد أن يكون قد أطلع حضراتكم عليها .

فالفرنسيون - وقد كانوا أصحاب الاتداب على سوريا ولبنان - يطعمون فى أن يكون لهم مركز ممتاز فيهما ، ويريدون عقد معاهدة معهما . وقد أفهمت الجترال كاترو فى مخادئاتى معه أن الظروف لا تسمح الآن بعقد معاهدة نهائية . وأن كل ما يمكن عمله عقد اتفاق مؤقت تجرى على مقتضاه الامور من الناحية العملية حتى يحين الوقت المناسب لعقد معاهدة نهائية . وقد أردت بذلك تمكين الحكومتين السورية واللبنانية من تسلم المصالح الوطنية التى يشرف عليها حتى الآن الموظفون الفرنسيون . وأعتقد أن اتفاق سوريا ولبنان على المصالح المشتركة بينهما كالأمر الجركية والأمن العام وشئون التعمير مما يسهل الوصول إلى هذه الغاية .

ولما كانت الحكومة الوطنية قد تألفت الآن فى كل من سوريا ولبنان فأتى أعتقد أن الآوان قد آن للعمل على تحقيق ذلك .

ثم أن هناك الدولة البريطانية وهى حليفتنا وهناك الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية شريكنا الكبيرة فى سير الحرب ولكل منهما تصريحات كثيرة فى مصلحة الامم الصغيرة . كما أن لبريطانيا تصريحات رسمية تضمنت بها استقلال سوريا واستقلال لبنان . فيجب انهاز كل ذلك فى مساننا لتحقيق آمال الشعب السوري الشقيق . ونحن

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١ - أعيد البحث فيها عن وجهات النظر في التعاون فكان الرأي النهائي ما يأتي .

- (١) إبداء أمنية البلاد العربية السعودية بأن تصل البلدان العربية لما تتمناه من المناء والسعادة .
- (٢) شعور جلالة الملك نحو البلاد الشامية جمعاء وما يتمناه لها من عز واستقلال في حكمها الجمهوري القائم في كل من سوريا ولبنان .
- (٣) المملكة العربية السعودية تعمل كل ما تستطيع لخلاص فلسطين مما هي فيه وترى أن تكون الكلمة في شأن فلسطين لما يجمع عليه أهلها فهم يقرون الشيء الذي يروونه صالحاً لبلادهم .
- (٤) إن موضوع التعاون بين البلاد العربية في المسائل الاقتصادية والثقافية أو أى تعاون ممكن فالمملكة العربية السعودية لا تمنع فيه عندما يكون ذلك في الامكان ويكون الوقت ملائماً له .
- (٥) أما اجتماع لجنة للبحث في هذه المسائل فعندما يحين وقت اجتماعها تكون المراجعة بيننا للاتفاق على وقت اجتماعها ومكانه .

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

المشاورات الخاصة بالوحدة العربية

بين

حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع مصطفى النحاس باشا رئيس وزراء المملكة المصرية ووزير خارجيتها

و

حضرة صاحب الدولة سعد الله الجابري بك رئيس مجلس وزراء الجمهورية السورية .

وجميل مردم بك وزير خارجيتها .

محضر الجلسة الأولى

في الساعة السادسة والنصف من مساء يوم الثلاثاء ٢٦ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٤٣ بقصر أنطونيانوس بالاسكندرية .

حضر

من الجانب المصري :

حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع مصطفى النحاس باشا رئيس وزراء المملكة المصرية ووزير خارجيتها

حضرة صاحب المعالي أحمد نجيب الهلالي باشا وزير المعارف العمومية

صاحب العزة محمد صلاح الدين بك وكيل وزارة الخارجية . وقام بأعمال السكرتارية .

حضرة الأستاذ أحمد رمزي القائم بأعمال المفوضية الملكية المصرية في

دمشق بالنيابة .

من الجانب السوري :

حضرة صاحب الدولة سعد الله الجابري بك رئيس مجلس وزراء الجمهورية السورية

حضرة صاحب الدولة جميل مردم بك وزير خارجية الجمهورية السورية

سعادة الدكتور نجيب الأرمنازي أمين السر العام لرياسة الجمهورية السورية

حضرة السيد صبري العسلي نائب دمشق

حضرة السيد علي حيدر الركابي رئيس ديوان وزارة الخارجية السورية .

رفعة الرئيس - إتي أفتح الاجتماع باسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وأرحب بحضراتكم جميعاً أجمل ترحيب

وأعرب لكم عن كبير سروري وعظيم انهماجي لفضلكم بأجابة دعوتي والحضور إلى مصر للاشتراك في مشاورات الوحدة العربية وإبداء آرائكم فيما تستطيع أن تقوم به لجمع كلمة البلاد العربية وتحقيق أمنيتها والعمل على حلها في حاضرها ومستقبلها ، ويسرني أن أهنئ سوريا في أشخاصكم بوضعها الجديد وعهدها الجديد وأن أكرر تهنئي الخالصة لحضرة صاحب الفخامة شكري الأولي رئيس الجمهورية السورية ولحضراتكم وجميع زملائكم وزراء وثواباً بهذه الثقة الغالية التي وضعتها الأمة السورية فيكم ، فكنتم خير من يمثل إرادتها وينطق باسمها ويدافع

محضر الجلسة الثالثة

في الساعة الواحدة بعد ظهر يوم الأربعاء أول سبتمبر سنة ١٩٤٣ بقصر أنطونينادس وبالمدينة السابقة .
تلى محضر الجلسة الثانية وصدق عليه وسلت صورة منه إلى دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا وحفظت الصورة
الموقع عليها بطرف رفعة الرئيس .
ثم قال رفعتنه إنه بطبيعة الحال سيحيط حضرة صاحب الجلالة الملك بما دار في المشاورات ، كما أن دولة
توفيق أبو الهدى باشا سيحيط به حضرة صاحب السمو أمير شرق الأردن .
أما فيما عدا ذلك فيحتفظ بسرية المشاورات طبقاً لما سبق أن تقرر في الجلسة الماضية وقد تم الاتفاق
على ذلك .

ثم اتفق على إصدار البيان المشترك الآتي :

« تمت اليوم المشاورات التي بدأت بين حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع مصطفى النحاس باشا رئيس وزراء
المملكة المصرية ، وبين حضرة صاحب الدولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا رئيس وزراء شرق الأردن بشأن وحدة
الأمم العربية وتعاونها بعد ثلاث جلسات تناولت المشاورات فيها هذا الموضوع من جميع نواحيه ، وبخاصة
من حيث الوضع الحالي لشرق الأردن ووضع المأمول سواء فيما يتعلق بعلاقته بسوريا ولبنان وفلسطين ، أو
بعلاقته بسائر الأمم العربية .

وقد سادت المشاورات روح الحرص العظيم على نجاح الجهود المبذولة لجمع كلمة الأمم العربية وتوجيه
أمورها الوجهة التي ترضاها .

ثم تلى هذا المحضر وصدق عليه وسلت صورة منه إلى دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا وحفظت الصورة
الموقع عليها بطرف رفعة الرئيس .

تم دواعت الجلسة حيث كانت الساعة الواحدة والنصف بعد الظهر .

امضاء | مصطفى النحاس
| توفيق أبو الهدى
| محمد صلاح لدين

ملخص المباحث التي جرت بين رفعة النحاس باشا والوفد العربي السعودي

الجلسة الأولى

- ١ - إبداء الرغبة في العمل لما فيه تأييد الصلات بين المملكة العربية السعودية ومصر بصورة خاصة
والبحث في كل ما من شأنه أن يؤدي إلى مافيه الخير للأمة العربية .
- ٢ - يجب أن يكون هدفنا العمل بكل ما يمكن لمصلحة الأمة العربية جمعاء دون النظر لجرم مقام لبعضها
دون البعض الآخر أو على حساب البعض الآخر .
- ٣ - يجب أن تتقي المخاطر والحجائل التي تضر مصلحة الأمة العربية .
- ٤ - يجب أن تكون خطانا في هذا المعترك معقولة مضبوطة حتى لا تتعرض لما يعوق سيرنا ويسد علينا
الطريق .
- ٥ - يجب أن يكون سيرنا في قضيتنا مبنياً على دراسة دقيقة لأوضاع الأمة العربية حتى نستطيع أن
نصف لها العلاج الناجع إذ أننا لو أردنا مثلاً أن نجتمع الأمم العربية كلها في دولة واحدة لتعارض ذلك مع
الأوضاع القائمة وقد ينشأ عنه اصطدام ليس لأحد مصلحة فيه .
- ٦ - يجب أن يكون اشتراك الأقطار العربية على قدم المساواة التامة ببعضها مع البعض .

الجلسة الثانية

- ١ - استعرضت وجهات النظر في التعاون والبحث في الموضوع بحثنا استيضاحياً .

الجلسة الثالثة

- ١ - بحث فيها شفويًا عن وجوه التعاون .

الجلسة الرابعة

- ١ - دونت فيها وجهات النظر وهي تشتمل على ما يأتي :
(أ) أن تستمر المساعي الفردية من الحكومات العربية لما فيه مصلحة لأي بلد عربي آخر وأن يكون ذلك
بشكل يؤدي إلى الثمرة المطلوبة ولا يحدث مضاراً بمصلحة العرب وأصدقاء العرب .
(ب) يرى تأجيل البحث في موضوع التعاون السياسي في الوقت الحاضر إلى أن تتغير الظروف القائمة .
(ج) الرغبة في تنمية التعاون الثقافي والزراعي مع مصر وسائر البلدان العربية .

وإذا كان الوضع الحاضر في سوريا لا يسمح بالتفاهم رسمياً على ما فيه مصلحة السوريين والعرب فليس من المعقول أن أمتنع أنا بصفتي الرسمية أو الشخصية عن الاتصال بالهيئات والرجال المؤثرين في سوريا للوصول إلى ما فيه مصلحتنا .

هذا بعض ما ضمته كتابي ويظهر أنهم بعد محاضرة لندن اقتنعوا بأن لا بأس من أن يعمل شرق الأردن للاتحاد مع سوريا ، ولكننا اختلفنا في شيء واحد وهو الوقت المناسب لهذا العمل ، فهم يرون أن هذا الوقت لا يكون قبل نهاية الحرب ، ونحن نرى أن الحرب لا تحل دون عمل كذا . وأخيراً قبلوا أن نبحت وتفكر في إعداد مشروعات تكون جاهزة عندما تنتهي الحرب أو عندما تسنح فرصة قبل نهايتها ، وعلى هذا الأساس أعدنا بعض هذه المشروعات ، وطبعاً أن يكون ما ذكرته في هذه الجلسة هو آخر ما وصل إليه تفكيري في هذا الشأن .

وهنا أبدى رفعة الرئيس إعجاباً وتقديره للبيانات الشافية التي أدلى بها دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا في الجلسة الماضية وفي هذه الجلسة فأوضح بكل جلاء مركز شرق الأردن وتاريخه وتطور الأحوال فيه وما يرمى إليه من أهداف وآمال ثم لحص رفعة موقف شرق الأردن من مسألة إعادة تكوين سوريا الكبرى على الوجه الآتي : الرغبة في قيام وحدة من الأقطار الأربعة والتغلب على العقبة التي قد تنشأ بسبب اليهود في فلسطين بإعطاء اليهود استقلالاً إدارياً .

وفاذا لم تيسر الوحدة الشاملة فيمكن تأليف وحدة من سوريا الصغيرة وشرق الأردن ثم يكون اتحاد منهما ومن فلسطين ولبنان على أن يكون هذا الاتحاد على طراز الولايات المتحدة أو على طراز الاتحاد السويسري . ثم انتقل البحث إلى مسائل عن رفعة الرئيس في أول الجلسة الماضية بشأن وجوه التعاون التي يرغب شرق الأردن في أن يشترك فيها مع الأمم العربية الأخرى فأدلى دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا بالبيانات الآتية :

(١) التعاون السياسي في الشؤون الخارجية :

يرتبط شرق الأردن بوضعه الحاضر في علاقاته الخارجية مع بريطانيا العظمى وحدها ولكنه يمكن من عقد معاهدات مختلفة مع بعض الدول العربية المستقلة وقبها مفوضه مع مفوضي هذه الدول .

ومن ذلك معاهدة صداقة وحسن جوار مع الدولة العربية السعودية في سنة ١٩٤٣ ومعهاهدة أوسع من ذلك عقدت مع العراق في سنة ١٩٣١ وهي معاهدة اعتراف متقابل وصداقة وحسن جوار وقد نص فيها على إمكان عقد اتفاقات بين البلدين بخصوص تسليم المجرمين واتحاد الجمارك .

وكذلك عقد شرق الأردن معاهدات واتفاقات مع المندوب السامي في سوريا بالنيابة عن سوريا ولبنان . كما أن شؤون تسليم المجرمين تجري بينه وبين سوريا دون تدخل السلطة الأجنبية .

وبالجملة فإن شرق الأردن يعمل على الاشتراك في الأمور الخارجية ويرغب - حتى ولو ظل على حاله الراهنة - في التعاون فيها مع الأمم العربية بقدر ما يجد الفرصة وبقدر ما يستطيع أن يتخلص من قيود المعاهدة المعقودة بينه وبين بريطانيا العظمى . فإذا نال باذن الله استقلاله فإنه يتعاون في الأمور الخارجية تعاوناً تاماً .

(ب) الدفاع :

يتمتع شرق الأردن بحسب التعديل الذي طرأ على المعاهدة منذ سنتين بالاستقلال في أمر جيشه وكانت

المعاهدة لا تسمح له بتشكيل قوات عسكرية إلا بموافقة صاحب الجلالة البريطانية ولكن هذا التقييد قد زال بعد التعديل المذكور وأصبح له الآن أن يشكل القوات العسكرية وينظمها بدون أن يرجع إلى أحد .

(ج) حماية الأقليات :

لأشأن لشرق الاردن بها .

(د) التعاون الاقتصادي :

تتمتع حكومة شرق الأردن في وضعها الحالي بكامل الحرية في الاتفاق مع الدول العربية على الأمور الاقتصادية وهي ترغب في التعاون مع الأمم العربية في هذا الشأن .

(هـ) التعاون الثقافي :

شأنه شأن التعاون الاقتصادي .

(و) التعاون الاجتماعي بما فيه التقنين :

شأنه شأن سابقه وهنا أضاف دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا أن لشرق الأردن سلطة تشريعية مستقلة عن البريطانيين .

ثم انتقل البحث إلى طريقة تكوين أداة تعاون بين البلاد العربية المختلفة فقرر دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا أنه كنزوري السعيد باشا يستبعد فكرة الحكومة المركزية ويفضل الوجه الأول من الوجهين الميئين في المحضر الرابع من محاضر المشاورات بين فخامته وبين رفعة الرئيس فاذا لم يرض الآخرون بهذا الوجه فلا مانع من الأخذ بالوجه الثاني .



ثم رفعت الجلسة حيث كانت الساعة التاسعة مساءً على أن تعقد الجلسة الثالثة في الساعة الواحدة بعد ظهر الغد .

مصطفى النحاس
امضاء توفيق أبو الهدى
محمد صلاح الدين

محضر الجلسة الثانية

في منتصف الساعة الثامنة من مساء يوم الثلاثاء ٢١ أغسطس سنة ١٩٤٣ بقصر أنطونياس وبالهيئة السابقة .
هنا رفعة الرئيس دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا بحلول شهر رمضان المعظم وشكره على ما جاء في الحديث
الذي أدلى به دولته إلى جريدتي المقطم والوفد المصري من عبارات طيبة عن رفعة .

ثم تلى محضر الجلسة الأولى وصدق عليه ووقعه رفعة الرئيس ودولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا وسكرتير هيئة
المشاورة وحفظ الأصل الموقع عليه لدى رفعة الرئيس وسلت نسخة منه إلى دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا .
وقد اتفق على أن تبقى المحاضر والمشاورة سرية لا يذاع شيء منها لا للصحف ولا لغيرها إلى أن يرى
بالاتفاق خلاف ذلك ، وعندئذ يتفق على دائرة الاطلاع وطريقته .

ثم قال رفعة الرئيس ان المشاورات وقعت في الجلسة الماضية عند تعرف رأي دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا
في طريقة تكوين الاتحاد الثلاثي بين :

- (١) سوريا وشرق الأردن .
- (٢) فلسطين .
- (٣) لبنان .

ومن أجل ذلك سلبت إلى دولته صورة من محضر الجلسة الرابعة من مشاورات رفعة مع فخامة
نوري السعيد باشا للاستئناس بما جاء فيه تيسيراً لتكوين الرأي .

وسأل رفعة دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا عن الرأي الذي كونه بهذا الخصوص .

توفيق باشا أبو الهدى - لقد فكرت ملياً في موضوع إعادة تأليف سوريا الكبرى فوجدت أن أحسن
ترتيب عملي هو - إذا أمكن - تكوين وحدة من الأقطار الأربعة فإذا اعترضت سبيل ذلك قضية فلسطين
أمكن إعطاء اليهود في فلسطين استقلالاً إدارياً . على أن يتم هذا بالطبع بالاتفاق بين سكان الأقطار الأربعة
فإذا قامت موانع دون الوحدة الشاملة أمكن تحقيق الوحدة بين سوريا الصغيرة (الداخلية) وبين شرق الأردن
ثم يكون اتحاد منهما ومن القطرين الآخرين ، أما عن نوع هذا الاتحاد فاني لأرى فائدة عملية منه إلا إذا كان
على طراز الولايات المتحدة أو على طراز الاتحاد السويسري وكل ذلك يتوقف بالطبع على اتفاق ذوى الشأن
في الأقطار العربية الأربعة .

وما دمت رفعتكم قد توليت أمر التفكير في اتحاد الأقطار العربية وأظهرتم في شتى المناسبات عطفكم على
القضية السورية وبذلت جهودكم المشكورة من أجلها فاني أرجو أن تسمحوا لي بإبداء آمال حكومة شرق
الأردن في الوحدة السورية .

لما أدلى مسترايدن بتصريحه الأول عن الوحدة العربية لم يكن لشرق الأردن أن يبحث في أمر هذه
الوحدة نظراً إلى صفوه وإلى وجود دول عربية أخرى أكبر شأنًا ولما استقلالها وسيادتها الكاملة كصر ولكن
شرق الأردن لم يجد وقتئذ مانعاً من أن يبحث في أمر الوحدة السورية أو الاتحاد السوري .

ففي سنة ١٩٤١ جاء مسترلتون وزير الدولة البريطاني السابق في الشرق الأوسط إلى عمان وجري بين وبينه
حديث في موضوع الوحدة السورية فاضيت إليه بآمالنا في أن تساعدنا بريطانيا العظمى على السير في هذا السبيل

الذي يهم شرق الأردن ويهم سوريا ويضع حداً لكثير من المتاعب التي قامت في فلسطين ولم تنجح إنجلترا حتى الآن
في القضاء عليها تماماً ، ثم لفت نظره إلى أن الأقطار الأربعة سوريا ولبنان وفلسطين وشرق الأردن كانت في
زمن الحكومة العثمانية مديرية وجزءاً من مديرية أخرى وأن مصالحتها مشتركة وأنها في مجموعها تولف وحدة
جغرافية فوعدت سمادته يومئذ بأن يبلغ هذه الأمانة إلى حكومته .

وقد كنت أقصد من ذلك بصفة خاصة ألا يحول البريطانيون بيننا وبين الاتصال بالحكومات العربية
الأخرى في هذا الصدد بحجة أن الاتفاق المقفود معهم يقضى بأن يتولوا مسائلنا الخارجية .

وبعد مدة جاء رد الحكومة البريطانية مشتملاً على ثلاثة أمور وهي :

أولاً - أن المثل الأعلى للوحدة العربية والاستقلال مما ينال العطف التام من حكومة جلالة ملك بريطانيا
على أن هذه القضية مما يرجع أمره إلى تبصر العرب أنفسهم عندما يكون الميدان أشد جلاء .

ثانياً - أن حكومة جلالة تری أن كل تقرب من الحكومة السورية أو من أية حكومة أخرى من
الحكومات التي تضعها حكومة شرق الأردن نصب عينها ينبغي ارجاؤه ريثما تبدو الحالة أكثر استقراراً .

ثالثاً - أن صاحب السمو الأمير وحكومة شرق الأردن وهما اللذان لا تشعر حكومة جلالاتهما بنير
شعور الشكر والوفاء يمكن أن يطمئنا إلى أن حكومة جلالاته سوف تصون مصالحهما المشروعة في الوقت المناسب .

هذا مضمون رد الحكومة البريطانية وقد جاني في منتصف سنة ١٩٤١ ولم أجد حاجة إذ ذاك للاصرار
في الموضوع لأن حكومة شرق الأردن كانت ترى أن الحكومة القائمة وقتئذ في سوريا غير دستورية ولا شرعية

إذ عينها مندوب سام أجنبي فهي لا تستمد سلطتها من الشعب ومن العبث المياحة أو التعامل معها .
ولقد أهمنا الانجليز وقتها أن من المصلحة العمل على قيام حالة أكثر استقراراً في سوريا بتأليف الحكومة

الشرعية وطلبنا منهم بذل التفوذ لدى الفرنسيين لكي تولف هذه الحكومة حتى نستطيع أن نتصل بها وتستطيع
هي أن تتصل بمن نشاء .

وبعد مدة أخرى حصلت مخاضات ثانية فيما يختص بإراءات الاعتماد وجاءنا الرد من الحكومة البريطانية
بالموافقة على ما طلبنا ولكن لفت نظري في هذا الرد العبارة الآتية :

إن أية حركة رسمية تجاه الحكومات العربية حول مسائل دستورية تختلف عليها ستكون في الأحوال
الحاضرة مصدرراً للحيرة والارتباك مما نعتقد أن سمو الأمير وحكومة شرق الأردن يرغبان في تجنبه .

فلما اطلعت على هذه العبارة حررت كتاباً شخصياً إلى المعتد البريطاني وجهت فيه نظره باعتباري شخصاً
مستولاً وباعتباري صديقاً إلى العبارة المشار إليها وقت ضمن ما قلت :

علمت وجهة نظرنا المستندة إلى وعود الحكومة البريطانية ولست أظن مطلقاً أن هذه الوعود كانت عبارة
عن تصريحات سياسية تحول دون السير بها التواصي غير العائنية التي تؤدي إلى وقف أي مسمى مما أعلنت بريطانيا

العطف عليه . وإني أعتقد أن الحيرة والارتباك اللذين أشير إليهما إنما قصد بهما مراعاة موقف الفرنسيين
الأحرار فيما يختص بسوريا ولبنان . ولا ترى هذه الحكومة أي مانع يمنعها من الاتصال بالحكومات العربية

المستقلة أما فيما يختص بسوريا فإنه لا توجد بها الآن حكومة مشروعة للنظام والعمل معها والسوريون والعرب
كافة ينظرون إلى إنجلترا نظرة عتب واستغراب من أجل موقف الفرنسيين وتعتهم وقد أصبحت تفتهم

تشمل الانجليز لاعتقادهم بأنهم يؤيدون الفرنسيين في تصرفاتهم ولا ريب أن وجود مثل هذا الشعور يعرقل
الكثير من الأمور .

"بما لان هذه الاقطار . إذا بقيت مجزأة . فقد تستطيع الاشتراك في بعض هذه الامور . ولكنها لا يمكن أن تشارك فيها كلها . وتكون الفائدة التي يتيسر لها الحصول عليها قليلة .

هذه أمنية أردت قبل كل شيء أن أفضى بها . وإني أرى كما يرى فخامة نوري باشا أن من المهم جداً السعي لايحاد سوريا الكبرى على أن تشارك بعد تكوينها في جميع وجوه التعاون السابق ذكرها .

فالفلسطيني يرغب في هذه الوحدة ليتخلص من الخطر اليهودي والسوري لتتسع مملكته ويقوى كيانه ، والاردني حتى لا يبقى بلده كاهو الآن صغيراً فقيراً يعتمد في نفاقته على معونة الانجليز . أما اللبناني فلا أعتقد أنه يوافق لما للبنان من أوضاع خاصة .

ونحن جميعاً نركن في تحقيق هذه الامنية إلى رفعة النحاس باشا بصفته زعيم الأمم العربية .

هذا هو رأي سمو الأمير وحكومته وشعبه .

أما الصعوبات المحلية والعرائق التي يبدو كأنها قائمة في سبيل تحقيق هذه الرغبة فمن السهل التغلب عليها مادامت المصلحة العامة هي غايتنا المشتركة . والذي نرجوه هو أن تساهدنا الدول العربية المستقلة ، لأن الأمم المتحدة تميل إلى إرضاء مصر والعراق . فلتق مساعهما عندها تأثيراً حسناً يؤيدنا فيما نبذله من جهود .

ولقد فهمت من مباحثاتي مع بعض الانجليز أن هذه الاقطار الأربعة ، إذا اتفقت على أمر فلن تقوم دونه موانع قطعية ، إلا فيما يختص بتأمين وضع مناسب لليهود في فلسطين ، وقد يسهل التغلب على هذه العقبة بفضل إرشادات رفعتكم . وعلى كل حال ، فليس هناك ما يمنع من اتحاد شرق الأردن وسوريا فوراً ، إذا اتفقتا على ذلك ، لعدم وجود أية صعوبة خارجية .

وهنا انتهى دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا من بيانه .

فقال رفعة الرئيس : إنه إزاء هذا البيان المفصل بترك مؤقتاً سؤاله الذي وجهه في بداية الجلسة ليسير مع دولته في الطريق التي سلكها . وأضاف رفعتة أنه لكي يستطيع بذل المسمى الذي يطلب منه ، يجب أن يكون هناك اتفاق بين الأقطار الأربعة على طريقة تكوين الوحدة أو الاتحاد .

دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا — الذي فهمته من تصريح رفعتكم ؛ ومن فخامة نوري باشا ، أنكم تقومون الآن باستطلاع رأي كل حكومة على حدة ، حتى إذا وجدتم وجهات النظر متقاربة ، دعوتهم إلى عقد مؤتمر منها ، وأنا إذا كنت قد أشرت في بعض بياني إلى رغبات أهل سوريا أو فلسطين فليست أزعم أنه يحق لي أن أتكلم باسمهم ولكن رفعتكم إذا دعوتهم من يمثل سوريا ولبنان وفلسطين ، وسمعتهم آراءهم وأبلغتهم مضمون أقوالى ووعدتهم أنهم يشاركونني اتجاهي ، فمعتد بكون التفكير فيما تسألون رفعتكم عنه .

رفعة الرئيس — ولكنني الآن استطلع رأيكم وهمتي أن أسألكم ماترون في كيفية تحقيق الوحدة والاتحاد بين شرق الأردن وسوريا ولبنان وفلسطين ، هل تندمج هذه الاقطار في دولة واحدة لها رئيس واحد وحكومة واحدة . أم يكون لها رئيس واحد وحكومات مركزية متعددة . أم تكون كل واحدة منها مستقلة عن الأخرى ويجمع بينها اتحاد يتفق على نظامه .

دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا — لو اقتصر الحال على سوريا وشرق الأردن ، لسهل أمر الوحدة ، لأن الاختلاف على نظام الحكم لا يكون سبباً لترك الوحدة . وإني أعتقد أن الوفدين السوريين ، إذا رأوا من المصلحة تغيير نظام الحكم ، فإني لا يتأخرون عن ذلك ولا يضحون بالوحدة بسبب نظام الحكم . وإذا كان منهم من يرى غير ذلك فانهم ينزلون على رأي الأكثرية . ولكن الصعوبة تأتي من لبنان وفلسطين .

رفعة الرئيس — إذن يحسن استبعاد فكرة الوحدة .

دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا — يمكن تكوين وحدة من سوريا وشرق الأردن ، ثم يدعى كل من لبنان وفلسطين إلى الاتحاد معها فيكون الاتحاد ثلاثياً بين (١) سوريا وشرق الأردن (٢) فلسطين (٣) لبنان .

رفعة الرئيس — ولكن كيف تكون هذه الوحدة بين سوريا وشرق الأردن ؟

دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا — تكون هذه الوحدة على أساس النظام الذي ترضاه الاغلبية .

رفعة الرئيس — ولكن مارأيكم أتم ؟

دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا — رأي أن يكون النظام ملكياً .

رفعة الرئيس — ولكن سوريا جمهورية .

دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا — يمكن أن يستبدل النظام الملكي بالنظام الجمهوري ، والذي يدعوني إلى هذا القول ، على بأن الكثير من السوريين ميالون للنظام الملكي . ويعني أن القائمين في الوقت الحاضر بالأمر في سوريا من الوطنيين المخلصين الذين يأبى اخلاصهم أن يجعل من قضية الملكية والجمهورية حائلاً دون تحقيق مصالح البلاد فاذا وجدوا المصلحة في تغيير شكل الحكم ، لم يكن لديهم مانع من ذلك .

وهنا سأل رفعة الرئيس عن طريقة الاتحاد الثلاثي بين :

(١) سوريا وشرق الأردن .

(٢) فلسطين .

(٣) لبنان .

وبعد مناقشات قصيرة ، أرحب ببحث ذلك إلى الجلسة المقبلة وسلم رفعة الرئيس دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا صورة من محضر الجلسة الرابعة من مشاورات رفعتة مع فخامة نوري السعيد باشا ، وهو المتضمن رأي فخامتة في طريقة تكوين الوحدة أو الاتحاد . وذلك للاستئناس بما جاء بهذا المحضر تيسيراً لتكوين الرأي .

ثم اتفق على اصدار البلاغ المشترك الآتي نصه :

ابتدأت اليوم بقصر انطونيانوس المشاورات الخاصة بالوحدة العربية بين حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع مصطفى النحاس باشا رئيس مجلس وزراء مصر وحضرة صاحب الدولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا رئيس وزراء شرق الأردن في جو من المودة الصادقة والرغبة المتبادلة في الوصول إلى جمع كلمة الأمم العربية وتحقيق التعاون بينها .

وسيعقد الاجتماع الثاني في منتصف الساعة الثامنة من مساء يوم الثلاثاء ٣١ أغسطس سنة ١٩٤٣

ثم رفعت الجلسة حيث كانت الساعة التاسعة والنصف مساء على أن تعقد الجلسة الثانية في منتصف الساعة الثامنة من مساء يوم الثلاثاء المقبل .

مصطفى النحاس
توفيق أبو الهدى
محمد صلاح الدين

ثم سألت رفعتة عما إذا كانت حكومة شرق الأردن تريد الاشتراك في هذه الوجوه؛ كلها أم تكتفي ببعضها وفي هذه الحالة مامي الشؤون التي تريد الاشتراك فيها؟

دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا — قبل الدخول في الموضوع وتمهيداً له، أرجو أن يسمح لي بإعطاء بعض الإيضاحات عن موقفنا في شرق الأردن، فإن مصر مثلاً دولة مستقلة استقلالاً تاماً ولها سيادتها ووحدتها السياسية والجغرافية. وكذلك العراق فإن له سيادته واستقلاله. ومن السهل أن يتفق بين مصر والعراق على التعاون في جميع هذه المسائل التي أشرتكم إليها. وكذلك الحال بالنسبة للمملكة العربية السعودية، إذا شاءت. ولكن الأمر يختلف فيما يتعلق بالأقطار الأربعة التي كانت تتألف منها سوريا الكبرى وهي: شرق الأردن، فلسطين، لبنان، وهذا ما أريد أن أشرحه.

إن الانتداب على سوريا، وإن كان قد انقضى، فإلزاماً عملاً. فالجمارك والأمن العام والشؤون الخارجية لا تزال في أيدي الفرنسيين، وليس هناك تمثيل دبلوماسي أو اتصال في الخارج، بل لقد حصل بعد أن أعلن الجنرالان ديجمول وكاترو استقلال سوريا، وكفلت بريطانيا العظمى هذا الاستقلال بلسان سير مايلز لامبسون مثلها في مصر — أن الجنرالين المذكورين عازداً تمسكاً ببقاء الانتداب، لأنهما لا يعترفان بما قرره حكومة فيشي من انسحاب فرنسا من عصبة الأمم ويتمسكان بعصبة الأمم وصك الانتداب. ولذلك كان من المتعين قبل أن يستطيع السوريون الاشتراك في شيء من وجوه التعاون التي أشرتكم إليها، وأن يحصلوا بالفعل على استقلالهم الذي لا يألون جهداً في المطالبة به، وأن يعرفوا حقيقة موقف فرنسا والأمم المتحدة من قضية الانتداب، لأنهم يعتبرون الانتداب ملغى بنسب على الاعتراف باستقلال بلادهم وكفالة بريطانيا لهذا الاستقلال. وبدليل أن جلالة ملك الانجليز هنا رئيس الجمهورية السورية وخاربه باعتباره رئيساً لدولة مستقلة كما أن الكثير من الدول اعترف بهذا الاستقلال وأوفدت بريطانيا العظمى وأمريكا ووزيرين مفوضين إلى سوريا. فالقول بعد كل ذلك ببقاء الانتداب أمر غير مفهوم ولا مشروع. ولا يختلف وضع لبنان عن وضع سوريا. فقد أعلن استقلاله بعد شهر أو شهرين من إعلان استقلال سوريا. وتلقى رئيس جمهوريته التهاني باستقلاله وأوفدت إليه بعض الدول ممثلها السياسيين.

أما شرق الأردن، فقد أعلن السير هربرت صموئيل، المندوب السامي البريطاني في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٢٣ أن له حكومة مستقلة يرأسها سمو الأمير عبد الله بشرط أن يحكم سموه بمقتضى دستور وعن طريق حكومة دستورية وأن يعقد مع بريطانيا معاهدة الاعتراف بهذا الاستقلال وقد تم ذلك بالفعل في فبراير سنة ١٩٢٨ إذ عقد بين الطرفين اتفاق أبرمه جلالة ملك الانجليز كما أبرمه المجلس التشريعي في شرق الأردن. وهذا الاتفاق مستمد من صك الانتداب على فلسطين وشرق الأردن مع استثناء الأحكام الخاصة باليهود.

وبمقتضى هذا الاتفاق أعطى شرق الأردن بعض الحقوق، كحق إيفاد موظفين قسطلين إلى الدول العربية وحق إصدار براءات الاعتماد إلى جميع القناصل الموفدين إلى شرق الأردن وحق الاتفاق مع أية دولة عربية على الأمور الاقتصادية والثقافية والاجتماعية وغيرها.

ويهمي هنا أن أبين أن شرق الأردن قد عومل دائماً معاملة تختلف عن معاملة فلسطين فقد سلبت بريطانيا العظمى في عدة كتب يضاء، كما سلبت في مؤتمر فلسطين الذي عقد في سنة ١٩٣٩، بأن الوعود التي قطعها السير مكماهون للمغفور له الملك حسين بشأن استقلال البلاد العربية تشمل شرق الأردن.

أما بالنسبة لفلسطين فقد كان الأمر محل خلاف. فالعرب يقررون بحق أن هذه الوعود تشملها كما تشمل شرق الأردن وسوريا ولبنان وسواحلها، بينما عاد الانجليز فقالوا إن هذه الوعود لا تشمل غير سوريا الداخلية (حماة وحلب وحمص والشام وتوابعها). وغير الأقطار الواقعة شرق نهر الأردن من البلاد التي وضعت تحت الانتداب.

ومن ذلك ترون رفعتكم أن شرق الأردن وسوريا لها — باعتراف الانجليز أنفسهم — سند قوي في المطالبة بالاستقلال والخروج نهائياً من الانتداب تنفيذاً للوعد المقطوع.

وهنا ذكر رفعة الرئيس أنه وضع في سنة ١٩٢٧ بحثاً ألقاه وزير الخارجية المصرية أمام عصبة الأمم. وقد أثبت فيه أن وعود مكماهون تشمل البلاد العربية المذكورة كلها، بما فيها فلسطين، فرد توفيق أبو الهدى باشا بأنه يعرف ذلك، وأنهم استفادوا من هذا البحث فيما يتعلق بشرق الأردن. فقال رفعة الرئيس: ولكن الأمر فيما يتعلق بشرق الأردن لم يكن محل خلاف، وأجاب دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا بأنه حرص مع ذلك على إثارة في مؤتمر فلسطين الذي عقد بلندن في سنة ١٩٣٩ لأبعاد المطامع اليهودية عن شرق الأردن وقدمت في ذلك وانتهى الاشكال.

ثم استطرد دولته فقال: أما عن فلسطين فقط احتفظ كل من العرب والانجليز بوجهة نظره وانتهى الأمر بإصدار الكتاب الأبيض الذي نص على ثلاثة أمور: الهجرة. وبيع الأراضي. والوضع السياسي الخاص بتأسيس الحكومة الفلسطينية. وقد وفي الانجليز بما وعدوا به في هذا الكتاب بالنسبة لتحديد الهجرة ومنع بيع الأراضي لليهود. وبقى الأمر الثالث. وقد جاء عنه في الكتاب الأبيض أن الحكومة الانجليزية ستدعو بعد خمس سنوات من تاريخ صدور هذا الكتاب (أي في أبريل القادم) لجنة من أهل فلسطين لوضع دستورها وتأسيس الحكومة الوطنية فيها.

وهنا لاحظ رفعة الرئيس أن العرب لا يوافقون على ذلك. فرد دولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا بأنه إنما أراد إيضاح الوضع القائم. ثم استأنف فقال:

إن كل قطر من الأقطار الأربعة يطالب باستقلاله وله حججه التي يستند إليها. وجميع هذه الأقطار ترمي — بعد التخلص من قيودها — إلى الاتحاد فيما بينها. وقد عرف ذلك فخامة نوري السعيد باشا فاقترح. في كتاب كان قد أرسله إلى المستر كايسي. إعادة الوحدة السورية بحيث تصبح هذه الأقطار الأربعة دولة واحدة أو متحدة على أن يكون المرجع في ذلك إلى رغبات السكان أنفسهم. ثم تدخل هذه المجموعة في الاتحاد العربي الذي يتألف من مصر والعراق وغيرها من الدول العربية.

فلما أصدر رفعة الرئيس تصريحه الشافي الذي كان له أعظم الأثر في البلاد العربية كلها سألني بعض وكالات الأنباء فصرحت لها بأننا ننتظر بسرور الدعوة التي يوجهها رفعة النحاس باشا إلينا للساهمة في هذا الأمر. ونرجو أن تعمل الدول العربية المستقلة بكل ما لها من وسائل فعالة. على أن تنال البلاد التي تتألف منها سوريا الكبرى استقلالها الحقيقي. وأن تكون وحدتها أو اتحادها باتفاق يتم بين أجزائها لتيسر وجود كتلة سورية مستقلة لها من حقوق السيادة بالبلاد العربية الأخرى كي تشترك في ما يجمع عليه العرب بشأن موضوع اتحادهم.

وقد قصدت بهذا التصريح أن أرجو من رفعة الرئيس. وهو الذي تفضل بالدعوة إلى جمع كلمة البلاد العربية. أن يساعد. بما لمصر من مركز وبما لرفعتة من نفوذ شخصي بصفته صاحب الزعامتين في المملكة المصرية على أن تنال نحن الأقطار الأربعة ما نصبو إليه لنستطيع أن نشترك في الأمور التي تفضل بالإشارة

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

المشاورات الخاصة بالوحدة العربية

بين

حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع مصطفى النحاس باشا ... رئيس مجلس وزراء ووزير خارجية المملكة المصرية

و

حضرة صاحب الدولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا رئيس وزراء شرق الأردن

محضر الجلسة الأولى

في منتصف الساعة الثامنة من مساء يوم السبت ٢٨ أغسطس سنة ١٩٤٣ بقصر أنطونينادس بالاسكندرية.

حضر

من الجانب المصري :

حضرة صاحب المقام الرفيع مصطفى النحاس باشا ... رئيس مجلس وزراء ووزير خارجية المملكة المصرية

حضرة صاحب المعالي أحمد نجيب الهلالي باشا ... وزير المعارف العمومية

صاحب العزة محمد صلاح الدين بك سكرتير عام مجلس الوزراء وقام بأعمال السكرتارية

من الجانب الأردني :

حضرة صاحب الدولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا ... رئيس وزراء شرق الأردن

حضرة الأستاذ سليمان السكر مساعد مدير عموم الجمارك بحكومة شرق الأردن

وقد حضر إلى مصر كسكرتير خاص لدولة توفيق

أبو الهدى باشا.

افتتح رفعة النحاس باشا الاجتماع بالترحيب بدولة توفيق أبو الهدى باشا والاعراب عن اغتباطه بأن يتعرف رأى دولته بالنيابة عن حضرة صاحب السمو الأمير عبد الله، أمير شرق الأردن، في موضوع الوحدة العربية، وأضاف رفعة الرئيس أنه سبق أن استطلع رأى فضامة نوري السعيد باشا، رئيس وزراء العراق كما أنه سبواصل استطلاع آراء مندوبى الدول العربية الأخرى التى يتيسر له استطلاع آراء مندوبىها. وذلك دون أن يبت فى شىء لأن الأمر فى طوره الحالى لا يعدو أن يكون مجرد مشاورات لتعرف الآراء المختلفة. ثم ذكر رفعتة أنه فى مشاوراته مع دولة نوري السعيد باشا، استعرض وجوه التعاون التى يصح أن تشترك الدول العربية فيها، كلها أو بعضها. فرق إمكان تحديدها على النحو الآتى :

أولاً - التعاون السياسى، ويشمل الدفاع والشئون الخارجية، ويلحق بذلك حماية الأقليات.

ثانياً - التعاون الاقتصادى ويشمل العملة والمواصلات والجمارك والتبادل التجارى بوجه عام.


ثالثاً - التعاون الثقافى والاجتماعى؛ ويشمل التعليم وما يتصل به، والتفنين.

مجلس اتحاد غير تنفيذى

(Assemblée) مجلس الاتحاد
(يمثل بالتساوى من الدول العربية الداخلة بالاتحاد بموجب نظام أساسى)

رئيس الاتحاد (ينتخب من قبل أعضاء مجلس الاتحاد)

(Conseil) مجلس رؤساء لجان الاتحاد



يكون لهذه اللجان صلاحية الاتصال والمخاطبة مباشرة مع الوزارات أو الهيئات المختصة فى الدول العربية الداخلة فى الاتحاد.

ملخص محضر الجلسة الثالثة

بناء على سؤال وجه إلى فخامة السيد نوري السعيد أجاب فخامته « إن الحلف أو الاتحاد إذا أمكن تحقيقه لا يكون إلا بين الدول المستقلة . وهذا لا يمنع من أن يقدم الحلف أو أى عضو فيه كل معونة ممكنة للأمم العربية الناقصة السيادة . وأما قضية تمثيل العرب في مؤتمر الصلح فالمؤتمر العربي هو الذى يقرر كيفية تمثيلهم في مؤتمر الصلح . »

ملخص محضر الجلسة الرابعة

وجه السؤال الآتى إلى فخامة السيد نوري السعيد وهو « إذا تمت الوحدة العربية فماذا يكون نوع حكومة الاتحاد المركزية ؟ »

فأجاب فخامته — إن اتحاد البلاد العربية بإيجاد حكومة مركزية لها جميعاً ، لا يمكن تحقيقه في الظروف الحاضرة مهما أردنا ذلك ؛ ليس فقط بسبب الصعوبات الخارجية بل أن ظروف البلاد العربية نفسها وما لها من مشكلات خاصة بكل منها وما بينها من تفاوت في الأحوال والاقتصاديات والثقافة فضلاً عن الصعوبات المشار إليها في البندين الثامن والتاسع ، كل ذلك لا يمكن معه تصور حكومة مركزية واحدة للجميع . فالبحت وراء هذا ضياع للوقت .

ولهذا رأى بموافقة الهيئتين استبعاد فكرة حكومة مركزية واحدة للجميع .

وقال فخامة السيد نوري السعيد إن التعاون في النواحي التى سبق ذكرها لا يكون إلا بأحد وجهين :

الوجه الأول — تكوين اتحاد له سلطة تنفيذية ، وتحدد هذه السلطة وطريقة التنفيذ في نظام أساسى تقبله الدول العربية التى تريد الدخول في الاتحاد . ويكون للاتحاد جمعية تمثل فيها الدول العربية الداخلة بنسبة عدد سكانها وميزانياتها حسب ما يتقرر في نظام الاتحاد الأساسى . ويكون للاتحاد رئيس ينتخب أو يعين وفقاً لأحكام هذا النظام . وتعاونه لجنة تنفيذية تمثل فيها جميع نواحي التعاون من سياسية واقتصادية وثقافية واجتماعية ويمكن لهذا اللجنة أن تستعين بالخبراء وأن تتخبر مباشرة مع الوزارات المختصة في الدول العربية المشتركة في الاتحاد وتكون اللجنة التنفيذية مسئولة أمام الجمعية . ولقراراتها قوة تنفيذية على الدول الداخلة في الاتحاد . وفي هذه الحالة تلتزم كل دولة تنفيذ القرارات ولو كانت مخالفة لرأى مندوبها

الوجه الثانى — إذا لم تقبل الدول العربية هذا النوع من الاتحاد الذى يترتب عليه تنازل كل منها عن جزء من سيادته والحد من حرية تصرفاته وإلزامه بالقرارات التى تصدر من الاتحاد ولو كانت مخالفة لرأيه ، فلا يبقى إلا تكوين الاتحاد على أساس أن قراراته لا تكون ملزمة إلا لمن يقبلها . وعندئذ تكون أداة الاتحاد ؛ كما سبق بيانه لا فيما يتعلق بطريقة تمثيل الدول المشتركة في هذا الاتحاد ؛ ففي الصورة الأخيرة لا يكون محل للتفاوت في النسبة وتساوى الدول المشتركة في الاتحاد في عدد المندوبين الذين يمثلونها .


وهنا لاحظ رفعة الرئيس أن هذه الصورة الأخيرة من صور التعاون قريبة الشبه جداً بنظام جامعة الاتحاد الأمريكى المعقود بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية ودول الأمريكتين الوسطى والجنوبية . مع ملاحظة أن هذا النظام الأخير استبعد التعاون السياسى استبعاداً تاماً واقصر على النواحي التجارية والصناعية والزراعية والاجتماعية

والثقافية . ثم شرح رفعة الرئيس نظام الاتحاد الأمريكى المذكور ولخصه على ما جاء في الجزء الثانى من السنة الثانية من مجلة القانون الدولى الصادر في سنة ١٩٣٨ . وأضاف رفعت أنه إذا استقر رأى على تكوين اتحاد بين الأمم العربية سواء على الوجه الأول أو على الوجه الثانى ، وسواء شمل التعاون السياسى أو استبعده فإن النظام الأمريكى يمكن الانتفاع به في وضع قواعد تنظيم الاتحاد العربى .

وقد رأى أن الاختيار بين الوجهين يستدعى استطلاع رغبات مختلف الدول العربية وقد ترك لرفعة الرئيس استطلاع رغبات الدول العربية المختلفة في هذا الصدد .

مجلس اتحاد تنفيذى

(أى حائز للسلطة التنفيذية بموجب نظام أساسى تقره الدول العربية الداخلة في الاتحاد)



يكون لفرع الهيئة التنفيذية هذه سلطة الاتصال والمخاطبة مباشرة مع الوزارات المختصة في الدول العربية الداخلة في الاتحاد .

ملخص المباحثات

التي جرت بين رفعة النحاس باشا ونخامة السيد نوري السعيد

لاطلاع أعضاء الوفود العربية الأخرى

ملخص محضر الجلسة الأولى

تبودلت الآراء في هذه الجلسة بصورة عامة واتهمت على الوجه التالي :

أرتئي أن مشروع التعاون لايجاد الوحدة العربية ينحصر في الأقطار العربية المستقلة وتستطلع آراء هذه الأقطار مع حكوماتها الوطنية في هذا الشأن .

وسأل رفعة النحاس باشا فخامة السيد نوري السعيد أن يبين النواحي المختلفة لهذا التعاون ، فارتئي أن يكون التعاون في النواحي المختلفة على الوجه التالي :

أولاً - التعاون السياسي ويشمل الدفاع والشؤون الخارجية ويلحق بذلك حماية الأقليات .

ثانياً - التعاون الاقتصادي ويشمل العملة والمواصلات والمجارك والتبادل التجاري بوجه عام .

ثالثاً - التعاون الثقافي والاجتماعي ويشمل التعليم وما يتصل به والتقنين .

ثم انتقل البحث إلى النظر فيما تكون أداة تحقيق التعاون ، وهل تكون بجانب الحكومات الإقليمية لكل أمة من الأمم التي تشارك فيه حكومة مركزية يهد إليها في المسائل المهمة الكبرى وماذا تكون سلطة هذه الحكومة المركزية وعلاقتها بالحكومات الإقليمية . وكيف يكون الحال إذا لم يتيسر الاتفاق بينها وبين تلك الحكومات وهل يمكن في هذه الحالة التنفيذ بشكل أو بآخر أو يبقى الأمر مقصوراً على مجرد الاستشارات وتتعلل المسائل المهمة الكبرى كما كان الحال في عصبة الأمم ؟ أم هل يكون هناك مجلس تنفيذي مكون من مندوبين عن البلاد العربية الداخلة في التعاون يتفق على إنشائه ومدى اختصاصاته ، ويوضع له نظام أساسي تقره هذه البلاد ، ويكون لقراراته الصادرة في دائرة اختصاصاته قوة تنفيذية .

وبعد تبادل الرأي رؤى إرجاء هذا الموضوع إلى جلسة مقبلة .

ملخص محضر الجلسة الثانية

استعرضت نواحي التعاون التي مر ذكرها في الجلسة السابقة فارتئي الاكتفاء بشأنها على الوجه المذكور .

وارتئي أن يتولى رفعة النحاس باشا المداولات مع البلاد العربية المستقلة بواسطة حكوماتها الوطنية . وأما

الأقطار الخاضعة للحكم العسكري أو تحت الانتداب أو لا توجد حكومات أهلية فيها فيترك لرفته الوسيلة التي يختارها لاستطلاع آراء أهلها على الوجه الذي برتئيه .

ملخص محاضر المشاورات

مع

العراق . شرق الأردن . المملكة العربية السعودية

سوريا . لبنان . اليمن

APPENDIX 3

THE ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL⁸²

The chiefs and members of the Syrian, Trans-Jordanian, Iraqi, Lebanese and Egyptian delegations at the Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference,

Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations,

And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries,

Have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (September 25, 1944) to Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944) in the form of a Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, and have agreed as follows:

1. LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join the League. It will have a council which will be known as the "Council of the League of Arab States" in which all participating states will be represented on an equal footing.

82. Arab Information Center, The Alexandria Protocol, pp. 1-8.

The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings which will strengthen the relations between those states; to coordinate their political plans so as to insure their cooperation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.

The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two member states of the League in which the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for solution. In this case the decision of the Council of the League will be binding.

In no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between any two member states of the League be allowed. But every state shall be free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions.

In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed.

The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between a member state of the League and any other member state or power, so as to reconcile them.

A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the political questions which may be the object of agreement

among Arab States.

2. COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND OTHER MATTERS

A. The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee shall closely cooperate in the following matters:

(1) Economic and financial matters, i.e. commercial exchange, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry.

(2) Communications, i.e., railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and telegraphs

(3) Cultural matters.

(4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, extradition of criminals, etc.

(5) Social questions.

(6) Questions of public health.

B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will be formed in which the states which have participated in the Preliminary Committee will be represented. This subcommittee will prepare draft regulations for cooperation in the above matters, describing the extent and means of that collaboration.

C. A committee for coordination and editing will be formed whose object will be to control the work of the other subcommittees, to coordinate that part of the work which is accomplished, and to prepare drafts of agreements which will be submitted to the various governments.

D. When all the subcommittees have accomplished their work the Preliminary Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittees as a preliminary step toward the holding of a General Arab Conference.

3. CONSOLIDATION OF THESE TIES IN THE FUTURE

the woes which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and denominations.

B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the Arab Governments and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard the lands of the Arabs of Palestine shall be referred to the committee of financial and economic affairs to examine it from all its angles and to submit the result of that examination to the Preliminary Committee in its next meeting.

In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I University at Alexandria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944).

APPENDIX 4

LETTER FROM YUSUF YĀSĪN OF SAUDI ARABIA, WRITTEN TO H. E. AHMAD MAHIR PASHA,
REGARDING THE APPROVAL OF SAUDI ARABIA TO THE PROTOCOL OF ALEXANDRIA.⁸³

Date 19 Muharram 1364 (3 January 1945)

His Excellency Doctor Ahmad Māhir Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt and Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the General Arab Conference: Greetings—Your Excellency knows that when I was in the Preparatory Committee of the Arab Conference in its last meeting in Alexandria, representing the Saudi Arabian Government, I did not sign the Protocol which was signed by the representatives of the governments of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq and Lebanon. I postponed signing it until that Protocol has been studied by the Saudi Arabian Government.

The Saudi Arabian Government was, and still is one of those that desire to unite the Arabs and would like to see the Arab States consolidated and in agreement on principles and foundations that would lead the Arab Nation to its goal. It has therefore charged me to expound these principles in order to be taken into consideration and appreciation during the activities of the Committees and in preparing for the meeting of the conference. The Saudi Arabian Government believes that in considering these principles it serves the common purpose of the Arab States and

83. The League of Arab States, The Minutes of the Sessions of the Political Branch Committee for Drawing up a Draft Pact of the League of Arab States, pp. 17-18.

helps to realize the aspirations of our entire nation. These principles are the following:

(1) A pact should be signed among the Arab States which would aim at their mutual responsibility and cooperation for the safety of each one of them and the safety of all of them and which would guarantee good neighborliness among them. Saudi Arabian Kingdom, the Iraqi and Yemeni Kingdoms, have had successful steps in this respect.

(2) It is understood that any Arab State is entitled to conclude directly agreements for its safety with any other Arab State without prejudicing any one of them, which would guarantee good neighborliness and fraternal cooperation.

(3) The mutual alliance and cooperation of the Arabs is not directed to any hostile end toward any nation or state or group of states but it is an instrument for self defense and for the establishment and maintenance of peace and for supporting the principles of justice and freedom for all.

(4) War is prohibited among the Arab states, and any dispute that would arise between two parties in the Arab group in any matter or failure on the part of one party to execute its obligations toward an Arab government in the pact, should be solved by peaceful means and mediation or by arbitration in accordance with the rules of justice that should prevail between brothers when solving disputes and for the execution of obligations. If one of the parties refuses to accept arbitration or to yield to the decision the Arab States should advise him what is proper, if it continues its aggression and hostilities, the Arab States shall decide after consultation what is appropriate to stop the aggression and

establish justice in the field of the Arab Nation.

(5) In order to avoid problems between the Arab States it must be understood from the outset that the system of government in Syria and Lebanon as republics should continue as well as it should be understood that their full independence is agreed upon.

(6) The effort to unify education and legislation among the Arab States and in the field of the entire Arab Nation is a favorable action, however the conditions of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and the existence of the holy places in it, gives it a special status so it will refuse to execute any principle in education or legislation that is contrary to the rules and basic concepts of the Islamic religion.

(7) The Arab States shall cooperate in facilitating their commercial dealings and in strengthening their economies being one nation and having a common interest. However, this cooperation shall not deprive any one of them of its freedom in the financial and economic administration of its country within the borders of its state, with full authority as to what its conditions and special interests call for.

These are the bases which the Saudi Arabian Government considers suitable for the consolidation of the Arabs and for facilitating the arrival at this supreme goal. In my capacity as a member of the Preparatory Committee representing my government I agree on the Protocol signed in Alexandria on 20 Shawwāl 1363 (7 October 1944).

I have no doubt, knowing the spirit of keenness which Your Excellency has for the welfare of the Arab Nation, that these bases which I mentioned shall meet with your support in the committees studying this problem that concerns all Arabs.

[Salutations]

Yūsuf Yāsīn

APPENDIX 5

PROPOSED PACT OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES SUBMITTED BY IRAQ⁸⁴

The Pact of the League of Arab States

In execution of the Protocol signed in Alexandria on Saturday 20 Shawwāl 1363, (7 October 1944) by the representatives of each of the states of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon and which provided for strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States and the support and stabilization of these ties and directing them to the welfare of all the Arab countries, the betterment of their conditions, the securing of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes, and that is in response to the public Arab opinion in all of the Arab countries, the authorized representatives, signatories to this, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

A league for the Arab States is formed from the states signing this pact, and from the other independent Arab States which accept to join the League by a declaration which will be deposited with the permanent Secretariat and reported to all member states of the League.

Article 2

The function of the League is to strengthen the existing links

84. Ibid., pp. 19-21.

among the Arab States, to coordinate their political plans, for the realization of cooperation among them, safeguard their independence and sovereignty from any aggression by all possible means, and to look in a general way into the affairs and interest of the Arab countries.

Article 3

The League shall have a council which will look after the realization of its purposes. This council shall be formed from the representatives of the Arab States that are members of the League. It will not be possible for any one state to have more than three representatives and each state shall have one vote regardless of the number of representatives. The council shall elect in the first meeting of each year a president from among the representatives of the Arab States, the appendix to this pact shall appoint the first president to the council.

Article 4

The Council of the League shall hold its ordinary meetings four times a year at the request of the president in one of the capitals of the Arab countries, at the end of each meeting the council shall appoint the capital for its next meeting. The appendix to this pact will show the first capital in which the council will meet. The council shall hold its extraordinary meetings, if this is requested, by at least two member states of the League. The Council shall draw up byelaws for its works.

Article 5

The council of the League shall guarantee the execution of the agreements concluded by the member states of the League with each other. Its decisions will be binding on those that accept them, except in the case where this pact stipulates that they should be binding on all.

Article 6

The League shall have a permanent Secretariat whose headquarters shall be (_____) it shall be composed of a Secretary General, two assistant secretaries and an adequate number of officials. The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary General who will also be secretary to the Council. The appendix to this pact will appoint the first Secretary General for the League. The council of the League will appoint an assistant Secretary General from each of the member states of the League nominated by his government. The Secretary General will appoint the necessary officials to carry out the works of the League. The council of the League will draw up byelaws for the works of the secretariat and the personnel.

Article 7

The Secretary General shall draw up each year the draft of the budget of the League and its permanent committees and shall submit this draft to the council of the League for approval. The budget of each year will fix the share of each member state of the League in the expenses.

Article 8

The members of the council of the League as well as the officials of its Secretariat and the members of its committees shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity during the performance of their duties. The Secretary General will have the rank of an ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary. The buildings occupied by the institutions, members and officials of the League shall be inviolable.

Article 9

Each of the member states of the League shall undertake to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the other states. If foreign aggression or a threat of aggression occurs against the safety, independence or sovereignty of a member state of the League any member state of the League may ask the president to call the council of the League for an immediate meeting of the League, and the council of the League will take unanimously the necessary measures to repulse that aggression and advise the member states of the League to execute them.

Article 10

The member states of the League shall exchange military missions on a basis decided by the Council of the League. The Council after taking the opinion of military experts shall draw up the plans and projects that will guarantee as much as possible the unification of the regulations and weapons among the Land, Air and Naval Forces belonging to the member states of the League and shall submit these plans and projects to the states for approval and execution.

Article 11

The member states of the League undertake not to adopt, in foreign countries, a position which may be contradictory to this pact. They may not, under any circumstances, adopt a foreign policy which may prejudice the policy of the League or the policy of any member state. They shall act as much as possible to unify their trends in foreign policy through organized consultations. Any member state which does not have a representative in any foreign country shall charge any other member state of the League with representing it in that country.

Article 12

In the event of a dispute between two or more member states of the League, and if this dispute cannot be settled through diplomatic negotiations, they shall present the whole matter under dispute for arbitration by the League. The two disputing parties shall agree on the mediation of one of the states, or the council of the League, or any organization or person, agreed upon by the two parties. If agreement is not reached the matter under dispute should necessarily be submitted to the International Court of Justice or to any organization competent to solve international disputes. The disputing states may not under any circumstances, resort to the use of force, the threat of using force, or to any other means of pressure.

Article 13

The Council of the League shall draw up a project of an Arab Court of Justice, which will have binding decisions. This project shall be submitted to the member states for approval.

Article 14

In the event of a dispute between one of the member states and a foreign state, the Council of the League, at the request of any Arab or foreign state, as well as on its own accord, may present its mediation for the settlement of the dispute. In the event that the mediation is not successful the Council shall take unanimously measures which would guarantee the safety of the Arab State in dispute and shall advise the member states of the League to execute these measures.

Article 15

The Council of the League shall establish permanent committees

for the following affairs:

1. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial exchange, customs, currency, and agricultural and industrial matters.
2. Communications including railways, roads, aviation, navigation and posts and telegraph.
3. Cultural and Legislation affairs.
4. Affairs of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements, and extradition of criminals and the like.
5. Social affairs.
6. Health affairs.

The Council of the League may establish other permanent committees for affairs other than those mentioned above.

Article 16

Each of the committees mentioned in the preceding article shall be composed of a chairman appointed by the Council of the League for a period of three years, and of a representative from each member state nominated by his government and appointed by the Council of the League. The committee, in performing its duties, shall seek the help of any specialist that it may deem necessary. They shall hold general Arab conferences to discuss matters under its jurisdiction, and shall help the technical bodies in holding these conferences. The Council of the League shall draw up byelaws for the operation of the permanent committees.

Article 17

The permanent committees shall present its proposals to the Council of the League for approval. If they are approved by the council each government of the member states of the League must present it to the

competent national authority for approval, and this approval shall not be binding to the state unless similiar approvals are issued by the competent authorities of the other states.

Article 18

Any member state of the League may conclude with any other member state, or other states, special agreements which do not contradict the provisions or the spirit of this pact.

Article 19

All member states of the League must register with the Secretariat all treaties and agreements concluded, or which will be concluded, with another member state, or any other state.

Article 20

This pact may not be modified except by agreement of all the states that accepted its provisions. In the event of a dispute in interpreting one of its provisions, the interpretation that is agreed upon unanimously by the Council of the League shall be binding. The Council of the League, by a majority vote, may refer the provisions of this pact to the Arab Court of Justice for interpretation.

Appendix

The first president of the Council of the League is _____.

The first place where the Council will meet is _____.

The first Secretary of the League is _____.

APPENDIX 6

PROPOSED PACT OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES SUBMITTED BY LEBANON⁸⁵

The Pact of the League of Arab States

The Arab States represented by _____ for _____.

In execution of the Alexandria Protocol, signed on 7 October 1944; and upon deliberating on the preliminary actions, the Pact of the League of Arab States shall be as follows:

Article 1

The League of Arab States shall be composed of the independent Arab States signing this pact and of the other independent Arab States which the Council of the League may decide to accept. The Council shall decide on an application for membership within six months from the date that it is presented.

Article 2

The League of Arab States shall be considered as a permanent conference for the Arab States, which aims at carrying out special functions defined in this pact. This League shall not have an international personality independent from the governments represented in its Council. Each member state shall maintain its full rights of sovereignty

85. Ibid., pp. 22-24.

and independence whether in the interior or abroad.

Article 3

The Council of the League of Arab States shall be composed of the representatives of the states participating in the League. They shall be represented in it on an equal footing. Each one of them shall have one vote regardless of the number of the representatives.

Article 4

The permanent headquarters of the Council of the League is Egypt. It may meet during Summer in Lebanon and in any other place decided upon by the Council of the League.

Article 5

The Council shall hold an ordinary session every six months and extraordinary sessions whenever the League calls for them at the request of two of the states of the League. The first ordinary session shall begin on 15 January and end on 15 February, the second shall begin on 15 August and end on 15 September.

Article 6

The Council shall meet for the first time at the invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government. It shall lay down its byelaws. It shall meet thereafter at the invitation of the Secretary General.

Article 7

There shall be established in the Council a permanent Secretariat: the permanent Secretariat shall be composed of, a Secretary General appointed by the Council, and officials appointed by the Secretary General who shall define their duties, the order of their rank and their salaries, with the agreement of the Council. The expenses of the Council

shall be borne by the states in proportional shares as fixed by the League.

Article 8

The Council shall elect by a majority a president for each session, who shall preside over the meetings.

Article 9

The members of the Council and the officials assigned by the Council, as well as the members of the committees, shall enjoy diplomatic immunity and all privileges granted to political representatives. This immunity will include the buildings reserved for the meetings of the Council and the places pertaining thereto.

Article 10

The function of the League:

1. Consultation and support for the welfare, independence, sovereignty in the interior and abroad, and the safety of the boundaries of each member state of the League. In the event of aggression against one of the member states or fear of aggression, the Council shall decide to adopt all possible means to repulse that aggression, and shall advise each state to execute them in accordance with its established laws.

The state against which an act of aggression is made shall evaluate the facts and decide whether they constitute an actual act of aggression or threat of aggression.

2. Observance of execution of agreements concluded by the states of the League, with each other, while preserving the provisions of Article 2 of this pact.

3. Strengthening the relations among the states and promoting

mutual understanding in political matters for the realization of cooperation in the matters mentioned in this pact.

4. Be concerned in general in the common interest of the Arab countries.

Article 11

The decisions of the Council shall be adopted unanimously by the states signing the pact, and by secret ballot, unless otherwise expressly stipulated in this pact. They may be adopted by a majority; however, in this case they shall not be binding except on those that accept them.

Article 12

Resort to force is not permissible to settle disputes between member states. In the event of a dispute it shall be solved by the ordinary diplomatic means, or by the mediation of the Council of the League, or by arbitration if agreed upon by the legislative authorities in accordance with the constitutional laws in force in each state. Arbitration shall take place in accordance with the rules mentioned in the special byelaws appended to this pact. However, arbitration may not be resorted to in the following matters:

1. In disputes relating to the sovereignty, independence, and boundaries of the states.
2. Disputes involving the interests of a state not participating in the League.
3. Disputes which must be settled by national judicial authorities.

Article 13

Each state shall have the absolute right to conclude agreements with any member state or any other state, especially if that state is a

member of any league or any other international organization, on condition that this action is not hostile to any state signing this pact. The treaties and agreements which any member state of the League may conclude with any other state shall not be binding on the rest of the member states. Furthermore the treaties and agreements that have been concluded, by a member state, prior to the date of this pact shall not be binding on the other member states.

Article 14

The Council shall mediate in disputes that might lead to war among member states, or between a member state and a non-member state.

Article 15

The Arab States participating in the League shall cooperate closely in the affairs mentioned below, in accordance with the principles of this pact and the rules mentioned in the annexes hereto, or in accordance with special agreements that may be concluded later in conformity with the constitutional rules in force within each contracting state:

1. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial exchange, customs, currency and agricultural and industrial matters.
2. Communications including railways, roads, aviation, navigation and posts and telegraphs.
3. Cultural affairs.
4. Affairs of nationality, passports, visas, execution judgements and extradition of criminals.
5. Social affairs.
6. Health affairs.

Article 16

In the event that one of the member states sees that it is in its best interests to withdraw from the League, it shall have the right to do so, provided it informs the Council of the League of its intention to withdraw six months prior to its withdrawal. Any state which does not carry out the obligations of this pact shall be expelled from the League.

Article 17

This pact may be amended by a majority of two thirds of the votes of the states of the League, however the state which does not accept the modification shall have the right to withdraw as soon as that amendment is put into effect, without being required to give the notice prescribed in this pact.

Article 18

This pact has been drawn up in the Arabic language and signed by the High Contracting Parties, each receiving a copy. This pact and the annexes shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective laws. The documents of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of His Majesty the King of Egypt and the pact shall become effective for each one of them upon the deposit of these documents.

Drawn up in _____ on _____.

[Then follows an annex of 19 articles regarding the rules of arbitration of disputes between member states, which ultimately were not adopted.]

APPENDIX 7

PROPOSED PACT OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AS DRAWN UP BY THE POLITICAL
BRANCH COMMITTEE⁸⁶

Draft of Pact for the League of Arab States

In execution of the Alexandria Protocol, dated Saturday, 20 Shawwāl 1363 (7 October 1944) by the representatives of each of the states of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon and which provided for strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States and the support and stabilization of these ties and directing them to the welfare of all the Arab countries, the betterment of their conditions, the securing of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes, and that is in response to the public Arab opinion in all of the Arab countries with the respect of the independence and sovereignty of the states participating in the League.

The contracting states agreed on the following:

Article 1

The League of the Arab States shall be composed of the independent Arab States signing this pact and of the other independent Arab States which desire to join the League by a request to be deposited with the

86. Ibid., pp. 97-101.

permanent Secretariat General and which the Council of the League will decide to accept in the first meeting held after the request is presented.

Article 2

The League shall have a Council which will act for the realization of its purposes. This Council shall be composed of the representatives of the Arab States participating in the League. Each member state shall be represented and each will have but one vote irrespective of the number of the representatives.

Article 3

The task of the Council shall be to supervise the execution of the agreements concluded by these states among themselves, and to hold periodic meetings in order to strengthen the relations among them and coordinate as much as possible their political plans, for the realization of cooperation among them, and for safeguarding their independence and sovereignty against any aggression by all possible means, and to look in a general way into the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. It will also be the task of the Council to create the means of cooperation with international bodies which might be established in the future, to guarantee security and peace, and to develop economic and social relations for the general welfare.

Article 4

The Arab States participating in the League shall have close cooperation in as much as the regulations and conditions of each state permit on the following matters:

A. Economic and financial affairs including commercial exchange, customs, currency, and agricultural and industrial matters.

B. Communications which will include railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and telegraphs.

C. Cultural affairs.

D. Affairs of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements and extradition of criminals.

E. Social affairs.

F. Health affairs.

Article 5

For each of the matters listed in the preceeding article there shall be set up a special committee in which the states participating in the League shall be represented. These committees shall take charge of drawing up, and formulating the rules and extent of cooperation in the form of drafts of agreements to be presented to the Council.

Cooperation in cultural, social and health affairs may take place with the representatives of the local governments or the national bodies and organizations in all the Arab countries. The Council shall organize the manner of representing these governments or bodies or organizations in the mentioned committees in order to realize the national purpose contained in the preamble of this pact.

Article 6

Cairo shall be the permanent headquarters for the League of Arab States. The Council of the League may meet in any other place that it chooses.

Article 7

The Council of the League shall have ordinary meetings twice a year and extraordinary meetings whenever necessity demands at the request

of two of the member states. Its ordinary sessions shall be in March and October of each year.

Article 8

The League shall have a permanent Secretariat General which shall be composed of a Secretary General, assistants, and an adequate number of officials. The Council of the League shall appoint by a majority of two thirds of the member states of the League, the Secretary General who will also be the Secretary of the Council. The appendix shall indicate the appointment of the first Secretary General for the League. The Secretary General shall appoint, with the agreement of the Council, the assistants and necessary officials to carry out the operations of the League. The Council of the League shall draw up byelaws governing the Secretariat General and the personnel.

Article 9

The Secretary General shall prepare the budget of the League and present it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each fiscal year. The Council shall fix the share of expenses to be borne by each of the member states of the League and which may be reconsidered when necessary.

Article 10

Members of the Council of the League and members and officials the committees, provided for in the byelaws, shall enjoy the privileges of diplomatic immunity during the performance of their duties. The Secretary General shall have the rank of an ambassador and the assistant Secretaries General shall have the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary. The buildings and other properties occupied by the establishments of the

League shall be inviolable.

Article 11

The Council shall be held for the first time at the invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government, and thereafter at the invitation of the Secretary General. The representatives of the States of the League shall preside in turn at each session.

Article 12

In the event of aggression, by a state against the safety of a member state of the League, or if there is fear aggression, the state which is being aggressed or threatened by aggression shall alone request the Council of the League to convene immediately, and the Council shall adopt unanimously any possible means to repulse that aggression. If the aggression is made by one of the states of the League the unanimous vote shall be taken without the aggressive state.

If the aggression occurs in such a way as to make the government being aggressed unable to contact the Council, the representative of that state shall request the meeting for the purpose mentioned in the paragraph above. If the representative is unable to contact the Council of the League any member state shall have the right to request a meeting of the Council.

Article 13

It is not permissible to resort to force for the settlement of disputes between two or more member states of the League. In the event of a dispute, and the disputing parties resorting to the Council to settle the dispute, then the decision of the Council would be effective and binding. Disputes relating to the independence and sovereignty of the

state and the safety of its territory shall not be subject to arbitration. The Council shall mediate in a dispute that might lead to war between a member state of the League and other states.

Article 14

The states of the Arab League who desire for closer cooperation and stronger relations than are stipulated in this pact, shall have the right to conclude among them whatever agreements they wish to realize this cooperation. The treaties and agreements that were already concluded or that will be concluded later by a member state of the League with any other state, shall not be binding nor restricting to the other members.

Article 15

Each of the member states of the League shall respect the system government in the countries participating in the League and consider it a right of those countries and undertake not to do anything to change that system in it.

Article 16

If one of the member states of the League finds that it is in its best interests to withdraw from the League it shall have the right to do so provided it informs the Council of the League of its intention one year prior to its execution. The Council of the League shall consider any state which does not fulfill the obligations of this pact as expelled from the League by a decision issued unanimously with the exclusion of the state under consideration.

Article 17

The states participating in the League shall deposit with the Secretariat General of the Council copies of all treaties and agreements

that were concluded or will be concluded between member states of the League or with any other state.

Article 18

With the exception of the cases provided for in this pact, all decisions taken unanimously by the Council shall be binding on all the member states. Their execution in each state shall take place in accordance with its basic laws. The decisions of the Council passed by a majority vote shall be binding on those that accept them and shall be executed in each state in the manner mentioned above.

A majority vote shall be sufficient to adopt the decisions of the Council, in the following matters:

- A. Personnel.
- B. Approval of the budget of the League.
- C. Drawing up of byelaws for each of the Council, Committees and the Secretariat General.
- D. Adjournment of the sessions of the Council.

Article 19

Amendment of this pact may be made with the agreement of two thirds of the states of the League, any state which does not accept the amendment may withdraw from the League when that amendment goes into effect, without adherence to the provisions of article sixteen of this pact.

Article 20

This pact and its annexes shall be ratified in accordance with the basic laws in force in each of the contracting states, and any states which are accepted by the Council to join the League.

The ratification documents shall be deposited with the Secretariat

General of the Council, and the pact shall become effective for those that ratified it, after the expiration of 15 days from the date of the receipt by the Secretary General of the ratified documents from four states.

Article 21

This pact has been drawn up in the Arabic Language in Cairo, on _____ in one copy to be kept by the Secretariat General of the Council and a true copy shall be delivered to each member state of the League.

Article 22

Until the Secretariat General of the League is established the Foreign Ministry of the Egyptian Government shall assume the functions referred to in Articles 20 and 21.

Annex number 1

In accordance with the provisions of the Alexandria Protocol, in connection with the special position of Palestine as viewed by the Arab States about its problem being tied with peace and settlement in the Arab World.

And in accordance with Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations mentioned in the Versailles treaty of 1919 which recognized the independence of the Arab countries separated from the Ottoman State, and whereas Palestine is among the countries whose independence is recognized in the mentioned covenant, whereby it acquired a legal right for independence, and whereas the preparatory committee took on 1 October 1944 a unanimous decision to have the representative of the Arabs of Palestine

participate in the meetings and works, the branch committee has decided to request from the preparatory committee the recognition of the right of Palestine to participate in the League of independent Arab States established on an equal footing.

Whereas Palestine for compelling reasons, has not until now, exercised its rights of independence recognized while recognition of this right is still standing from the legal aspect and has not undergone any change, therefore the committee suggests that the Council of the League shall take charge of the matter of selecting an Arab representative from Palestine to represent it in the Council of the League until this country will enjoy the exercise of its independence.

Annex Number 2

Special Decisions for the Arab Countries

Whereas the Alexandria Protocol has provided that among the functions of the League is to look into the general interests of the Arab Countries and whereas this end cannot be realized except through cooperation with all those countries, in all affairs by all possible means, the Branch Committee suggests that the Preparatory Committee draw up an annex special to the pact of the League embodying the bases of cooperation and enabling its Council to fulfill its mentioned mission.

APPENDIX 8

PACT OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES⁸⁷

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC;

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF TRANS-JORDAN;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA;

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE YEMEN;

Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States;

And anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes;

And responding to the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab lands;

Have agreed to conclude a Pact to that end and have appointed as

87. The Arab Information Center, Basic Documents of the League of Arab States, pp. 9-16. Although the transliteration does not conform to the system that the author has been using, it has been left unchanged from the English version translated by the Arab Information Center, New York.

their representatives the persons whose names are listed hereinafter:

The President of the Syrian Republic; who has appointed as representatives for Syria: His Excellency Faris al-Khuri, Prime Minister; His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Royal Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan; who has appointed as representatives for Trans-Jordan: His Excellency Samir al-Rafa'i Pasha, Prime Minister; His Excellency Sa'id al-Mufti Pasha, Minister of the Interior; Sulayman al-Nabulusi Bey, Secretary of the Cabinet;

His Majesty the King of Iraq; who has appointed as representatives for Iraq: His Excellency Arshal al-'Umari, Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Minister Plenipotentiary of Iraq in Washington; His Excellency Tahsin al-'Askari, Minister Plenipotentiary of Iraq in Cairo;

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia; who has appointed as representatives for Saudi Arabia: His Excellency the Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency Khayr-al-din al-Zirikli, Councillor of the Saudi Arabian Legation in Cairo;

His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic; who has appointed as representatives for Lebanon: His Excellency 'Abd-al-Hamid Karami, Prime Minister; His Excellency Yusuf Salim, Minister Plenipotentiary of Lebanon in Cairo;

His Majesty the King of Egypt; who appointed as representatives for Egypt: His Excellency Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha, Prime Minister; His Excellency Muhammad Husayn Haykal Pasha, President of the Senate; His Excellency 'Abu-al-Hamid Badawi Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency Makram 'Ubayd Pasha, Minister of Finance; His Excellency

Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan Pasha, Minister of Justice; His Excellency 'Abd-al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri Bey, Minister of Education; Abd-al-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, Minister Plenipotentiary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of the Yemen; who has appointed as representatives for the Yemen: His Excellency Sayed Hussein El-Kabsi.

Who, after having exchanged their plenary powers, which were found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1

The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States which have signed this Pact.

Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the League. If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will be deposited with the Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the Council at the first meeting held after submission of the request.

Article 2

The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member states; the coordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close cooperation of the member states, with due regard to the organization and circumstances of each state, on the following matters:

A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry.

B. Communications; this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs, and posts.

C. Cultural affairs.

D. Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition of criminals.

E. Social affairs.

F. Health problems.

Article 3

The League shall possess a Council composed of the representatives of the member states of the League; each state shall have a single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives.

It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of the objectives of the League and to supervise the execution of agreements which the member states have concluded on the questions enumerated in the preceding article, or on any other questions.

It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations.

Article 4

For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be set up a special committee in which the member states of the League shall be represented. These committees shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles and extent of cooperation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be presented to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to the aforesaid states.

Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the con-

ditions under which these representatives may be permitted to participate and the rules governing such representation.

Article 5

Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between two or more member states of the League is prohibited. If there should arise among them a difference which does not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory.

In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member states, or a member state and a third state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.

Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority vote.

Article 6

In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council.

The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures necessary to repulse the aggression. If the aggressor is a member state, his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.

If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state attacked finds itself unable to communicate with the Council, that state's representative in the Council shall have the right to request the convocation

of the Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council.

Article 7

Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them.

In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws.

Article 8

Each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.

Article 9

States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end.

Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future between a member state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members.

Article 10

The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is established in Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place it may designate.

Article 11

The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session twice a year, in March and in October. It shall convene in extraordinary session upon the request of two member states of the League whenever the need arises.

Article 12

The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an appropriate number of officials.

The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a majority of two-thirds of the states of the League. The Secretary-General, with the approval of the Council shall appoint the Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of the League.

The Council of the League shall establish an administrative regulation for the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters relating to the Staff.

The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first Secretary-General of the League is named in an Annex to this Pact.

Article 13

The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each fiscal year.

The Council shall fix the share of the expenses to be borne by each state of the League. This share may be reconsidered if necessary.

Article 14

The members of the Council of the League as well as the members of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in the administrative regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions.

The buildings occupied by the organs of the League shall be inviolable.

Article 15

The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government. Thereafter it shall be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the member states of the League shall alternately assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary sessions.

Article 16

Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on the following matters:

- A. Matters relating to personnel.
- B. Adoption of the budget of the League.
- C. Establishment of the administrative regulations for the Council, the committees, and the Secretariat General.
- D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions.

Article 17

Each member state of the League shall deposit with the Secretariat-General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded or to be concluded

in the future between itself and another member state of the League or a third state.

Article 18

If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such withdrawal is to go into effect.

The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to fulfill its obligations under this Pact as having become separated from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of the states, not counting the state concerned.

Article 19

This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of the states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and stronger the ties between the member states, to create an Arab Tribunal of Arbitration, and to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee security and peace.

Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session following the session in which the motion was initiated.

If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 20

This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to the basic laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the

Secretariat-General of the Council and the Pact shall become operative as regards each ratifying state fifteen days after the Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification from four states.

This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (March 22, 1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safe keeping of the Secretariat-General.

An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League.

[Here follow the signatures.]

(1) ANNEX REGARDING PALESTINE

Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had become detached from that Empire, has come to an end. She has come to be autonomous, not subordinate to any other state.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be settled by the parties concerned.

However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own affairs, the Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision for a regime based upon recognition of her independence.

Her international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could the independence of the other Arab countries.

Although the outward manifestations of this independence have remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be allowed to interfere with her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine and until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should take charge of the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work.

(2) ANNEX REGARDING COOPERATION WITH COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE

Whereas the member states of the League will have to deal in the Council as well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and affect the Arab world at large;


And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their realization;

Now therefore, it particularly behooves the states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when considering the admission of those countries to participation in the committees referred to in the Pact, that it should do its utmost to cooperate with them, and furthermore, that it should spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding of their future with all the political means at its disposal.

(3) ANNEX REGARDING THE APPOINTMENT OF A SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE

The states signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His Excellency Abd-ul-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, to be the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

This appointment is made for two years. The Council of the League shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretariat-General.



COUNCIL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

COMPOSITION: States Members Delegates.

FUNCTION: Any question within the scope of Arab interests.

VOTING: Quasi-unanimous assent in specified cases.

PROCEDURE: Regular sessions twice a year, March and September.

COMPOSITION: Ministers of Economic Affairs.

FUNCTION: Economic cooperation.

VOTING: Single majority.

PROCEDURE: Annual session the first week of September.

COMPOSITION: Foreign Affairs Ministers and Defense Ministers.

FUNCTION: Collective security.

VOTING: Majority of two-thirds.

PROCEDURE: Special sessions at the request of any member state.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE
Foreign Affairs Ministers

HEALTH COMMITTEE

ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

OIL SUB-COMMITTEE

COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE

CULTURAL COMMITTEE

LEGAL COMMITTEE

SOCIAL COMMITTEE

CONSULTATIVE MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Staff

PERMANENT MILITARY COMMISSION

Officers of the General Staff

Military Inspector

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

The Permanent Secretariat of the League consists of a Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretaries and a permanent Staff of about 120, including members of all member states.

It comprises the following Departments: Political, Economic, Legal, Cultural, Press and Publicity, Administrative and Financial Affairs, Social, Technical Affairs, Communications, etc.

The Secretariat is located in Cairo.

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ARAB INFORMATION CENTERS
New York City

AWIC
Washington Branch

AIC
Chicago Branch

AIF
San Francisco Branch

ARAB INFORMATION CENTER
Ottawa, Canada

PERMANENT BELGIUM
Geneva, Switzerland

ARAB INFORMATION OFFICE
Paris, West Germany

ARAB INFORMATION OFFICE
Buenos Aires, Argentina

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